Poetics at the interface : patterns of thought and protocols of reading in Pynchon scholarship by Björninen, Samuli
   
Poetics at the Interface 
Patterns of Thought and Protocols of Reading in Pynchon 
Scholarship 
Samuli Björninen 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin Originality Check service in 
accordance with the quality management system of the University of Tampere. 
 
 
 Tampereen yliopisto 
Viestintätieteiden tiedekunta 
 
BJÖRNINEN, Samuli:  Poetics at the Interface. Patterns of Thought and Protocols of Reading in 
Pynchon Scholarship 
 
Lisensiaatintutkielma, 199 s. 
Yleinen kirjallisuustiede 
Heinäkuu 2017 
 
 
Tutkielma käsittelee poetiikan, lukemisen teorioiden ja yhden kirjailijan tuotantoa tulkitsevan tutkimuksen 
suhdetta. Lähestyn aihetta yhdysvaltalaisen Thomas Pynchonin ja tämän romaaneita käsittelevän 
runsaslukuisen tutkimuskirjallisuuden kautta. Tutkimusongelmani on kirjailijan teosten 
kirjallisuustieteellisten tulkintojen rooli yleistettävien poetiikan periaatteiden ymmärtämisessä. Työssä 
määrittelen poetiikan Jonathan Cullerin, kirjallisuusfenomenologien ja reader-response -teoreetikkojen 
oppien pohjalta lukemisen teoriaksi. Näin ymmärrettynä poetiikka tutkii kirjallisen tekstin tulkinnan ja 
analyysin taustalla vaikuttavia havainnon, ymmärtämisen ja kognition prosesseja. Tästä näkökulmasta 
katsoen poetiikka on niin kognitiivisen kirjallisuudentutkimuksen, lukuprosessin empiirisen tutkimuksen 
kuin myös jälkiklassisen narratologian keskustelukumppani. 
Tutkimukseni tarkentaa vuoroin poetiikan teorioihin lukemisen proseduureista, vuoroin Pynchon-luentoihin, 
joiden analyyttisia valintoja voidaan kuvata lukemiseen tarkentavan poetiikan avulla. Oma analyysini pyrkii 
hienosyiseen mutta tulkinnan taiteen herkkyyttä kunnioittavaan erittelyyn Pynchon-tulkintojen 
tunnistettavista piirteistä. Menetelmäni vastaa seuraavanlaisiin kysymyksiin: Jos Pynchonin romaanien 
mittasuhteita ja tematiikkaa voi pitää suorastaan ensyklopedisena, miksi tutkimuksessa niin usein keskitytään 
samoihin teemoihin ja tekstuaalisiin piirteisiin? Mikä tekee tietyistä avainkohdista ohittamattomia tulkinnan 
kannalta? Miksi kompleksisesti rakentuneen ja idiosynkraattisen tulkinnan ero on lopultakin melko selvä? 
Vastauksia hakiessaan tutkielma etsii jalansijaa lukemisen konventioiden ja tekstin kognitiivisen 
prosessoinnin väliltä. Työn teoriaosassa eritellään lukuproseduureja ja tulkinallisia malleja ja huomataan, että 
rakenteelliset metaforat, miniatyyrianalogiat ja tematisoivat lukutavat ylittävät tämän kuilun. Kaikkien 
näiden lukutapojen teoretisoinnissa vedotaan kirjallisiin konventioihin tai traditioon, mutta samalla niiden 
nähdään kytkeytyvän erottamattomasti kognition ja havainnon prosesseihin. Työn analyysiosassa tutkitaan 
Pynchonin esikoisromaani V.:n (1963) tulkintoja näiden proseduurien käyttöä tarkastellen. Analyysissa 
korostetaan myös tekstin sekventiaalisen prosessoinnin sekä narratologian kuvaamien kertomuksen äänten ja 
puhuja- tai kertojapositioiden vaikutusta siihen, miten edellä mainitut lukemisen proseduurit toimivat. Työn 
eräänlaisena mottona toimii kirjallisuudentutkija Robert Scholesin ajatus, että lukemisen protokollat voidaan 
ymmärtää menetelmällisesti vain tiettyyn pisteeseen asti. Työ lähestyy tätä pistettä suunasta, jossa 
kirjallisuudentutkimuksen lukuproseduurit alavat sekoittua yleisempiin tulkinnan ja havainnon prosesseihin. 
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PART I: AT THE INTERFACE 
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1. Pynchon and Poetics 
 
 
 
In this sort of book, there is no total to arrive at. Nothing makes any waking 
sense. But it makes a powerful, deeply disturbing dream sense. Nothing in 
the book seems to have been thrown in arbitrarily, merely to confuse […]. 
Pynchon appears to be indulging in the fine, pre-Freudian luxury of dreams 
dreamt for the dreaming. (“A Myth of Alligators.”) 
 
 
 
Thomas Pynchon’s reputation as a difficult writer was established early on after his confounding 
debut V. came out in 1963 when the author was 26 years old. The Time magazine review of V. cited 
in the epigraph can stand in for quite few contemporary responses. Pynchon’s challenge was also 
taken on in the academia, even though he only became one of America’s most extensively studied 
post-war novelists in the wake of Gravity’s Rainbow (1973). Even in the present state of affairs, 
marked by an abundance of scholarly interpretations, whole databases of annotations, and a stock of 
culturally transmitted fore-knowledge about Pynchon, the experience of reading one of his novels 
retains its aura of inexplicability. 
 
Recording one’s early encounter with Pynchon’s work has become a veritable convention in scholarly 
discourse, and one which I would gladly reiterate. Yet I have had the curious pleasure of finding this 
encounter phrased to perfection by others. I first read Pynchon’s V. as an undergraduate, and while 
reading it I remember feeling constantly at loss about what it was really about and how it was to be 
understood, but it permanently changed my perception of novels. This is very much my experience, 
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but it almost doubles as a free translation of lines found in the M.A. thesis of a Finnish Pynchon-
pioneer Tiina Käkelä-Puumala (1994). In comparison, consider the following anecdote beginning a 
recent book by an international one, David Cowart (2011): 
 
I read my first Pynchon novel in Ethiopia, in quarters that lacked electricity and indoor plumbing (actually, 
there was no outdoor plumbing either). When the daylight faded, I read on by Coleman lantern. […] A solitary 
American in the Horn of Africa, I read a lot, half-systematically filling gaps in a haphazard undergraduate 
education. I did not understand Pynchon’s V., but it transported me. Reading it became a turning point in my 
intellectual life. (Cowart 2011, SIVU.) 
 
While this anecdote, and others of its kind, represents someone else’s experience, it is certainly 
representative of mine as well. It is easy to recognize “one of the most persistent encounters of [one’s] 
intellectual life,” to borrow Thomas Hill Schaub’s phrase, but difficult to get into particulars about 
the processes actually undergone in reading (see Schaub 1981, ix).1 The descriptions of first 
encounters with Pynchon also show traces of what I find one of the most characteristic as well as 
elusive features of the vast field of writing on and around Pynchon, something best described as a 
sense of déja lu: explications of the difficulty of reading Pynchon – whether terse and anecdotal or 
book-long and erudite – ring strikingly similar. 
 
The broad aim of this thesis is to show how study of poetics may help us come to terms with 
similarities in readings of extremely complex novels. The task is undertaken, on one hand, by reading 
Pynchon’s novels, with a special place reserved for his novelistic debut, V. (1963), and on the other, 
reading Pynchon scholars, with a special focus on those who somehow engage with the notion of 
“Pynchon’s poetics.” My reason for considering Pynchon an exceptionally appropriate writer for this 
purpose is precisely the curious imbalance one finds between the shared critical understanding of his 
texts and the writings they have inspired. His novels are famous for their impenetrable language, 
interpretative indeterminacy, and innumerability of discourses, all of which can be seen as aspects of 
his poetics. Yet delving into scholarly and other writings on Pynchon, as diverse as they are, reveals 
a wealth of canonized readings and stock responses. In both academic and non-academic responses 
to his novels, and especially to their difficulty, we encounter far less indeterminacy and divergence 
than the reputation of the novels warrants. Commentators are continually held back and baffled by 
the same “key passages” and interpretive dilemmas. Reading, even when it is by consensus deemed 
                                                          
1 There are, however, a few descriptions of reading of Gravity’s Rainbow (for the first, second, even third time): 
McHoul And Wills 1990, 23–33; Leverenz 1976. 
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nearly impossible, seems prone to produce a consensus quite regularly. If Pynchon’s texts are so 
labyrinthine and centrifugal, why all the convergence? 
 
The present work aims to revisit the idea that study of poetics might be most fruitfully understood as 
a theory of reading. This idea of poetics provides a stage on which my own readings can enter into a 
fruitful dialogue with individual responses found in Pynchon studies. Yet more importantly, this 
theoretical context is one that allows us to discuss the conditions and restrictions under which existing 
studies can be used as a kind of documentation of ways of reading Pynchon, as well as one that allows 
for a negotiation of the extent of generalizability of protocols of reading.2 Poetics as a theory of 
reading allows one to dwell on the questions arising from the marvelously heterodox field of Pynchon 
studies which is however more and more coming to be defined by its “will to community” (Berressem 
2012, 173). 
 
This chapter is intended as a general introduction to the discussions taken on in this thesis. It will 
organize the research questions into a field of inquiry and contextualize them theoretically. Chapter 
1.1. discusses some prominent threads in Pynchon Studies, which is one of the two primary contexts 
to my thesis. The brief introduction to Pynchon Studies focuses on two aspects in particular. Firstly, 
early Pynchon Studies, as well as some of the more recent work, often conceptualize their discussions 
of Pynchon’s literary “ideas”3 – the concepts, themes and metaphors in the novels – as a search for 
“Pynchon’s theory.” There is a whole continuum of work that partially fits this description. Many 
ideas falling in with this loose grouping play a major role in the novels and have had a long-standing 
effect on Pynchon studies. The second law of thermodynamics, for instance, has remained a talking 
point for almost five decades.4 Likewise, the epistemological incongruence between two ways of 
interpreting statistical data, embodied by Roger Mexico and Dr. Edward Pointsman in Gravity’s 
Rainbow, keeps coming up from one decade to the next. Few ideas in Pynchon, or Pynchon studies 
for that matter, have proved as influential to the self-reflexive rhetoric of the scholarly enterprise as 
the epistemological gulf of Mexico-Pointsman.5 
                                                          
2 The phrase is found in Jacques Derrida’s Positions: “[R]eading is transformational. […] But this transformation cannot 
be executed however one wishes. It requires protocols of reading.” (Derrida 1981, 63.) It is later picked up by 
Robert Scholes, whose book Protocols of Reading (1989) is an inspired attempt to discuss our reading protocols in 
such a way that gives the creative and idiosyncratic art of reading its due.  
3 Probably the best early systematic treatment of the vague-sounding “Pynchon’s ideas” can be found in Schaub (1981; 
see also Cooper 1983). 
4 See e.g. Mangel 1976; Palmeri 1989; cf. Eve 2011; Letzler 2015. For a more comprehensive view on the scope of 
studies on entropy see the bibliography of secondary materials on Vheissu web page, where search term “entropy” 
scores 60 hits: http://www.vheissu.net/biblio/. 
5 George Levine (1976) comments on the shadow Pynchon’s ideas cast on the enterprise of systematic study: “A critic 
of Pynchon needs to consider whether he isn't Ned Pointsman to Pynchon's Roger Mexico” (10). The idea of the 
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Secondly, at the other end of the spectrum, there are studies that aim to show that the views expressed 
in Pynchon’s novels are consonant with an existing theoretical frame or philosophy. Sascha Pöhlmann 
has recently referred to this branch as “that tradition of Pynchon criticism that dwells extensively on 
scientific and philosophical concepts in order to elucidate the texts that are fundamentally informed 
by them” (2012). The diversity among these concepts is striking, however. Pynchon’s work has been 
put to dialogue with a myriad approaches and theories. Some of these are not even extensively 
thematized in the novels. One can find discussions of Pynchon drawing from quantum mechanics, 
post-structuralism, Peircean pragmatics, or phenomenology, for example.6 
 
The approaches above are examples of ways in which Pynchon Studies have pursued Pynchon’s 
“poetics” – although this is poetics in a very specific sense. The sense is roughly Bakhtinian: the 
Russian scholar saw poetics as the author’s “artistic visualization of the world, the principle behind 
his artistic structuring of a verbal whole, the novel” (1984, 11, emphasis original). The first 
approaches, seeking “Pynchon’s theory,” largely make do with ideas talked about in the novels, while 
the second appeal to more implicit thematization of theoretical ideas, often based on the seeming 
resonance they have within the novels. There are also other partially related senses in which studies 
pursue Pynchon’s poetics. For example, Pynchon’s works have been studied in the context of literary 
genres or movements. These studies have variably cast Pynchon’s work as Postmodernist fiction, 
historiographic metafiction, Menippean satire, metahistorical romance, mythography, or 
encyclopedia.7 Some of these approaches are discussed at length below. 
 
Poetics, provisionally without epithets, is the other primary context for the present study and requires 
more elaboration. If this chapter is named vaguely “Pynchon and Poetics,” it is for the reason that the 
relationship between a literary oeuvre or work and poetics remains at this stage indefinite. The task 
of working towards definitions is taken on in chapter 1.2. Today, there may be no need for overt 
anxiety about the history of poetics as a “science of literature.” The erstwhile science of literature has 
outlived each of the scientific pretensions it has taken on. Yet undoubtedly, poetics in the guise of 
one among the myriad “approaches” to literature, now has a position in literary studies that can at 
                                                          
Pavlovian Pointsman representing, and warning against, the systematizing, totalizing attempts to contain Pynchon’s 
art within a scientific framework has had a lasting effect on Pynchon studies. 
6 Quantum mechanics: Friedman (1983), Savvas (2011); post-structuralism: Berressem (1993), McHoul and Wills 
(1990), Mattessich (2002); Peircean pragmatics: Amian (2008); Phenomenology: Sigvardson (2002). 
7 Postmodernist fiction: Mchale (1987); historiographic metafiction: Hutcheon (1988); Menippean satire: Kharpertian 
(1990); metahistorical romance: Elias (2001); mythography: Hume (1987); encyclopedia: Mendelson (1976). 
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best be called marginal. As Monika Fludernik puts it, the current literary theory is marked by 
eclecticism, and approaches are used strategically towards specific needs of the research, without 
imposition of superordinate frameworks. Where “poetics” is used, it is in reference to an open system 
that reacts to locally arising questions. (Fludernik 2010, 924-925; cf. Pier 2012). 
 
Also, the notion that interpretation, the hermeneutic process aiming at finding meanings of texts and 
understanding them, plays a part in development of poetics is no longer as controversial as it once 
was (cf. Seamon 1989). Even the harshest critics of interpretative criticism now remark that the study 
of literature as a system never precluded interpretation – although an interdiction of sorts was 
momentarily in place (Culler 1981; cf. Seamon 1989; Henkel 1990). The same critics now say that 
structuralism and the systematic endeavor of theorizing discursive practices “enabled the remarkable 
exfoliation of critical possibilities, which became ‘approaches’ to interpretation” (Culler 2010, 907). 
 
In the second subchapter of the introduction, I will also show how the emphasis within poetics has 
shifted between privileging or giving the dominant position either to the text or to the reader, with the 
problematic question of the author never far away. The overarching question of poetics has wandered 
from how the “text itself” works, to how literary communication works, to what happens in the 
process of reading, and back again. Poetics during the 20th Century spans a vast expanse from studies 
of how authors write, to how texts come to mean, to theories of how we read. Here I will frame poetics 
in a way that is relevant to the goals of my study. 
 
In chapter 1.3, I will argue further that in recent decades the most natural habitat to poetics in the old 
guise of “science of literature” has been in certain branches of cognitive literary studies. Yet the 
questions of how, and with what cognitive faculties and cultural competences we make sense of texts 
are very much the traditional province of poetics. However, today these questions, in the frame of 
cognitive studies, comprise the area of literary studies with strongest links to cutting-edge research in 
empirical and natural sciences. As I will show, however, the question of mind and cognition has 
figured in the study of poetics throughout the past century, and its recent ascendency not only reflects 
recent theories and discoveries about the mind, but affirms the process of seemingly eternal return in 
the study of poetics. 
 
The field of Pynchon studies has traditionally been eager to adopt technical innovation. Our times 
make no exception to this pattern. Digital humanities are rewriting the rules of studying materials 
spanning thousands of pages – such as Pynchon’s oeuvre – as well as implementing new methods to 
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study of reading. In chapter 1.4, the introduction concludes with a look into these new applications, 
and argues that taking a few lessons from the history of poetics and theory of reading might help us 
avoid adopting an overly simplistic view of the interaction between texts and reading. 
 
In these subchapters, a place for poetics will be sought in between the study of textual features and 
reflection on procedures of reading, and between institutional practices of interpretation and 
phenomenology of reception. This allows me to articulate how and in what (limited) capacity 
Pynchon studies and readings of Pynchon’s novels may be analyzed as a corpus of reading 
procedures. As the forthcoming excursions into the history of the 20th Century poetics show, there 
seems to be a periodically renewed need for the type of study that takes a step back to reflect on the 
analytical or interpretive practices afoot on the field. Rather than proposing a novel understanding of 
what studying studies or reading readings entails, the aim of this work is to revisit some of the insights 
from the previous cycle – what used to be called a systematic study of poetics, even a “science” of 
literature, and its later self-critique. 
 
 
1.1. Approaching the Pynchonian – Reading, Theorizing, Interpreting 
 
If the sampling of Pynchon Studies in this introduction needs to be deliberately narrow, a more 
comprehensive picture of the field will be assembled piecemeal throughout the work. True 
comprehensiveness is beyond the scope of this study, and perhaps these days the same goes for any 
study on Pynchon. Summaries of the field were made frequently amid the early enthusiasm, and this 
task was later taken on in the back pages of the seminal Pynchon Notes.8 In 1989 Clifford Mead 
compiled a 176-page bibliography of primary and secondary sources, and later still, the dream of the 
encyclopedic knowledge of all things Pynchonian survived in web-based environments. 
Unsurprisingly, the usefulness of communally networked databases was immediately apparent to 
Pynchon-scholars and enthusiasts.9 However, in more recent publications, such as the high-profile 
                                                          
8  Pynchon Notes was founded by John M. Krafft and Khachig Tölölyan in 1979. In addition to becoming the most 
important journal of the young field it also was the foremost pre-internet era discussion forum, a fascinating artifact 
of scholarly communality and collective effort. In the latter stages of writing this work all of the past issues of 
Pynchon Notes have been made available as an open access archive https://pynchonnotes.openlibhums.org/. As the 
successor to the earlier journal, Orbit: Writing around Pynchon (2012–) took the logical step forward and has been 
published exclusively online: http://www.pynchon.net/. 
9  The crowd-sourced annotation project of Pynchon’s novels is ongoing at http://pynchonwiki.com/, curated by Tim 
Ware. The web page “Vheissu,” recycling the name of one of the first Pynchon-portals, maintains an up-to-date 
bibliography of secondary sources: http://www.vheissu.net/biblio/alles.php. 
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Cambridge Companion to Thomas Pynchon (2012), the selected bibliographies are conspicuously 
avoiding any claims to comprehensiveness. 
 
The prospect of Pynchon becoming one of the most studied, analyzed, and interpreted authors of his 
time was not inconceivable at the time of the publication of V. in 1963, but this prospect only became 
reality in the aftershock of the author’s third novel, Gravity's Rainbow (1973). The academic 
institution had to react to what many felt was a whole new novel, and early scholarly writing on 
Pynchon is marked by certain distinctive aspects. One of the remarkable features in early Pynchon 
studies is the eagerness with which scholars undertake studying the texts with concepts lifted out of 
the very novels they aimed to bring within the discourse of criticism. Earliest post-Gravity’s Rainbow 
writings include discussions of topics such as entropy, paranoia, and anarchism (see Levine and 
Leverenz 1976). On the other hand, the employment of concepts that seem suggestive of interpretive 
strategies was deemed a distinctly Pynchonian textual strategy. As noted above, many of these 
concepts remain widely discussed – both for their literary effects and their relevance in the cultural 
context of the novels. Their academic renewability is a point of interest in itself. This reciprocal 
movement between Pynchon’s concepts and their real-life contexts marks a whole branch of criticism. 
In this work, it is described as the “search for Pynchon’s theory.” 
 
This aspect of Pynchon studies may be juxtaposed with attempts to study Pynchon’s poetics by 
approaching them in particular theoretical contexts, such as poststructuralism, deconstruction, or 
classical and postclassical narratology. Here the movement is from theory to analysis, or from 
theoretical writings to Pynchon’s writing, and back again. These attempts, too, often emphasize the 
centrality of Pynchon’s concepts, but slightly differently. Instead of grappling with concepts 
explicitly deployed in the novels, studies invested in specific theoretical approaches make inferences 
about the theoretical impetus behind Pynchon’s texts. This approach will be discussed below under 
the heading “reading theory with Pynchon.” The juxtaposition of these two approaches is not meant 
to imply a separation of two distinct categories of coming to terms with Pynchon’s work. Rather, the 
difference is operational, and in practice it mainly manifests in how the aims and scope of study is 
spelled out. Across this analytical division, studies may share in other things, and inversely, they may 
practice their own creative idiosyncrasy regardless of their neighbors. The interpretive, explicatory 
and theoretical power of each study is not contained by anything as simple as two (or more) possible 
relations between Pynchon and theory. The distinction is made for practical purposes, and its 
usefulness will be argued for below. 
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Illustrating the repeated patterns in analyzing Pynchon requires posing a few relatively 
unsophisticated questions to scholarly works of considerable finesse. These questions concern the 
methods and practices of literary analysis. Inevitably this leads me to read Pynchon-scholarship in a 
way that in other context – significantly that of literary interpretation – might be seen as tendentious 
or symptomatic. Again, one hopes that the proof of the pudding is in putting it where the mouth is: if 
the questions posed help us understand reading Pynchon, interpreting literary texts, and writing 
academic studies, then perhaps the occasionally instrumentalizing readings of prior studies will be 
justified. Among other things, the work at hand offers an account of Pynchon’s exceptional longevity 
– and I do believe the logic is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to a great many representatives of 
Pynchon studies as well. 
 
In Search of Pynchon’s Theory 
 
What on Earth is “Pynchon’s theory?” This question more or less defines the first volume of academic 
writings on Pynchon’s work. Although the book stands as the first visible trace of the emergence of 
Pynchon studies, it would be slightly dubious to call Mindful Pleasures (Levine and Leverenz 1976) 
an attempt at formulating a theory, let alone a poetics. In fact, the book explicitly expresses its 
reservations towards the possibility and plausibility of such a task. The editors assert that the book 
will do little to produce a “settled reading” of Pynchon, and that this tentativeness is very much 
intended (3). However, those afforded the luxury of retrospection may now say that the collection 
keeps being read in precisely this capacity. It is seen as a cornerstone upon which much of the first 
post-Gravity’s Rainbow generation of scholarship builds. One of its most enduring contributions, 
however, may well be the recognition of how Pynchon’s work challenges the idea of systematic study: 
 
The very idea of a collection of essays about Pynchon violates the terms on which he presents himself to us. 
V. mocks the synthetic minds that insist on making shapes out of the meaningless variety and colourfulness 
of experience […]. A critic of Pynchon needs to consider whether he isn't Ned Pointsman to Pynchon's Roger 
Mexico, whether he isn't mistaking the occurrence of “caries” to “cabals” […]. (Levine and Leverenz 1976, 
10.) 
 
 
The same ethos is captured, in more transparent diction, by Peter L. Cooper, who remarks upon 
Pynchon’s deep ambivalence towards the human instinct to “find – or make – patterns of experience 
and then interpret them” (1983, 1). Therefore, the idea that this instinct is thematized in Pynchon’s 
novels is almost as old as the idea of studying them in the first place. 
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Two further points about this influential collection give context to this self-reflexivity, but also 
suggest how the phenomenon may transcend its immediate context. Firstly, Mindful Pleasures studies 
the novels mostly by elaborating on the concepts found in the novels themselves. It is easy to 
sympathize with Hanjo Berressem, who suggests that the early critics attempt to come to terms with 
Pynchon’s difficulty “by clarifying – to themselves as much as to the critical community – some of 
the central concepts Pynchon uses to organize his text” (2012, 169). In Mindful Pleasures the 
challenge of merely being able to read Pynchon is captured by the brilliantly unorthodox “On Trying 
to Read Gravity’s Rainbow” (Leverenz). In addition, the collection unearths the critical resources of 
paranoia (Sanders) and dehumanization (Tanner). It also establishes that the idea of entropy informs 
Pynchon’s work in such a way that it becomes an organizing principle and not just a theme (Mangel). 
It also makes a lasting contribution to genre theory via the concept of “encyclopedic novel” 
(Mendelson). No more than two years later many of the essays were responded to and reacted against 
in Edward Mendelson’s Pynchon: A Collection of Critical Essays (1978). These two collections, with 
later volumes such as Clerc’s (1983) and Bloom’s (1986), fixed several concepts or themes as staples 
of Pynchon studies: anarchy, apocalypse, decadence; information and entropy; technological progress 
and atavism. These collections also roughly span what we might call the Golden Age of Pynchon 
Studies. 
 
The second point of interest in Mindful Pleasures is that the volume seems perfectly in tune with its 
time in how it articulates a certain need for scholarly self-reflection. It was published just before De 
Man’s Allegories of Reading and the English translation of Derrida’s Writing and Difference aired 
the post-structuralist grievances about literary criticism still falling short of understanding its own 
logic and rhetoric. The early blossoming of self-reflection in Pynchon studies is often reported as lost 
in the process of academic canonization. Whether or not the assessment is sound, this loss, too, is 
prophesied in Mindful Pleasures. The anxiety felt at the consolidation of reading strategies finds a 
fitting metaphor in “routinization of charisma,” an expression in Gravity’s Rainbow which itself 
alludes to Max Weber’s writings on the gradual “disenchantment” of the modern world. In Levine 
and Leverenz’s introduction, it already becomes characteristically difficult to draw the line between 
Pynchon’s writing, his intertextual allusions, and the critical discourse of the scholars (cf. Vella 1988, 
133). If a third long-lasting influence may be attributed to Mindful Pleasures, it would be this 
blending of discourses. Although linking this exclusively to studying Pynchon might be too near-
sighted, it is evident that few authors are cited in academic prose as extensively, as informally and so 
often without attribution as Pynchon. Perhaps more than any other Anglophone author of the late 20th 
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Century, Pynchon seems to have the knack for the mot juste, which scholars find themselves resorting 
to, almost in spite of themselves. 
 
Pynchon’s concepts, therefore, start a life of their own early on in the emerging Pynchon studies. 
Levine and Leverenz already see this in an ironic light. They write: 
 
The temptation, clearly, has been irresistible to take his allusions, his dropped clues, his metaphors, and run, 
right into the ordering patterns that that welcome us to the Firm. We see V’s, or double S’s, or WASTE baskets 
and make criticism. We “do” the themes and the symbols […] (Levine and Leverenz 1976, 10). 
 
Indeed, the temptation to focus on Pynchon‘s key terms or metaphors and to base an interpretation 
on them may have proven strong, but surely this is something we could say about studying most 
authors. The distinctively Pynchonian aspect of the issue at hand is rather that in Pynchon’s texts such 
keys are found in unusual abundance. 
 
In my view, therefore, the more interesting line to pursue would be to see this temptation as something 
we should credit the works with. Certain aspects of Pynchon’s textual practice might actually make 
certain strategies of reading or interpreting seem appealing, even unavoidable. While this is close to 
what Levine and Leverenz argue, they adopt a strangely apologetic rhetoric – as if Pynchon’s 
intention (like Joyce’s before him, should we take the Dubliner for his word) had been precisely to 
throw off academics with their conventional recuperative practices, and academics were now 
declaring they were not going to abide by this pact. Rather, these thematized hermeneutics, these 
models borrowed from natural sciences and mathematics, can be seen to provide a simpler point of 
departure. Pynchon’s novels clearly have a thematic concern – seriocomic in the best literary tradition 
– with the myriad of ways of acquiring and using knowledge, with the ways of making an organized 
worldview of the chaos of phenomena and perceptions. These ways are as plural as anything in 
Pynchon’s universe and may be used as means to various ends: to understand humanity, to control 
nature, to subjugate our others, to love God’s critters, to build bombs and conquer space, to remain 
knowing of the wind and the skies. However, if the temptation to interpret the work with or through 
them is so inescapable, there must be a way to describe them theoretically within context of poetics 
– of both Pynchon’s poetics and poetics as a theory of reading. 
 
The task of theoretical description is taken on in chapter 2. It is argued, on one hand, that we need a 
distinction between the author’s topics and what is often described as Pynchon’s theory. On the other 
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hand, the concepts, metaphors, and emblems cannot be seen in isolation of their content and context 
– purely structurally, as it were. The concepts catching on in Pynchon Studies clearly transcend their 
“mere” thematicity and become metaphors and models for literary structures and reading (cf. Cooper 
1983, 154). Yet if such concepts are understood as suggesting reading strategies, it is often because 
they also are explicitly about matters of knowledge and interpretation. 
 
We might recall here Pöhlmann’s phrase on concepts which can elucidate “the texts that are 
fundamentally informed by them.” The view taken on poetics in this work would suggest that 
comments like Pöhlmann’s should be read, not only as statements about the texts or their features but 
rather as summaries of complex interpretive processes which may be described in terms of “the 
developing responses of the reader,” as Stanley Fish proposes, or in terms of conventions and 
operations by which literature produces its observable effects, as Jonathan Culler puts it (Fish 1972, 
387; Culler 1981, 52–53). It will be then suggested that the complex process of reading, recognition, 
and interpretation may be conceptualized as what is called the hermeneutic circle in certain traditions 
of philosophy.10 Section 1.2 below explores how the study of poetics negotiates its relation to 
hermeneutics before its reorientation as a theory of reading. 
 
 
Reading Theory with Pynchon 
 
In contrast to the idea of “Pynchon’s theory” discussed above, there are works that clearly state their 
intention to bring Pynchon within the sphere of certain critical discourses in order to study how the 
formerly unpursued lines of inquiry might show Pynchon in a new light. We could, for instance, draw 
a comparison between Hanjo Berressem’s post-structuralist Pynchon's Poetics: Interfacing Theory 
and Text (1993) and Samuli Hägg’s Narratologies of Gravity's Rainbow (2005). These works are 
avowedly “interfacing theory and text”, as the subtitle of Berressem’s 1993 book declares. Hägg 
points out that he might have used the same title, although both “interfacing” and “theory” would 
have meant something different (Hägg 2005, 8). Berressem takes his theory from poststructuralist 
thinkers: Lacan, Derrida and Baudrillard. Hägg, on the other hand, draws from classical and 
postclassical narratology. The two works are obviously dissimilar in their theoretical orientation, but 
they resemble each other in how they spell out their aim to study the author in the light of certain 
theory or poetics. Berressem sets out with the task of filling a gap in Pynchon studies, and finds it 
                                                          
10 See especially Heidegger 1962, 190–191; 194–195. 
12 
 
ironic “that Pynchon should be almost the last contemporary American writer to be fully incorporated 
into a poststructuralist framework” (1993, 1). Hägg, likewise, remarks on the virtual absence of 
narratological studies on Pynchon (Hägg 2005, 9). Furthermore, the two scholars share a certain fore-
conception of Pynchon's prose: both find that it anticipates, resists and parodies theoretical 
approaches to the text (Berressem 1993, 6–10; Hägg 2005, 21). 
 
Studies of Pynchon framed in this manner have seen a recent increase in numbers. One recent 
contribution has been made by Martin Paul Eve with his book Pynchon and Philosophy (2014). This 
study, too, finds in Pynchon a “hostility towards (or at least engagement with) theoretical discourses” 
and then a complication of this attitude. Eve aligns himself with earlier Pynchon studies by citing 
Berressem’s line on how Pynchon’s novels constantly undercut their previous statements – Berressem 
being of course far from the only one to suggest something like this. To Eve, it is apparent that the 
hostility towards theory is participatory and productive, and that bringing (also) philosophical 
discourses to bear on Pynchon’s novels will help us towards a better understanding of the author’s 
thinking. (Eve 2014, 3.) This is very much in accordance with the current communal spirit in Pynchon 
studies. However, like many contemporary Pynchon scholars, Eve also engages in a metatheoretical 
debate around the critical practice of discussing theory (in his case various strands of philosophy) and 
literary works side by side. He explicitly sets his method against Berressem’s, whom he singles out 
as the most significant precursor to this type of study. Whereas Berressem describes his attempts at 
reading through various post-structuralisms – Derridean, Baudrillardian, Lacanian – as multiple 
readings which are “complementary rather than exclusive,” Eve purports to work towards a single 
reading that “explicitly excludes points of incompatibility from each theorist.” This is done to avoid 
statements of there being a Wittgensteinian, a Foucauldian, and Adornian Pynchon. Eve’s focus is 
unapologetically set on how ideas from each thinker could be complementary to one another.” What 
emerges from these readings is a construct Eve is happy to call a “critical Pynchon.” (Ibid., 8–9.) 
 
In all three works mentioned above, therefore, we hear the emphasis fall differently on the idea of 
interfacing theory and text, and by all accounts the works share little theoretical ground. The 
justification for placing them side by side is not found in their similarities to each other but, rather, in 
their representativeness of an institutional branch of study – one that can, indeed, be characterized as 
interfacing theory and text, or, as I would argue, more particularly as reading theory with Pynchon. 
The distinctive quality of these studies which justifies the latter characterization is the articulated 
attempt to bring a pre-selected set of theoretical ideas to interaction with Pynchon’s texts. 
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As individual accounts of Pynchon’s poetics, the three books mentioned here find some common 
ground. Although each of them deals with different kinds of theory, poststructuralist, narratological, 
or philosophical, each of them discovers that it is (also) this particular theory that Pynchon’s work 
resists (cf. Berressem 1993, 1; Hägg 2005, 5–6; Eve 2014, 3). While Pynchon’s perceived resistance 
or engagement with theory is concretized through analyses of texts, it would be misleading to suggest 
that this outcome results from application of theory to objects of study. Rather, the assumption already 
in place is confirmed by the readings performed in each study. 
 
The assumption of my study is that something remains to be said about this process, which my study 
proposes to treat as hermeneutical. Whereas the studies discussed earlier under “Pynchon’s Theory” 
discover the concepts informing Pynchon’s texts in those very texts, the studies “reading theory with 
Pynchon” find the crucial concepts in other texts. In a sense, the difference is superficial, because in 
no way can any on Pynchon’s concepts be truly immanent to the texts alone – truly “Pynchon’s,” as 
it were. Yet it is possible to discern two different configurations of interfacing theory and text: one in 
which the texts seemingly provide the concepts by which they are fundamentally informed, and the 
other, in which the concepts are found in other (theoretical) texts, and their use is based on an assumed 
or perceived relevance of the concepts and their expected capability to elucidate the text. 
 
The studies discussed above, therefore, provide another fascinating point of entry to the discussion 
of relations between text and theory. On one hand, they exemplify the critical notion that texts may 
interact better with some theories than others, or that texts may even require or elicit certain 
approaches. Further, each of them finds in Pynchon’s writing a peculiar quality of theory-
consciousness, even though the meaning of “theory” varies significantly. The latter discovery is 
reminiscent of the one made by several scholars of the early Pynchon’s studies, namely, that 
Pynchon’s novels seem always already engaged in a cleverer-than-thou repartee with our theoretical 
approaches. However, as will be demonstrated below, the idea of Pynchon's novels anticipating 
various theoretical approaches occurs even more widely in Pynchon studies. It comes up even where 
the focus is on more particular questions of literary poetics such as those concerning genre or period. 
 
 
Pynchon’s Genre and Period, and, Does Pynchon really Know All This Theory? 
 
A large number of studies approach Pynchon's work as postmodern or postmodernist fiction. 
Pynchon’s third novel Gravity’s Rainbow is often portrayed as the paradigm case of the American 
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postmodern(ist) novel, and most studies which cast Pynchon in this role tend to give this novel a 
privileged position in the oeuvre.11 
 
Brian McHale’s influential definition of literary postmodernism in relation to conventions of high 
modernism has been found useful in Pynchon studies (see McHale 1987; 1992). McHale’s well-
known early analysis of Gravity’s Rainbow operates on this very conception of postmodernism in 
showing how the novel seems to demand various modernist reading strategies, which it then leads up 
various blind alleys. This process serves as a “de-conditioning” of the reader. (McHale 1979, 107.) 
In Molly Hite’s Ideas of Order in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon (1983) we find the same emphasis: 
Pynchon's fiction calls into question, undermines and parodies modernistic conventions. Hite links 
the term postmodernism to Pynchon’s texts because they cannot be read successfully through “our 
knowledge of established conventions, even modernist conventions.” (Hite 1983, 3–4.) At this point, 
however, we must focus beyond the modernist and postmodernist conventions themselves, on the 
recurring pattern in criticism: the play of conventions and the way Pynchon seems resistant to 
conventional reading. In Hite and McHale, the pattern is concretized in the to-and-fro switching 
between the theory of modernist and postmodernist poetics and the processing of the text in a way 
that seems to suggest that such a theory is relevant to reading and understanding Pynchon. This 
circular logic should already sound familiar to us. 
 
Similar pattern can be found in some accounts of how Pynchon typifies certain characteristics of 
periods or genres. Pynchon’s novels have been read through many generic lenses, as shown above, 
but rarely without pointing out that Pynchon tends to bring the urge of categorization itself into relief. 
Some ostensibly in-between terms have been tried on: Hutcheon’s “historiographic metafiction,” and 
Wilde’s “midfiction,” to mention but a few. Yet these studies, too, have found that Pynchon’s texts 
fail to abide by the generic pact that they first seem to necessitate (Hutcheon 1988; Wilde 1987, 75–
76). 
 
According to Hutcheon, Pynchon's fictions are “intertextually overdetermined” and “discursively 
overloaded” to the point where they both parody and enact the systematizing tendency of all 
                                                          
11 Our day and age is witnessing what must have been inconceivable before the turn of the millennium: Pynchon’s role 
as the prophet of postmodernism is being questioned in Pynchon Studies. Indications of this shift have been around 
at least since the publication of Against the Day in 2006, and rereading Pynchon’s previous novels in the shifted 
light of his later works has become a prominent thread in criticism (see e.g. Pöhlmann 2010; Rossi and Simonetti 
2015). Also, the theoretical arguments for Pynchon’s postmodernism have been revisited. (See De Bourcier 2014.) 
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discourses (Hutcheon 1988, 133). As Hutcheon points out, despite acknowledging problems of 
systematization, even postmodernist criticism cannot help but seek some system or another. She cites 
Gravity’s Rainbow as an example of a novel that is conscious of this dilemma and employs it as a 
vehicle of parody. This effect is achieved “by over-totalization, by parodies of systematization.” 
(Hutcheon 1988, 58–59.) Patricia Waugh also comments on the parodies of systematization in the 
novel: “[S]ystems compete with each other, collectively resisting assimilation to any one received 
paradigm, and thus the normal channels of data-processing.” The information is never systematized 
or structured into a coherent body of meaning or interpretation. (1984, 39.) 
 
One more illustration of how such over-totalization is discovered in Pynchon can be seen in how 
Pynchon's massive novels have been studied as “encyclopedic.” Novels like Gravity's Rainbow, 
Mason & Dixon, Against the Day, or V., seem to attach to certain domains of knowledge with an 
unusual urge to say everything about them. The encyclopedic as a generic term has been discussed 
with explicit linkage to Pynchon, postmodernism, or both, and these discussions are usually 
accompanied by reflections on the theoretical implications of the term (Mendelson 1976, Bersani 
1990, Herman and Van Ewijk 2009). 
 
The term “encyclopedic narrative” is coined by Edward Mendelson in his well-known essay. He 
classifies Gravity’s Rainbow alongside Don Quixote, Moby-Dick, and Divina Commedia, among 
others, as a work that signifies the moment in the history of a “Western national culture” when it 
“becomes fully conscious of itself as a unity, [and] produces an encyclopedic author” (Mendelson 
1976, 161)12. Given the time of writing, Mendelson was probably reacting to the Pulitzer board’s 
controversial decision not to award the prize to Gravity’s Rainbow, against the unanimous 
recommendation of the fiction jury. Subsequently the grandiose rhetoric of his essay as well as the 
idea of encyclopedic narrative has invited some criticism. The notion of the encyclopedic, however, 
caught on in Pynchon-scholarship. 
 
Luc Herman and Petrus van Ewijk (2009) revisit the view, suggesting more moderately that some 
novels may “produce the illusion that they have encyclopedic proportions and perhaps even manage 
                                                          
12 Others, including Brian McHale, do not impose such cultural singularity on Gravity’s Rainbow. McHale outlines a 
field of proto-postmodernist American “meganovels” that anticipate Pynchon’s encyclopedism (2008, 403). Ercolino 
recognizes that there have been several attempts to describe the “long, hyperabundant, hypertrophic narratives, both 
in form and content.” (See Ercolino 2014, Karl 2001, Moretti 1996, LeClair 1989.)  
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to impose some form of order on the wealth of material” (169, emphasis original). More importantly, 
and in a fashion that is reminiscent of other accounts which endow Pynchon’s work with pre-emptive 
powers over theorizing, the authors claim that Gravity’s Rainbow actually reflects and builds upon 
“an insight into its own limitations as an encyclopedic novel” (ibid.). The illusion of encyclopedic 
order hinges on the imposition of “some form of order” on the chaotic material – and this is only just 
achieved, by falling suitably short. Again, theory and perceived features of text feed back into one 
another, since only by applying the theory of encyclopedic narrative can one read the novel as 
flaunting its limitations as an encyclopedia, and the application of the theory requires a tentative idea 
of encyclopedic narrative as a relevant concept in understanding the novel as a whole. 
 
Again, the work at hand proceeds from the assumption that this dialogue of theory and text can be 
seen as a hermeneutic process. At the same time, however, the different works discussed above – 
those in various ways interfacing theory and text – form a portion of what this work approaches as 
Pynchon’s poetics. In literary poetics, however, hermeneutics or interpretation has often been 
excluded from the realm of poetics. The rationale for this exclusion can be questioned in a number of 
ways, as will be shown below. There is also a branch of poetics which seems particularly apt to 
produce readings in this way. It was named descriptive poetics by Benjamin Hrushovski (later 
Harshaw), and it will be discussed in the context of literary poetics in the following chapters. 
 
 
Interpreting Pynchon’s Theory-Consciousness 
 
What connects these attempts to bring genres and periods, and theories and thinkers, to bear on 
Pynchon is the cyclical logic of toggling back and forth between a theory and a reading that makes 
the theory relevant or necessary. It can be argued, then, that the capacity of Pynchon’s text to 
undermine theoretical approaches is not due to our understanding of Pynchon’s work depending on 
any theory as such. In a limited sense, then, the search for Pynchon’s theory is not to be resolved, 
even if we should finally be able to decide on the right concepts, philosophies, and theories to bring 
to bear on his work. We are probably better off this way, too, as the search for Pynchon’s theory has 
already shown its remarkable ability to reinstate itself in different theoretical domains and under 
different theoretical dominants. This, after all, may be why we are now able to find the politically 
radical Pynchon, an unlikely prospect in the relativist postmodern era (see e.g. Thomas 2007; Herman 
and Weisenburger 2013; Freer 2014). This, in brief, might be why half a century after John Barth 
wrote about his famous essay on “exhaustion,” Pynchon can show us he was renewable all along. 
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To wrap up this chapter, let us close the circle and return to the experience of reading Pynchon. The 
impetus for much of the scholarly work on Pynchon may be approached in the light of Schaub’s 
description of his experience of reading Gravity’s Rainbow: 
 
My initial efforts at understanding […] were characterized by a frustrating search for repetition, symmetry, 
and a consistency revealing Pynchon’s true disposition and theme. The experience of reading Pynchon, 
however, is really an analogue of the conundrums of search his books describe. (Schaub 1981, ix.) 
 
One recurring notion in these impromptu stories of first encounters with Pynchon’s works is that the 
frustration of reading is “an analogue of the conundrums of search his books describe.” Another 
theme in scholarly narratives is identifying repetition and symmetry as elements of the search for the 
point, the argument, the philosophy, or “disposition and theme.” A question was posed at the 
beginning: if Pynchon’s writing is so difficult and disruptive, why studies of his work are marked by 
such a startling degree of correspondences? 
 
Taking a retrospective look into Pynchon studies, Writing Pynchon (1990) by McHoul and Wills 
discovers in Pynchon-scholarship “a whole secondary mode of reading, itself a secret postal system” 
–  a canon of textual fragments and citations that is circulated in secondary literature (108). The same 
passages from Pynchon’s books get picked out by a scholarly generation after another. To McHoul 
and Wills it seems almost as though the critics read the critics and circulate the texts among 
themselves (ibid.). Schaub’s search for repetition and consistency, disposition and theme, has been 
rearticulated so consistently in Pynchon-scholarship it has itself become a theme. McHoul and Wills 
were among the first to distinguish some effects of the consolidation of readings predicted earlier in 
Mindful Pleasures. While they were not the only ones to observe this phenomenon, their willingness 
to elevate the issue into the center of their discussion still seems daring. In other respects, Writing 
Pynchon itself may be regarded as an exercise in “reading theory with Pynchon.” In this case the chief 
theoretical ideas are the Derridean play and deferral of meaning and Barthes’ notion of the writerly 
text. Writing Pynchon could easily be called post-structuralist, and therefore juxtaposed with 
Berressem’s Pynchon’s Poetics. The analytic practice in McHoul and Wills’s book is so left-field, 
however, that this would do justice to neither of the two books. 
 
According to the authors, Writing Pynchon takes quite seriously the task of approaching Pynchon in 
the open-ended field of poststructuralist textuality. By now we know some of the more obvious 
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critical moves this elicits. For example, when the writers think that the Derridean notion of writing is 
“too Pynchonian to ignore,” it by definition entails that they must not only “locate” the textual play 
but participate in it (ibid., 8–9). Their attempt can certainly be deemed a qualified success. As 
exceptional and exhilarating a work of literary criticism as Writing Pynchon is, some of its 
exhortations feel, well, “something like a hot air balloon”, if one may not only cite the book but also 
appropriate its apparatus of citation (McHoul & Wills 1990, 63). Yet it would be disingenuous to 
fault McHoul and Wills’s textual analyses. The unusual method of selection and presentation of 
“textual evidence” yields genuinely interesting results, and provides new insight, not only into 
Pynchon’s texts but also into practices of criticism. 
 
The most radical feature of Writing Pynchon might be how the whole of its analytical practice is 
interwoven with reflections on practices of analysis which are rarely seen as worthy of consideration 
at all – such as citation.13 While the book is permeated with the deconstructive games with these 
practices it also displays a rare sensitivity to the potential spectrum of analytical choices, or 
“maneuvers,” of putting the text to use. That the book frequently opts for the least likely of choices 
seems rather symptomatic in context. The practice of McHoul and Wills’s book reacts to the 
challenges arising both in the academic deconstructive criticism of the time and in Pynchon studies 
of the 1980s, as the field was greatly informed by the current theory but yet to implement its 
challenges to methods and practices of criticism. 
 
Indeed, there is a more general context for McHoul and Wills’s inquiry into what they call the “secret 
postal system” of Pynchon studies. It is nothing less than the practices of literary analysis and 
criticism at large. McHoul, who may have said it best without Wills, argues in a 1987 issue of 
Pynchon Notes that in literary study quotations are always used strategically, to strengthen the 
coherence, logic, or position the argument builds toward. To demonstrate the implications of this 
practice, McHoul decides to do something else for a change: 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 In chapter entitled “Telegrammatology” the authors take the first sentence of each chapter of The Crying of Lot 49 
and compile them into a paragraph, which turns out to be a surprisingly good plot summary of the novel. Citing the 
final sentences of each chapter, on the other hand, produces a markedly different text “poetic – metaphysical even.” 
(McHoul and Wills 1990, 109–111.) Elsewhere, the book juxtaposes textual fragments hundreds of pages apart and 
presents them in a way that typographically – through use of the virgule – coincides with the conventional way of 
citing verse poetry without line breaks.  
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I try to show how a critical reading of a work can be constructed from passages which have been selected 
not on the basis of their support for a particular preconstructed argument but on random, or at least 
thematically unmotivated grounds. […] Another reason for selecting textual samples first (rather than 
selecting them later to support a pre-given reading) is that it avoids what is rapidly becoming, in the case of 
Gravity’s Rainbow at least, a “canon” of Pynchon quotables. (McHoul 1987, 31.) 
 
McHoul’s approach questions what has been nearly unquestionable in literary studies, the status of 
textual evidence and the methods for finding it. Of course, McHoul’s anti-method is actually a 
specific kind of method for fulfilling a specific kind of theoretical task. The task is clearly more 
“metahermeneutic”14 than interpretive and it serves as an illustration of the conditions and 
conventions of a general but undertheorized critical procedure. Yet, this critique could perhaps be 
taken even further. One could justifiably wonder whether the preselectivity or preconstructedness that 
McHoul’s procedural restriction on text selection is supposed to help resist might not yet work on 
other levels of analysis. This apprehension, in fact, is supported by the relatively conventional 
deconstructive analysis ensuing from the anarchic attempt to circumvent method on one level.15 This 
does little to diminish the force of the underlying challenge to literary analysis, utterly convincing in 
its intuitive and emancipated act of self-reflection. 
 
Yet one might want to ask what might account for the ease with which the most iconoclast among us 
revert to conventional procedures of analysis. If one can successfully dodge out of dogmatism in one 
place, why it is so easy to behave dogmatically in another? One answer in given by Paul H. Fry in his 
Reach of Criticism. Fry proceeds from a view that we cannot help but be preselective, and 
methodically so. Fry writes: 
 
That there is method to our inadvertencies is such an old and clearly established paradox in nearly all fields 
of cognitive inquiry that it scarcely bears repeating. Preselectivity, whether it be unconscious, ideological, or 
simply, in general, what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls “prejudiced,” is of course methodical – so intensely so, 
indeed, that it makes the firmest efforts at formal thinking seem absentminded by comparison. (1983, 1.) 
 
This stance implies that one cannot simply observe texts for their salient features without applying a 
theory of what is salient in texts. The practice of citing key passages as evidence permeates the whole 
business of analyzing literature and producing interpretive, descriptive, or explicatory writings on 
literary works. Passages chosen to support an interpretation are made persuasive by the global 
                                                          
14 See Korthals Altes 2014. The concept is defined and discussed below in chapter 1.2. 
15 The reading procedures typical to deconstruction and deconstructive literary criticism have been discussed by Culler 
(1982) and Gasché (1986), among others; for an overview of this discussion see e.g. Keskinen (1998, 50–56). 
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interpretation already provisionally implied. The whole grasped through the select passages it is a 
kind of whole they can uphold. This is characteristic of any number of interpretive approaches, but 
as will be argued below, as much can be said of the systematic approaches to poetics. 
 
Yet the position according to which preselectivity permeates all thinking also allows one to move to 
another level of analysis, and it is the level which a sampling of Pynchon criticism brings to relief. 
Quotations are doubtlessly used to strengthen a preselected logic, coherence, or position. Yet if one 
quotation may serve evidence for several positions, and if quotations selected at random can support 
any number preselected positions, this suggests that the interplay of textual evidence or key passages 
and provisional interpretive frames is more complex than might first appear. 
 
It is suggested above that the distinctive feature of analyzing Pynchon’s novels might be the tendency 
of the processes of self-conscious observation becoming foregrounded. This may explain why the 
idea of Pynchon’s theory-consciousness arises in so many of the various theories and contexts 
informing Pynchon studies. If the novels come across as breaking from modernism, it is because the 
shortcomings of a reading conditioned by modernist conventions are still understandable to a 
modernistically conditioned mind, but only just. Likewise, the failure of the works to fit into 
epistemologies implied by cultural constructs such as periods and genres can be conceptualized within 
these epistemologies – but not without the very epistemologies being thrown into relief. This logic 
seems inescapable in Pynchon studies. Undercutting a self-imposed system, dialectically raising an 
opposing system; this is a recurring discovery in Pynchon studies. It has gone by many an ingenious 
moniker in the studies of the yesteryear: muffin-crater interplay (Hume 1987, 185), faux-didactism 
(Hägg 2005), autodestruction (Berressem 1993), and as already mentioned above, de-conditioning of 
the reader (McHale 1979). 
 
Chapter 2 discusses some of the ways in which this effect, while remaining distinctly Pynchonian, is 
of wider significance to reading and interpretation and can be approached through certain much-
theorized concepts of literary theory. First, however, the cyclical hermeneutical process must be 
contextualized within the study of poetics. The function of the next section of the introduction is, first 
and foremost, to frame theory of poetics in such a way that is pertinent to the protocols of reading I 
have above treated as ways of approaching Pynchon’s poetics. 
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1.2. Problems of Poetics and Poetics of Problems 
 
It is now necessary to leave Pynchon aside for a while in order to elaborate on the “Poetics” in 
“Pynchon and Poetics,” and to show how the field of study called poetics is understood in this thesis. 
When looking at the history of literary poetics, it is plain to see that many groundbreaking studies 
have been devoted to a single author’s poetics and its “problems”, and fashioned as a search for the 
principles behind the author’s artistic structuring of the literary work, to paraphrase Bakhtin (1984, 
11). As suggested above, it is precisely in this sense that the search for “Pynchon’s theory” may be 
seen as a quest for a poetics. 
 
Even when study of poetics entails primarily a descriptive scrutiny of one author’s work, the aim 
tends to be more general, and of course producing broader statements about literature within a study 
largely based on one author is a time-tested endeavor. Although poetics engages with the general 
through the particular, there is variation in how observing specific authors or works weighs against 
observing larger systems like canons, genres, or cultural literacy. Particularly in scientific poetics, 
studying single authors or works is devalued, and in the 20th century context of various formalisms 
and structuralism poetics becomes associated with the outspoken goal of formulating a “science of 
literature.” Histories of literary theory tend to draw a trajectory through Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
Cours de linguistique générale (1st ed. 1916) to its influence on Russian formalists, and via Roman 
Jakobson to Prague linguistic circle and beyond to the New Critics and French Structuralists 
(Eagleton 1996, 83–96; Doležel 1990, part II). There are also numerous pre-20th Century precedents 
to scientific criticism (see Doležel 1990, part I). From one century to the next, the history of 
“occidental poetics” is defined by a pronounced engagement with structure, systematicity, and 
scientific thought of the time (cf. Doležel 1990, 1–8). However, the 20th Century schools can be set 
apart from their predecessors by their affiliation with linguistics (cf. Seamon 1989, 294). The 
development of linguistics-based systematic poetics culminates in structuralism and structuralist 
poetics. 
 
It is reasonable to claim that today structuralist literary theory or poetics mainly survives as a 
collection of writings by scholars who were not merely its practitioners but also its most astute critics. 
One thinks, in the Anglo-American context, of Culler (1975b, 1981, 1982), and Jameson (1972, 
1981), but also Roland Barthes, whom the English-speaking academia knew well through both his 
22 
 
structuralist and post-structuralist writings.16 Although Structuralism did initially foster ambitions of 
becoming a pilot science for humanities, in literary studies scare-quoting “science” was common 
enough even amid the early optimism (Hrushovski 1976; cf. Olsen 1976; Lokke 1987, 546; McHale 
1994, 57). In subsequent accounts of the state of literary studies, indictment of the scientific 
pretensions of poetics varies from severe (e.g. Jackson 1989) to lenient but firm (Fludernik 2010). In 
the following sections I will discuss some of the challenges that arose from within the scientific 
endeavor of poetics, and show how they intersect with the issues that have been linked to the different 
ways of “interfacing” theory and text. 
 
 
Theoretical and Descriptive Poetics 
 
The heyday of structuralist poetics was marked by interesting ambiguities. As Seamon (1989) shows, 
the use of Saussurean linguistics as a model posed various problems that derive from the model 
itself.17 In the first phase of scientific poetics the problem concerned the proper object of study and 
defining the “system” to be studied. The object of study of poetics was not to be the work, which was 
traditionally the object of “criticism, understanding, and interpretation,” but neither could it be the 
whole of language. Roman Jakobson famously defined the mid-level object of study situated between 
language and a particular work as the “literariness” of literature. But if the system of literariness was 
the proper object, then what was one to do with this or that particular work? “There is no ‘science’ 
particular to this rose or that squirrel,” quips Seamon, mimicking the scientist talk of the time. (298; 
cf. Todorov 1977.) Jameson, too, argues that the focus on (super)structures instead of individual 
works sets structuralists apart from, for instance, the Russian Formalists (1972, 101). 
 
One answer to the question of what to do with individual works can be found in Benjamin 
Hrushovski’s (later Harshaw) introductory essay to PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and 
Theory of Literature, which distinguishes between theoretical and descriptive poetics. Under 
descriptive poetics Hrushovski groups the studies which aim to describe properties of literary corpora, 
                                                          
16 In the American context this double exposure to structuralism and its post-structuralist critique both at once has a 
significant precedent in the 1966 seminar “Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man” at the Johns Hopkins 
University, which featured such speakers as Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, a young Tzvetan Todorov, and Jacques 
Derrida, among others, and which to many hearers served as an introduction to structuralism while also unveiling its 
most radical critique to date (Macksey and Donato 1972). 
17 Jackson (1991) and Tallis (1988), among others, argue that structuralist literary theory is based on a radical 
misreading of Saussurean linguistics. 
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genres, or canons in the metalanguage of theoretical poetics. The descriptive practice treats the 
literary materials as test cases for the poetic theory. He writes: 
 
Theoretical Poetics (or “Theory of Literature”) involves a theoretical activity, the construction of a system 
built according to the logic of a question or a set of questions. On the other hand, descriptive Poetics is a 
scholarly activity involving an exhaustive study of the literary aspects of certain specific works of literature 
(Hrushovski 1976, xv). 
 
In this configuration, the thing to do with particular works is to describe them in sufficient detail at a 
relevant level (cf. Barthes 1975a, 253). According to Hrushovski, descriptive is to theoretical poetics 
as “fieldwork” is to theory in other human sciences. Thorough scrutiny of literary works provides 
material, data and experimental evidence for theory to build on. (Hrushovski 1976, xvi). The twofold 
task assigned to poetics echoes the synthesis of rationalism and empiricism in Kant’s metaphysics: 
fieldwork accumulates the perceptual data without which concepts remain empty, yet fieldwork 
produces nothing, remains blind, unless it relies on conceptual structures. The bipartite scientific 
practice also aligns with the Popperian ideal of scientific progress through the interplay of falsifiable 
theory and repeatable experiments. 
 
For Hrushovski individual readings required in description of texts are of secondary value. 
Interpretation is seen as a subfield of the science of literature still in its “pre-scientific” stage. 
Hrushovski proposes that it can be developed beyond that only by “the vigorous development of a 
systematic poetics” (ibid., xxiv). Hrushovski prioritizes the systematizing goal of descriptive poetics, 
and studying specific works is given largely an instrumental function. Descriptive study validates the 
theory or turns back on it, revealing its shortcomings, while interpretations of the texts are 
inconsequential as concerns the goals of poetics. 
 
Yet as far as poetics was concerned, at some point two roads had already diverged. Gérard Genette's 
Narrative Discourse (1980, orig. Figures III, 1972) was already reshaping poetics with its refusal to 
choose between theoretical and descriptive approaches. To Genette, it was not enough to discover the 
typologies of narrative techniques in Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu, nor was it enough to 
have Proust's fathomless, time-shaped novel simply provide the textual illustrations required by the 
emergent poetics. (22–23.) It is fair to say, as Samuli Hägg does in apprising the effect of Genette’s 
work on narrative poetics, that Genette's subsequent readers have made the choice for him. 
Narratology adopted Genette’s work on narrative discourse as a theory of narrative poetics. (Hägg 
24 
 
2005, 8.) It is tempting to hypothesize that this might have to do with how certain key passages in 
Genette’s Narrative Discourse/Revisited have taken on a life of their own. The fact that these passages 
include the typologies of narrative situations and focalizations, during which Genette’s discussion 
extends beyond Proust, towards a larger canon of texts (mostly realist and modernist fiction written 
in French and English), seems rather concordant with this hypothesis. Be it as it may, it is clear that 
Genette’s work is often understood as a prefabricated framework which is, in principle, applicable to 
analysis of any and all narratives. The debate goes on as to what is the most appropriate context for 
Genette’s work. John Pier, among others, suggests that Genette never set out to write a treatise in 
theoretical poetics. Instead his treatment of narrative discourse is “a study of the specificity of 
narrative within the scope of an open poetics.” Genette’s method “navigates between” the particular 
and the general. (Pier 2010, 10.) 
 
From the viewpoint of analytical practice, Genette’s decision is a productive one. It allows the analyst 
to work closely with the text while constantly reflecting on the conceptual network with which one 
analyzes it. Apparently, but perhaps only apparently, Narrative Discourse therefore performs the 
double task spelled out in Hrushovski’s take on poetics: it analyzes empirical data to test the concepts 
of theoretical poetics. However, the joint effort of theoretical-descriptive poetics differs from 
Genette’s approach in one important respect, this being the diminished role given to a particular work 
in Hrushovski’s poetics. Tzvetan Todorov is also making it quite explicit that the individual work 
“remains alien” to the goals of structuralism (1977, 31). Tellingly, the focus on Proust persuades 
Todorov against considering Genette’s Narrative Discourse a work of structuralism in the strictest 
sense (1977; cf. Hägg 2005, 4–5; Pier 2010, 16–17). Seamon argues, however, that the theoretical 
priority of a system over a work always posed problems to the practice of poetics. In what Seamon 
sees as the second phase of scientific poetics, the work makes a return, and with it, the question of 
interpretation. 
 
 
Poetics or Hermeneutics? 
 
The theoretical-descriptive model, as Hrushovski devised it, did not revolutionize structuralist 
poetics. This may be, as Paul de Man has suggested, due to a certain “resistance to theory” in the 
academy. The aims and scope of poetics have on one hand been exaggerated and on the other 
diminished, sometimes based on genuine misconception, at other times on strategic grounds. (1986, 
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4–5; 11–12.) Culler suggests that instead literary criticism has managed to give itself an immense 
scope by insisting that a work may express any number of things, almost anything, in fact, and that it 
is the critic’s task to interpret and make explicit what it expresses within the context provided by one 
or another “approach” (2010, 906). Culler links this argument with a long tradition of what 
philosopher Jacques Rancière names expressive poetics in his Mute Speech [orig. Parole muette, 
1998]. Expressive poetics (or poetics of expressivity) makes possible an understanding of literature 
(and, more generally, art) as mute in the sense that it is seen as a specific mode of language: “a 
language that speaks less by what it says than by what it does not say, by the power that is expressed 
through it” (2011, 59). The regime of expressivity is contrasted with representative poetics: 
representative poetics determines the genre and generic perfection of literature; and expressive 
poetics determines them as direct expressions of the “poetic power” (Ibid., 67). According to 
Rancière, the view of literature in the regime of expressive poetics gives rise both to the notion of 
self-sufficiency of literary art and the view of literature as an expression of society: 
 
This fundamental division puts on the same side the adepts of pure literature and the historians and 
sociologists who see it as the expression of a society, those who dream of a spirit world along with the 
geologists of social mentalities. It subsumes the practice of pure artists and social critics under a single 
spiritual principle whose ineradicable vitality consists in its remarkable capacity to transform itself to a 
principle of positive science and materialist philosophy. (Ibid.) 
 
Rancière argues that both the idea of literature and the idea of culture are offspring of the same 
revolution. History and sociology are henceforth “sciences that give the silence of things its eloquence 
as a true testimony about a world” (ibid., 68). Seamon, writing well before the publication of 
Rancière’s book, recognizes the idea that modern systematic poetics pursues mute things. He traces 
the contours of this pursuit throughout the 20th Century history of literary theory: 
 
Plato thought that the poet spoke, but madly or wrongly, while modern poetics assumes that poetry is, in 
[the poet Archibald] MacLeish’s famous phrase, “palpable and mute.” […] [T]he establishment of a scientific 
criticism entails the notion that the object of study is “a verbal imitation of a human productive power which 
in itself does not speak” (Frye, Anatomy 12). Psychoanalytic theory also treats the work as dumb (for dreams 
and symptoms do not speak), as does Fredric Jameson when he calls narratives “magical” ([The Political 
Unconscious] 103). Umberto Eco makes the same claim when he refers to the “aesthetic text” as a “magic 
spell” that semiotics can undo ([A Theory of Semiotics] 270, 271). (Seamon 1989, 296.) 
 
This implies that what the text appears to say is never what the work means, hence the critic’s job of 
articulation or “explication,” as the New Critics put it. Not only may one’s experience of literature be 
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a non-rational one, as Wellek and Warren suggest by insisting that the student “must translate his 
experience of literature into intellectual terms, assimilate it to a coherent scheme,” but the same could 
be true of writing and interpreting literature (Wellek and Warren 1973, 15; Seamon 1989, 296). 
According to Rancière, all “expressive poetics” proceeds according to two principles: “first, to find 
beneath words the vital force that is the cause of their utterance;18 second, to find in the visible the 
sign of the invisible” (2011, 67). 
 
Culler argues on the basis of Rancière’s theory that under the expressive regime of poetics the mute 
works may be interpreted endlessly, and this is evident in the myriad approaches seeking to make 
explicit the ideas, ideologies, politics, and artistic visions that the works implicitly express (cf. Culler 
2010). This ties in with Culler’s criticism of the view that the institutional and professional role of 
the scholar is to produce interpretations. In an earlier essay Culler states that interpretation still seems 
to be the only legitimate activity for a professor of literature (Culler 1981, 17). He links the ongoing 
preference of interpretation or hermeneutics over poetics with the enduring influence of New 
Criticism on literary studies. The influence of New Criticism lives on in “that widespread and 
unquestioning acceptance of the notion that the critic’s job is to interpret literary works” (ibid., 5). 
 
The Cullerian denigration of interpretation, then, finds its proper target in the procedures of the 
profession, and not in the processes of interpretive reading as such. In fact, hermeneutics, as discussed 
by Wolfgang Iser, another prolific theorist of reading, is often seen in terms not too dissimilar to those 
found in Culler’s poetics. Scholars like Seamon, working in the wake of scientific poetics, argue that 
interpretation quickly finds a place within poetics and that discussing the role of interpretation in 
poetics is another aspect marking the second phase of scientific poetics (1989, 298). However, Iser’s 
description of hermeneutics suggests that the very distinction might be misconceived. In Iser the 
hermeneutics is linked to the tradition spanning from the 18th Century thought of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher to the hermeneutic phenomenology of Paul Ricœur. According to Iser, this tradition 
has by default conceived of hermeneutics as a self-reflexive practice of coming to understand the 
conditions of understanding. Interpretation is seen as “the rigorous practice of discovering and 
elucidating the ramified conditionality of how understanding comes about.” In this view, 
hermeneutics is seen as a specific historical and generic variety of interpretation whose arrival marks 
“the stage at which interpretation becomes self-reflective.” (Iser 2000, 41–42.) Thus defined, 
hermeneutics emphasizes self-reflexivity and interest towards its own conditions. As we will see 
                                                          
18 Orig. “la puissance de vie qui les fait énoncer.” Culler translates this as “the animating force that drives their 
articulation” (2010, 906). 
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shortly, similar self-reflective turn also characterizes Culler’s version of structuralist poetics, and 
prefigures what Seamon calls the third phase of scientific poetics. 
 
Poetics versus hermeneutics is a common scholarly theme throughout the 1970’s and the 1980’s, but 
it is possible to find concurrent attempts to evade strict distinctions between, on one hand, theoretical 
and descriptive poetics and, on the other, poetics and interpretation. Stein Haugom Olsen, in his 1976 
essay “What Is Poetics?” addresses these distinctions by highlighting the necessarily prescriptive 
nature of poetics. According to Manfred Bierwisch, whom Olsen singles out as the representative of 
the earlier generation of linguistically oriented scholars, the objective of poetics is to identify “the 
particular regularities that occur in literary texts and that determine the specific effects of poetry” 
(Bierwisch, 1970). According to Bierwisch, doing descriptive poetics on a literary work would 
require being able to detect the effects and judgments that come about through the “maximally 
adequate” understanding of the text. Yet for Bierwisch, description of the measures one has to take 
to arrive at a “maximally adequate understanding” of a poetic text exceeds the scope of poetics, as 
does the question of what constitutes such an understanding. (See Olsen 1976, 350–351.) 
 
Olsen responds to this view by pointing out that in this configuration poetics will always have to 
predetermine the relevance of certain features or properties of literary texts. Seeing literary work as 
structured requires a prescribed set of relevant structural categories. Olsen claims that no account of 
the poeticity or literariness of the work can rest on given structural features but requires an explication 
of “a method (interpretation) [sic] of assigning artistic relevance to parts of a work identified through 
this method” (Olsen 1976, 349). This characterization of how analysis in poetics works can be seen 
in relation to the readings discussed in the previous section. In articulations of “Pynchon’s theory” or 
“theory read with Pynchon” the circular logic seemed inescapable, and it was characterized as 
hermeneutic. Indeed, Olsen’s critique of scientific poetics doubles as an argument for treating analysis 
in poetics as interpretative practice. 
 
Olsen argues that any interpretative question, even when answerable in the form of a structural 
description or description of “meaning,” is in the end made significant only because it asks how an 
element serves the intended artistic purpose (Olsen 1976, 350–351). Olsen argues that the intertwined 
practice of structural description and interpretation should provide grounds for figuring out the work’s 
intention. Here, by contrast, the overlapping interests and questions in poetics and hermeneutics 
suggest that Olsen’s view can be seen as a description of the hermeneutic process itself. Textual 
features chosen in support of an interpretation are made perceptible and significant in the context of 
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the global interpretive frame. The whole grasped through the parts it is a kind of holistic interpretation 
these parts can support. 
 
Furthermore, it seems that even in a stoutly anti-intentionalist context, where laying foundations on 
concepts like the author or the work is expressly renounced, we can locate the cyclical practice of 
identifying features in interaction with a dynamic interpretation of the whole text. This can be, for 
instance, a theory supposedly informing the text, or the “disposition and theme” of the text, to repeat 
once again Schaub’s telling phrase from his early treatment of Pynchon. Such antifoundationalist 
theoretical context can be found, for example, in Berressem’s or McHoul and Wills’s poststructuralist 
analyses of Pynchon’s text. Olsen’s position could be seen to plausibly describe many of the readings 
in search of Pynchon’s theory, as well as those readings presupposing the relevance of certain 
theoretical ideas. Therefore, instead of a rigid and mechanic endeavor, “doing poetics” comes across 
as a creative activity with much closer affinities to interpretation than is often admitted in the context 
of literary theory. 
 
 
“The Text Itself” or Reading? 
 
The view emphasizing the overlaps of poetics and hermeneutics also allows us to consider a reader-
oriented position on poetics. The notion of poetics as a theory of reading is a major, if sometimes 
neglected feature in Jonathan Culler’s work, beginning with his Structuralist Poetics. The key to this 
can be found in the much-quoted statement relating poetics to literature as linguistics is to language, 
a statement, one might argue, often misunderstood.19 The analogy of poetics being to literature as 
grammar is to language is not Culler’s invention, but it is his notion of grammar that sets him apart 
from earlier structuralists adopting the analogy. Indeed, Culler emphasizes that works like Todorov’s 
Grammaire du Décaméron use grammatical metaphors – and is quick to point out that there are 
problems (ibid., 252). Culler’s poetics, in contrast, finds a new model of grammar in Chomskyan 
generative grammar. If, according to Culler, poetics is a “grammar,” it is so by virtue of being a theory 
applied unconsciously while reading, as result of a culturally determined literary competence. To 
Culler, the work has a structure and meaning because it is read in a particular way, because what we 
                                                          
19 On (mis)attributing ideas to Culler, see the exchange between John Searle and Louis H. Mackey in The New York 
Review of Books (Searle 1983; Mackey and Searle 1984). 
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may perceive as structure and meaning is concretized through a “theory” applied in the act of reading 
(113). 
 
An offhand reading of this stance might suggest that the model of linguistic grammar is almost a 
contingent element in Culler’s theory – it simply happens to be a fitting analogy to whatever it is we 
do while reading texts – but this is not really the case. Rather, what Culler does to poetics in 
Structuralist Poetics is best understood by taking the linguistic analogy as po-faced as possible. The 
Chomskyan Transformational-Generative grammar superseded former, mostly descriptive 
approaches that used to dominate linguistics (see Searle 1972). What Chomsky represents in study of 
grammar, is in a sense a “turn toward the conditions of language-use” – and Culler’s 
reconceptualization of structuralism, and later semiotics, as a theory of reading, is in many respects 
a faithful analogy of the Chomskyan move in study of grammar. The Chomskyan definition of the 
subject matter of generative linguistics as “speaker’s knowledge of how to produce and understand 
sentences, his linguistic competence” finds an accurate analogy in Culler’s recalibration of poetics as 
a study of the conditions under which it is possible for literary works to have a meaning or a range of 
meanings. 
 
The generative model shows in Culler’s practice, too. He cites Barthes’ notion that “structuralism has 
emerged from linguistics and in literature it finds an object that has itself emerged from language” 
(Culler 1975, 112). His next step, however, is not to start developing tools which are analogous to the 
ones used in linguistics. This would be a kind of activity that the first generation of structuralists 
engaged in. Culler explicitly takes a stand against the more and more “elaborate and complex analytic 
procedures” created in structuralist poetics. In the spirit of the generative model the proper goal is to 
“define the conditions of meaning” and “to specify how we go about making sense of texts, what are 
the interpretive operations on which literature itself, as an institution, is based” (ibid., xiv–xv). This 
is how structuralist poetics or semiotics becomes, according to Culler, a theory of reading (ibid., 258–
259; 1981, 47–80). Culler may be the only one to have put it this explicitly, but the idea that 
(structuralist) poetics would develop into a theory of reading was more widespread during the period 
(see Seamon 1989, 301–302). 
 
Steven Mailloux names Culler, alongside with scholars like Stanley Fish, as “social critics,” who 
study the underlying systems of textual meaning production (Mailloux 1982, 21–22). Jacqueline 
Henkel’s (1990) thorough discussion shows that these writers, with many others, including Mailloux 
himself, are united by their interest in linguistic or speech-act models. In particular, they are interested 
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in those linguistic models which posit that works and interpretations are not produced and realized 
through private codes “but according to a set of rulelike principles held within some community and 
assimilated by the individual.” (449.) It is easy to see now that it is the “generative” impulse in 
Culler’s poetics, or in other words the social or institutional emphasis, that makes him so reticent 
when it comes to working with texts with a pragmatic toolkit. For Culler, readings or interpretations 
are data rather than the goal of study of poetics (1981, 47–79; 1982, 64 – 83; 1988b). Culler therefore 
rarely participates in the structuralist bricolage20, but when he does, his approach stands apart from 
the huffing entrepreneurship synonymous with American spin-offs of structuralism – especially 
narratology. Culler’s analyses, even when they might count as “ingenious interpretations”21 do not 
present us with new instruments to poke our discourses with. Of all the American advocates of 
structuralism Culler may have always been the least “practical.” 
 
Seamon, however, finds a context for the sensibility Culler embodies. It is found in what he considers 
the third phase of scientific poetics. In this phase the object of study changes yet again: “from the 
structural unity that underlies literature or literary works to the deep structure of interpretation itself” 
(Seamon 1989, 301). The model based on the interplay of conventions and competences, which Culler 
introduces in Structuralist Poetics always shows the potential to straddle the gap between being a 
theory of reading literature and a theory of reading readings of literature. Gradually the emphasis 
shifts towards the latter: in his early writings he maintains that the meaning of the work, which New 
Criticism and hermeneutics engaged with, is less interesting than the conditions of works being able 
to have meaning in the first place. Later, however, this transforms into a claim that individual 
interpretations are less interesting than the competences and conventions of reading which make 
interpretations possible (Culler 1981; 1988a; 1988b). 
 
The problematic consequences of Culler’s reframing of poetics as a theory of reading are, however, 
apparent in the light of the discussion above. Culler’s treatment of interpretations as data renders 
them, in effect, paroles muettes: they become texts that, like literary texts, cannot say what they mean 
and it remains the critics (unchanging) job to explicate their meaning. The consequence, as 
predictable as it is disappointing, is that Culler ends up speaking by himself. This can be seen both 
on theoretical and practical level. Interpretations used as data can be made to express great many 
things, and therefore they are available as evidence for Culler’s readings. Arguably these readings 
                                                          
20 On bricolage and literary criticism see Genette (1982, 3–4; cf. Derrida 1978, 360). 
21 Culler prefers that critics take existing ingenious interpretations as data instead of producing more of them (see Culler 
1988b). Yet arguably he has produced a few of these himself (see Culler 1981, 47–79, 169–187). 
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come across as blends of description and interpretation, as Olsen’s critique of poetics suggests they 
should. The practical consequence is that most authors of interpretations show no more interest in 
discussing them with Culler than literary authors typically delight in discussing the interpretations of 
their works with scholars. 
 
The study at hand, however, wishes to revisit the idea of poetics as a theory of reading. The final, and 
according to Seamon unfinished, phase of poetics involves asking questions about the rules by which 
interpretations are produced. According to Culler himself, however, “approaches attempting to 
reconstruct codes, generic or otherwise, that make possible literary works and their effects” have 
fallen out of favor, because the first question posed to any new critical idea is whether it helps us 
produce betted interpretations (2010, 906–907). However, a follow-up question seems obvious: can 
asking questions about the procedures by which interpretations are produced help us produce better 
interpretations? The final section of this chapter outlines a methodological argument for a practice of 
reading novels and their readings, which in the latter stages of this study will be applied to Pynchon 
and his critics and interpreters. 
 
 
Descriptive Poetics Reconsidered 
 
Brian McHale’s conception of descriptive poetics differs from Hrushovski’s on several significant 
points. While the earlier notion of poetics gave systematic description of corpora, genres, or more 
hesitantly, individual works, a reciprocal role in relation to the theory of poetics, McHale’s revision 
casts descriptive poetics as a “mid-level” theory. This intermediate status means that descriptive 
poetics no longer functions as an experimental level in a scientific model based on theorizing and 
testing. While descriptive poetics no longer aims at verifying or falsifying theoretical hypotheses, it 
still strives to operate on a level of generalization beyond a specific text. McHale writes that 
descriptive poetics should be sufficiently general for its findings to work as “evidence for more than 
one interpretation of a specific text,” but also “not so general as to prevent its findings being subsumed 
under more than one high-level theory (of literature, culture, semiosis, etc.)” (McHale 1994, 59, 
emphases original). 
 
To understand the implication of this reorientation in descriptive poetics, it may be useful to consider 
an analogous shift in philosophy of science. The earlier Popperian view of science posited that 
theoretical conjectures must be falsifiable by experimental observations. This is clearly the model on 
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which the old theoretical-descriptive model of poetics builds. Subsequently, however, Thomas Kuhn 
took a step towards a less mechanical view by arguing that expectations inherent in theoretical “world 
views” pre-structure observations. Observation is “theory-laden” (see Kaiser 2016, 78).22 Obviously, 
there can be no description without observation, and in fact this is what McHale’s descriptive level 
entails: stopping to observe ranges of possible meanings and the level of phenomena making them 
possible (McHale 1994, 63). In this light descriptive poetics is a theoretical endeavor. It entails a 
theory about this mid-level, which makes certain phenomena observable: literary forms functioning 
within their semi-autonomous traditions, literary conventions which explain what it is to read 
something as literature instead of a reflection of phenomena made observable by some other theory. 
 
The possibility of viewing descriptive poetics in this light in no way quarrels with McHale’s original 
argument for the benefits of this approach. McHale argues that while descriptive poetics is not 
identical to either interpretation or theory it can be informed and have implications for both 
interpretation and theory. It is this in-between status that makes defining descriptive poetics slightly 
awkward, but it is also what recommends it. (McHale 1994, 59.) 
 
As suggested above, it is quite reasonable to perceive descriptive poetics as broadly theoretical. It is 
also possible to find a context in which descriptive poetics can be seen as an interpretive practice. 
This context is “metahermeneutics” as defined by Liesbeth Korthals Altes (2014). Speaking from 
within the field of narrative studies, she posits that metahermeneutics can study presuppositions, 
procedures, aims, and claims implicit in interpretive processes and conditions. This does not preclude 
study of particular works, as “metahermeneutic validation proceeds via reasoning and does not itself 
include empirical testing.” However, according to Korthals Altes, it is possible to see the 
metahermeneutic orientation itself also as broadly hermeneutic, and it is distinguished from 
interpretations of individual works “by kind rather than type.” (96.) Not unlike McHale’s descriptive 
poetics, its distinctive feature is its level of generality and distance, and while it can certainly 
concentrate on particular texts, the focus lies on “reconstructing interpretive processes and 
conventions.” The focus on poetics as a metahermeneutic endeavor allows us to be concerned both 
with meanings of texts themselves and conditions of reading them as specific kinds of texts. 
                                                          
22 The centrality of this notion to the Kuhnian view of science as well as the difference between Popper and Kuhn has 
recently been discussed on the occasion of the semicentennial anniversary of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. (See Richards and Daston in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions at Fifty or Ian Hacking’s new 
introduction to Kuhn’s book (Richards and Daston 2016; Hacking 2012.) On ideas of falsifiability in literary poetics 
see Hrushovski (1976). On pre-selectivity of observation in literary analysis see Olsen (1976) and Fry (1983). 
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According to Korthals Altes, metahermeneutic approach “expands on what Genette and Culler termed 
poetics” (ibid.). The continuity with the tradition of poetics suggests that also descriptive poetics can 
be seen as metahermeneutic. Indeed, like metahermeneutics, descriptive poetics dwells on 
conventions by which people read literature and the conditions under which texts are read as literature 
(cf. ibid.; McHale 1994, 65). 
 
While descriptive poetics is contiguous with theory-formation as well as with interpretation, the mid-
level focus of descriptive poetics also has implications for our critical practice. These implications 
are significant enough to have warranted a view that descriptive poetics can be used as a method. 
McHale never claims that descriptive poetics is a straightforwardly applicable method but rather that 
it is a way for analysis to negotiate the scope, aims, and focus of study in the space between theory 
and interpretation. However, it is quite possible to methodize McHale’s version of descriptive poetics, 
and this is helped by parts of the essay reading like a procedural guide. McHale writes: 
 
[T]he introduction of the descriptive level compels our discourse to hesitate, to linger over or circulate among 
a range of possibilities. Instead of rushing to specify a text’s meaning in the light of a theory, the descriptive 
project encourages us to map out a range of possible meanings, or to seek to grasp the conditions of meaning 
in specific texts. (1994, 65, emphasis.) 
 
This passage seems to lay out quite a few guidelines for how to proceed in analysis. Admittedly, 
hesitation, lingering, circulating, and not rushing constitute at best an impressionistic picture of what 
one is actually supposed to do in analysis. The methodization of descriptive poetics is, as McHale 
argues its definition should be, negative (cf. McHale 1994, 59). The true methodological potential of 
descriptive poetics is revealed by the available interpretive range, by the reflective vantage on 
conventions, made possible by suspending the point-to-point blanketing of text by theory (see ibid., 
62). 
 
If McHale’s descriptive poetics can be seen as a method, it might not be a method of “doing poetics” 
as much as it is a method of talking about what transpires in a specific kind of reading or 
interpretation. In accordance to his own reformulation of poetics as a theory of reading, Culler has 
made an analogous adjustment in his approach to interpretation, which he sees as producing “stories 
of reading.” Culler writes: 
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Focus on the conventions and operations of reading leads critics to treat literary works as a succession of 
actions on the understanding of the reader. An interpretation of a work thus comes to be an account of what 
happens to the reader: how various conventions and expectations are brought in to play, where particular 
connections and hypotheses are posited, how expectations are defeated or confirmed. To speak of the 
meaning of the work is to tell a story of reading. (1982, 35.) 
 
If we entertain the idea that readings may be seen as articulations of what “the reader” does while 
reading, then descriptive accounts can also be seen as stories: stories of what the reader perceives and 
pays attention to. If analysis results in what Culler calls a story of reading, evidence suggests that 
McHale’s essay on descriptive poetics builds its argument around a comparison of such stories. 
McHale argues that the happiest story is that of a reader who might reach any number of 
interpretations, but on observing a range of possible meanings, stops to reflect on the procedures of 
reading and on the conventions enabling or restricting them. As Culler points out, the early reader-
response theories were partly spurred by the discovery that there is no authoritative basis for stating 
what is in the text and what is not. It turns out, however, that it is no easier to say what is the reader’s 
experience. The reading, or the reader’s experience, much like “the text” in structuralist thought, is 
something that needs be recovered, but can only be recovered by producing it. (Culler 1982, 81–82.) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the cyclical movement between theory-formation and detection 
of textual features is integral to poetics. Its inadvertent methodicity is amply demonstrated by 
Pynchon studies, but undoubtedly it could be demonstrated by any corpus held together by a common 
object of study. According to Robert Scholes (1989), it is likely that our “protocols of reading” allow 
a degree of methodization. Yet he adds that reading may have “too much of in it of art and craft to 
yield entirely – or even largely – to methodization.”  Studying reading requires “taking method as far 
as it will go and then finding some way to go a bit further.” (2.) If this is so, then descriptive poetics 
could provide an opening. 
 
The descriptive practice can contribute both to theory and interpretation, while also avoiding the 
“flattening” or “blanketing” effect inherent in interpretations also aspiring to be theories in themselves 
(cf. McHale 1994, 59). Granted, the theoretical insights may be shaped by preconceptions of 
relevance, and interpretation may be restricted by the features becoming observable through 
application of a theory, but rather than concerning descriptive poetics in particular, this is a potential 
criticism towards all approaches interpreting literature in a theoretical context. As a practice of theory-
laden observation and metahermeneutic reflection, descriptive poetics, with its interest in mid-level 
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description, however theory-laden and interpretation-colored, allows for a maximal mobility for 
reflection of reading procedures. 
 
The methodological choices made in this work stem from the idea that descriptive poetics, with 
McHale’s revisions and the ones suggested here, might actually have somewhat broader scope than 
has been previously acknowledged. It furthermore shares with many other approaches the mobility 
and circularity of procedures – the movement between theory and text, the particular and the general, 
concepts and contexts, parts and wholes. This argument is further elaborated in chapter 2. 
 
 
1.3. Poetics and the Mind 
 
While reader-oriented poetics and recent reformulations of descriptive poetics can be seen as attempts 
to navigate between the dichotomies endemic to study of poetics, there may still be areas of inquiry 
where the earlier aims of scientific poetics can be found in their strong forms. The present chapter 
will show that quite a few of the questions formerly discussed in different phases of systematic or 
“scientific” study of poetics are central to many of the ongoing projects in cognitive literary studies. 
This inquiry has relevance to Pynchon studies, too. As mentioned above, Pynchon studies were quick 
to adopt technological advances of the computer age. Perhaps because of the colossal volume of the 
corpus, as well as its apparent difficulty and density, annotation databases, digitized versions of the 
novels, and searchable digital bibliographies were brought to Pynchon studies early on. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that the recent technological and methodological innovations in digital humanities 
and empirical reading studies are being eagerly implemented in Pynchon scholarship. The problems 
this chapter addresses, with regard to studies trying on these technologies and methods, is only 
indirectly connected to the new Pynchon studies themselves. Rather, the focus lies, on one hand, on 
the underlying conception of the literary text and textual evidence, and on the other, on the notion of 
how text interacts with the readers’ minds. The digital humanities may be technologically forward-
looking, but they sometimes express views of humanistic research, and literary studies in particular, 
that seem exceedingly conservative. 
 
Therefore, some of the issues here clearly mirror the discussions in the previous chapter. The first 
section below considers the ways in which cognitive literary studies have presented themselves in 
scientific terms, while the second one delves into discussions about the role of interpretation in 
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cognitive literary studies. The third section asks how cognitive literary studies address the question 
of literariness. There are different views within cognitive literary studies as to how the qualities and 
effects that are specific to literature or to the experience of literariness come about. Here it is inquired 
how different cognitive approaches navigate the space between textual features and cognitive 
processes in locating and defining literariness. It will also be argued that this question is no less 
pertinent in earlier structuralist and formalist poetics, and that these earlier schools of literary study 
were, in some ways, quite successfully coming to terms with this ambivalence. The question of 
whether the forms pursued by poetics reside in the text itself or the reading human mind, are not only 
asked throughout the three phases of poetics distinguished by Seamon, but actually precede the 
systematic poetics of the 20th Century. 
 
 
The Cognitive Science of Literature 
 
Perhaps more than any other branch of literary study since the 1970’s programs of systematic poetics, 
early cognitive literary studies emphasize that scientificity should be the justification for the endeavor 
of studying literature. Mark Turner’s Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive 
Science (1991) certainly wears its faith in a scientific paradigm shift on its sleeve and celebrates the 
age of discovery of the human mind (16). According to Turner, the cognitive approach “provides a 
ground that is common to the whole profession” (22). Richardson and Steen (2002) state that the 
cognitive approach is set apart from the “[c]ontemporary theories of literature and culture” by its 
willingness to re-engage with the category of “the natural” (3). In the era of cognitive literary studies 
poststructuralist theory has been attacked as relativist, even nihilist. One of the overarching goals has 
been to find a biological and material basis for cognitive processes (Jackson 2000, 322–323). 
 
Exemplifying the latter aim, Joseph Carroll advocates an evolutionary psychological approach to 
literature (1995) by arguing that “the conceptual structure of syntax is lodged in neurological 
structures,” and variations “in syntax generate variations in physical sensation” (106). Likewise, 
Patrick Colm Hogan finds in cognitive science the ground to which literary universals can be fixed 
(1997, 239). With benefit of hindsight, Alfonsina Scarinzi (2015b) argues that the early, “cognitivist,” 
cognitive literary study is nothing less than defined by these arguments. For instance, cognitivist 
literary study explains literariness – the erstwhile object of study of formalist and structuralist poetics 
– by an appeal to deviation from pre-formed mental schemata, as opposed to deviation from ordinary 
language in formalist approaches (263). In each case, it is assumed that it is possible to ground 
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observed effects of artistic texts on a biological or neurological realism. Critics of cognitive literary 
study often point out that the foundations are rather shaky, as cognitive science is not yet able to offer 
a basis as firm as its adherents wish (Sternberg 2009, 455–456; see also Richardson 2004, 2). On the 
other hand, more recent cognitive literary studies insist that this basis is anything but universally 
agreed on. Instead of consolidating a consensus, newer studies often find themselves in a rather heated 
discussion about different conceptions of the mind and about the relation between the brain and the 
body and/in the world. 
 
Although the principles of cognitive processes remain debated, there is wide agreement about what 
kinds of questions cognitive literary studies should address. Ellen Spolsky summarizes the foci of 
cognitive literary studies in one big question: 
[H]ow does the evolved architecture that grounds human cognitive processing, especially as it manifests itself 
in the universality of storytelling and the production of visual art, interact with the apparently open-ended 
set of cultural and historical contexts in which humans find themselves, so as to produce the variety of social 
constructions that are historically distinctive, yet also often translatable across the boundaries of time and 
space? (Spolsky 2004, viii.) 
 
Spolsky’s question straddles the line between the historically changeable cultural contexts of 
reception and cognitive generalizability, insisting that they both are vital to the task of cognitive art 
studies. Opting for a less assenting rhetoric, however, Adler and Gross argue that the cognitive turn 
actually marks an aggressive overturning of priorities in study of literature. Cognitivist or post-
cognitive-turn approaches elevate “the workings of the human mind, previously one among other 
possible foci of literary study, to the top level to which all other parameters of literature are 
subordinated” (Adler and Gross 2002, 198). According to some commentators, in Turner’s Literary 
Mind (1996) this priority manifests itself so forcefully that Turner seems to be using literature to 
explain cognition rather than using cognition to explain literature (Jackson 2000, 340). Gross (1997) 
suggests that this logic of study entails “tailoring the object of inquiry to the mode of inquiry” in a 
way that seems less concerned with the former than it seems to strive for the legitimization of the 
latter (282). Yet one must remember that similar critiques were once directed at other schools of 
inquiry – such as structuralism (e.g. Derrida 1978, 4; see also Gasché 1986, 144–147; Jackson 1991). 
 
In what may be seen as another attempt to stake a claim to scientificity of cognitive literary studies, 
many advances have been made towards making it more of a testable, experiment-based science. 
Experiments and test situations with actual human readers are newly abundant in literary study after 
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being out of the spotlight for decades.23 David Herman asserts that the rise of cognitive science has 
also marked the return of empirical and experimental approaches in the humanities. According to 
Herman, there have been “attempts to establish empirical methods for testing correlations between 
textual features and the processing triggered by those features” (2009, 79). This orientation has 
already produced several influential studies. 
 
A recent study conducted by David S. Miall (2015), who can be considered one of the pioneers of 
empirical cognitive literary study, is exemplary of this branch of inquiry. Building on previous 
discoveries of his own, as well as those of Willie Van Peer and Patrick Colm Hogan, Miall treats the 
ability to detect foregrounded elements in texts as a kind of cognitive universal. Miall believes that 
foregrounded features account for literariness of literature (see also Miall and Kuiken 1994; 1999; 
Miall 2006). The test method involves measuring changes in reading time – the milliseconds it takes 
for the stone to become stony, as it were – and requires the test readers to rank segments of text on 
basis of how “striking” they appear. According to Miall the test results were as expected: readers took 
longer to read passages in which effects of foregrounding were evident, and the foregrounded 
passages also elicited a heightened emotional response (2015, 178–180). 
 
Miall’s arguments for the necessity of empirical studies of reading have been humanist rather than 
scientist. It is easy to agree with the general ethos of his study. Miall has argued that since reading as 
a cultural practice might be in decline, it is important to ask why and how actual people read, and to 
observe what happens to them when they read. Equally urgent is the need to test whether there are 
effects unique to reading literary texts or whether reading can be shown to yield quantifiable cognitive 
benefits. While these questions should be more than enough to keep scholars occupied, it often seems 
that maintaining the accordance with the current cognitive science is the most pressing challenge. In 
a field that itself goes through rapid changes, painstaking and rigorous differentiation among 
theoretical ideas is constantly required. According to Carroll (2011), those who take evolutionary 
study of literature seriously “must constantly be assimilating new research in the evolutionary human 
sciences” (xi). The need to make literary study accommodate the different and often incompatible 
theoretical advances often seems the foremost rationale behind the publication of new volumes of 
literary studies. 
 
                                                          
23 Culler’s critique of empirical approaches during the heyday of reader-response approaches argues that these 
approaches cannot help but participate in the production of stories of reading. (1982, 64–83). 
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Hence, in response to the “cognitivist” approach, which proceeds from a theory of cognition based of 
mental representations – schemata, scripts and such – we now also have the anti-Cartesian, anti-
representationalist, enactivist views of cognition, all of which refute the view according to which 
cognition is based on mental representations (see Scarinzi 2015a). Several other recent volumes have 
shown similar emphasis in being primarily concerned with rectifying errors in our notions of the 
mind. Even Peter Stockwell, in his notably analysis-driven Cognitive Poetics, has an agenda for a 
renewed understanding of cognition. He urges that cognitive literary studies move beyond the 
Cartesian mind-body view of cognition (2002, 4).24 These examples point toward a more general 
preoccupation in cognitive literary studies. The scientific basis, which the new approaches are 
negotiating, is frequently so novel and disputed that literature actually becomes the fallback term, the 
affirmative, confirmatory point of reference in the rapidly changing wilderness of ideas about the 
mind. Consequently, one must constantly ask what, if anything, the responses to different scientific 
theories arising within cognitive or evolutionary literary studies are telling us about literature. “In a 
way they claim that literature is what people have thought it is since Aristotle,” Tony Jackson 
deadpans, “but now we know that this is biologically true” (2000, 336). Indeed, among the critiques 
of cognitive literary studies one of the more prominent has been the accusation for lack of novelty 
and inability to say anything about literature which is not already commonly held. However, theorists 
working in cognitive literary studies often articulate the need for practical and critical applications, 
even though producing them has proven a genuine challenge for a number of interesting reasons. 
Significantly, they are reminiscent of some of the problems encountered in structuralist and formalist 
poetics. 
 
 
The Problem of Interpretation in Cognitive Literary Studies 
 
Richardson and Steen (2002) note that few critics have produced “cognitively informed interpretive 
readings of literary texts that at the same time acknowledge their historical specificity” (5). They 
therefore seem to adhere to the argument that the capability to support well-formed analytical 
readings is the measure of success for any new theoretical perspective – and the lack of good readings 
therefore a deficiency (cf. Culler 2010). This deficiency is, of course, something that numerous 
publications since 2002 have striven to rectify. Yet unlike many other programs or theoretical 
                                                          
24 Arguably, however, the idea of embodied cognition has been extremely successful in cognitive literary studies and 
probably the one question concerning cognition that is less divisive in cognitive literary studies than it is in cognitive 
studies at large. 
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orientations, cognitive literary studies are not best known for producing insightful readings. As the 
role of interpretation was found problematic in earlier phases of systematic poetics, this dilemma can 
be approached by looking into Peter Stockwell’s work on cognitive poetics (2002; 2009). 
 
In his approach to cognitive poetics, Stockwell makes no effort to hide his allegiance to some of the 
aims of the structuralist and scientific endeavors of the earlier generations. Some of his basic notions 
are minor variations of old-school formalisms emphasizing the specific quality of literature, its 
literariness. Literature, Stockwell writes, is defined by its “texture,” which is “the experiential quality 
of textuality” (2009, 1, 14). On the other hand, his assertion that textuality itself “is the outcome of 
the workings of shared cognitive mechanics, evident in texts and readings,” echoes the Cullerian 
version of structuralist poetics, or in other words, the conventions-and-competences approach to the 
basic conditions of literary texts having meaning as literary texts (Culler 1975). Stockwell, like 
Culler, also posits that studying readings is a necessary part of poetics (Stockwell 2009, 1). He 
acknowledges that being able to discuss interpretation systematically was one of the reasons why the 
cognitive turn was embraced in literary studies (ibid., 4). Gavins and Steen (2003b) attest to this 
enthusiasm: “[Cognitive poetics] suggests that readings may be explained with reference to general 
human principles of linguistic and cognitive processing” (2). 
 
When it comes to analytical correspondences between structuralist and cognitive poetics, Stockwell 
is forthright about many central concepts of poetics maintaining their relevance in the context of 
cognitive poetics. In Cognitive Poetics (2002), many of these correspondences are explicitly spelled 
out. For one, narratological concepts of narrative agents and restrictions in point of view and 
knowledge are linked to the idea of deixis as part of embodied cognition. On the other hand, figure-
ground configurations in perception, on which the term “foregrounding” is based on, form a basis for 
literariness in the context cognitive literary studies. What was taken as the object of study in formalist 
and structuralist poetics, is redefined as the cognitive effect of foregrounded figures producing 
cognitive estrangement (see Stockwell 2002, 14). The connection between aesthetic and cognitive 
estrangement actually predates Stockwell’s cognitive poetics, as it was Reuven Tsur who first spun 
Jakobson’s catchphrase about literariness as a motto for cognitive poetics in the late 1970’s. Whereas 
Jakobson saw in poetry “an organized violence of poetic form over ordinary language,” to Tsur 
literariness was violence committed against cognitive processes (see Tsur 2002). 
 
Various criticisms facing Stockwell’s work result from the apparent mismatch of the conservatively 
conceived reach of poetics and the insistence on a non-conservative, non-Cartesian view of cognition 
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as embodied and extended. On one hand, therefore, the concepts are traditional, often linked by 
analogy to concepts that were already discussed by earlier formalist, structuralist, phenomenological, 
and psychoanalytic critics. As Miall points out, Cognitive Poetics sets out to deal almost exclusively 
with meaning and signification, thus failing to benefit from many of the new areas on which the 
notion of embodied cognition could expand, such as emotion, feeling, and aesthetics (see Stockwell 
2009, 4). On the other hand, Stockwell’s readings are fine-grained and immediately accessible to 
readers with background in literary studies. Again, it is evident that poetics and interpretation are 
rather more needing each other than being mutually exclusive. 
 
On the other hand, Stockwell’s work expedites the process in which cognitive poetics may become 
more metahermeneutic (Korthals Altes 2014). According to Korthals Altes the metahermeneutic 
approach to narrative entails a “metacritical analysis of conventions which allow people to make and 
interpret narratives.” The notable precursors to such metahermeneutics are found in poetics of Culler 
and Genette. (96.) Because of the strong emphasis on understanding underlying processes of readings 
and interpretations, Stockwell’s idea of poetics indeed comes close to some of the earlier ideas of 
poetics. 
 
If poetics, as Fludernik suggests, should today be seen as an open field of locally arising questions, 
sometimes the workings of cognitive literary studies seem to draw in the opposite direction (cf. 
Fludernik 2010, 924–925). Some critics have argued that this leads to the “disappearance of literature 
into the mind” (Gross 1997). Others have pointed towards the circularity or redundancy of 
argumentation (Jackson 2000; McHale 2012). In this, cognitive literary studies actually bears little 
resemblance to poetics, its appeal to scientificity notwithstanding. Rather, cognitive literary studies 
seem to become more and more defined by their approach to the study of mind, and less and less by 
their approach to the “literary” in the sense found in earlier poetics. 
 
As Richardson and Steen imply, the relevance of concepts used in one’s approach is usually shown 
by means of convincing analytical results (2002, 5; cf. Spolsky 1993, 3). In cognitive literary studies, 
there has been an internal polemic going on about the priorities of study. Marco Caracciolo raises this 
point in making a useful distinction between readings informed by cognitive science and other 
readings (2016). He argues that readings informed by cognitive science are not necessarily better 
interpretations than any other readings. If they are, it is not because the theory which they employ 
rectifies former theoretical shortcomings. In fact, Caracciolo suggests, readings “cannot contribute to 
a scientific project as is.” (190–195.) Caracciolo is not alone in saying this. This statement resembles 
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Hrushovski’s programmatic treatise on the division of labor between theoretical and descriptive 
poetics. On also hears a similar echo in Spolsky, who argues that descriptions of cognitive processing 
of literature should “only incidentally produce new interpretations of literary works” (2004, ix). 
 
This gives rise to an interesting contradiction in cognitive literary studies. On one hand, we can see 
that the cognitive turn recalls the heyday of structuralism in its attempts to ally literary study with 
“the aims, rules, and methods of scientific inquiry” (Korthals Altes 2014, 94). On the other hand, the 
orientation of cognitive literary studies also begins to resemble other “hermeneutic programs,” to use 
another, and in some ways opposite term from Korthals Altes (2014, 96). Korthals Altes defines 
hermeneutic program as an approach in which the adjective, “such as ethical, feminist, or rhetorical, 
defines the relevance frame, which in turn determines which textual elements become signifying in 
the first place and how they are taken to signify” (96). The adjective “cognitive” could be added to 
the list, although not all cognitive literary studies are equally liable to be seen as adherents of a 
hermeneutic program. It is worth pointing out that this is very much business as usual in poetics: as 
discussed in chapter 1.2, this cyclical movement between the predetermined relevance of certain 
concepts and perceived features is a constant in poetics. That is, it is not only the adjectival modifier 
which can define relevance – arguably poetics is always inclined to posit more or less prescriptive 
relevance frames as well as liable to produce more or less tendentious readings. As Susan R. Suleiman 
puts it, “Hermeneutics is not […] something one can do without (it is coextensive with all criticism), 
but merely something one can acknowledge or not” (1980, 38). 
 
If it is the case, as Korthals Altes suggests, that we tend to view the “adjectival” approaches as 
hermeneutic programs, it is evident that the results presented by cognitive literary studies are often 
programmatic interpretations of texts. Yet this might not be the sternest of critiques. If all 
interpretations entail a theory applied in reading, and if all approaches are somewhat hermeneutic and 
somewhat programmatic, it can simply be questioned whether cognitive literary studies has been a 
successful hermeneutic program. This is one context for the critical argument that the cognitive 
approaches are yet to illuminate literary studies with convincing readings. 
 
This work shares interest in the metahermeneutic direction taken in cognitive literary studies – 
especially cognitive poetics. Issues discussed in cognitive literary studies are closely related to the 
focus of this thesis, which views poetics as a theory of procedures and patterns of reading (but also, 
less amenably to the cognitivist focus, conventions of reading literary texts). Especially descriptive 
poetics, as discussed above, clearly states its metahermeneutic goals. Yet as shown in the previous 
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chapter, the cyclical procedures of poetics can be seen as hermeneutic in themselves. Poetics, 
therefore, is not seen as an alternative to hermeneutics, but as a way of coming to terms with a 
spectrum of interpretative processes. All the while, it must be acknowledged that this process of 
coming to terms is inherently circular and entails a movement characterizing the becoming of 
understanding in the modern hermeneutic tradition. 
 
 
Cognitive Poetics – A Theory of the Literariness of the Mind? 
 
Above, we have glimpsed into the ways in which cognitive approaches stake their claim to 
scientificity. On one hand, we have seen how cognitive literary studies emphasize that the validity of 
its results hinges on operating with a current and valid scientific view of how the human mind works. 
On the other hand, the blooming field of the digital humanities has renewed our interest in empirical 
and statistical data literary texts and actual acts of reading can present us with. Cognitive approaches 
to literature have adopted some of the methods of digital humanities, and with them, the scientific 
ideals of falsifiable theoretical conjectures and empirical testability. In addition, and even more 
importantly, cognitive studies have also informed the digital humanities. Cognitive science is largely 
responsible for the underlying conceptions of the mind, and for the understanding of how texts 
interact with minds. 
 
Cognitive literary studies have fought off the relativism and conceptual instability that seemed 
inherent and unavoidable in structuralism and various post-structuralist approaches. The strongest 
arguments for a stable ground on which the new cognitive literary studies should build are perhaps 
found in branches of cognitive literary study seeking neurobiological or evolutionary psychological 
basis for literary effects and experience of the literary (cf. Richardson 2004, 10–14). However, there 
is a link to an earlier stage in 20th century science. Asking whether the structures with which we 
analyze our culture are actually mental patterns was central to early structuralism. Robert Scholes 
nods towards this tendency by bestowing the ambiguous title “Structuralism as a movement of mind” 
on the opening section of Structuralism in Literature (1974). The scholars he cites, ranging from 
Claude Lévi-Strauss to Jean Piaget, are far less ambiguous. Lévi-Strauss writes in Structural 
Anthropology: 
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[W]e have been behaving as if there were only two partners – language on the other hand, culture on the 
other – and as if the problem should be set up in terms of the causal relations: ‘Is it language which influences 
culture? Is it culture which influences language?’ But we have not been sufficiently aware of the fact that 
both language and culture are the products of activities which are basically similar. I am now referring to this 
uninvited guest which has been seated during this Conference beside us and which is the human mind. (1963, 
71.) 
 
Let us also consider the following, from a 1984 interview of A. J. Greimas by Paul Ricœur: 
 
[Greimas:] We notice – simply, for example, by consulting a reader such as the one published by Dell Hymes 
on Language in Culture and Society – that three thousand human communities fabricate proverbs, riddles, 
stories, and so on in the same way, and that they narrate these by using forms which are, mutatis mutandis, 
identical. Consequently, when we speak about semio-narrative structures we are in fact dealing with kinds 
of universals of language, or rather with narrative universals. If we were not afraid of metaphysics we could 
say that these are properties of the human mind. (Greimas and Ricœur 1989, 555, emphasis added.) 
 
While there are similarities between the structuralist and cognitivist approaches to the forms of 
culture, these passages also help appreciate the differences. The excerpt from Greimas’s interview 
points towards a significant difference between the intellectual context of the structuralist and the 
cognitivist era. While the cognitive approaches may willingly engage with the category of the 
“natural,” Greimas abides by the (post)structuralist mistrust of “metaphysics,” if not without a hint 
of reluctance. Some branches of cognitive literary studies, especially those identifying themselves as 
materialist, are equally wary of metaphysics. The cognitive materialists, however, firmly count on 
the materiality of the neurocognitive basis to fend off this threat (cf. Richardson 2004, 19–20). 
 
Poetics deriving from formalism and structuralism, rather than establishing a structural uniformity of 
the text and mind, saw the internal emphasis between text and the reading processes switching to and 
fro without finally settling on either. Alfonsina Scarinzi shows how this mobility has helped the idea 
of literariness, foundational to the erstwhile “project” of poetics, to be adopted in cognitive literary 
studies. Even though literariness was introduced by Jakobson as a linguistic concept, it effortlessly 
transformed into “a matter of reader response coming into being in the interaction between the striking 
devices, which characterize a literary text, and the reader’s cognitive processes and feelings” (Scarinzi 
2015b, 262). In her discussion Scarinzi proposes to reassess the place of literariness in cognitive 
literary studies in the light of the so-called enactivist view of cognition, which purports to shed the 
dualisms dominating earlier studies, such as mind and body, or text and cognition. 
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According to Scarinzi, the early cognitivist view on literariness conceives of it as a readerly frame 
activating in response to “the striking stylistic devices of a literary text.” The anti-dualistic variant, 
marking a shift from cognitivist to enactivist literariness is defined as follows: 
 
[L]iterariness can be considered to be the lived aesthetic quality of the reader’s consummatory experience 
of the embodied process of sense-making of the reader’s deviation from expectation she brings forth in the 
interaction with the striking devices of a text. (2015b, 262.) 
 
One way to assess the possible validity and usefulness of such redefinitions must lie in their 
consequences for theory and application. This particular definition is all too helpful in determining 
what exactly is new about the notion of enactive literariness. It is not the concept of literariness, which 
is defined conservatively through the idea of deviation – the textual devices are equally “striking” 
whether they are defamiliarizing the language on the sentence level, or forcing the mind to refresh its 
schemata, or affecting the experience of the embodied process of sense-making. Neither is it the idea 
that literariness is negotiated between the text and the reader, as the interaction of the mind and text 
is the basic premise in all cases. The difference, then, is simply the different conception of mind in 
cognitivist and enactivist approaches. The theoretical strength of the enactivist definition seems to be 
its ability to exclude dualistic and disembodied notions of mind, but whether this has any practical 
and analytical consequences is questionable. The definition, in short, does not make the experience 
or quality of literariness emerge any clearer from literary texts. It simply makes a claim about how 
the experiencing and perceiving mind works. Such claims may affect our understanding of the mind 
in any number of significant ways, but they must be subjected to scientific scrutiny themselves. 
Gross’s comment on Turner is a case in point: she argues that when Turner’s argumentation seems 
most grounded on the physiological, neurological level it is actually purely speculative (Gross 1997, 
283). 
 
There is a recurring point of criticism, made by Bo Petterson, among others, that cognitive literary 
criticism at times shows a disregard for previous discussions in literary theory and criticism, which 
may lead to “thwarted results or false claims of critical novelty” (Pettersson 2011, 94). In particular, 
one has in mind here the history of critical scrutiny of the idea of deviation as the defining feature of 
literary language.25 The new empirical studies by Miall (2015), Emmott et al. (2013), and the 
                                                          
25 Cf. chapter 2.0 for further discussion for criticism of deviation-based conceptions of literary qualities of texts. 
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theoretical reframing in Scarinzi (2015b) all appeal to a simple, stylistic conception of deviation. The 
empirical studies proceed to seek corresponding deviation in neurocognitive responses to literary text. 
The theoretical reassessments, on the other hand, struggle to create any difference in the analytical 
applicability of the concept of literariness itself. It seems clear that both the empirical and the 
theoretical revamps fail to reap the rewards hard won by generations of thought questioning the 
deviation-based theory of foregrounded features of literary texts. The seemingly hard data provided 
by new methods encourage the researchers to assume a facile correlation between textual cues and 
cognitive effects (see Stockwell 2009, 3). Granted, it may be extremely difficult to measure the 
subtleties of literary experience, but at the moment these reassessments of literariness yield little more 
than a weary formula: deviant text, therefore, the mind, it boggles. 
 
Yet cognitive literary studies make several important points. Reading is not just decoding meaning 
but a multifarious experience. Although other aspects of that experience – attention and emotion as 
well as sensation, affect, and other types of physiological response – are deservedly getting more and 
more attention, we should maintain that seeking meaning is part of the experience of literature. 
Experienced effect of meaning, such as ambiguity or undecidability, surely cannot be reduced to the 
citations we use to demonstrate this effect in our interpretations. However, it is perfectly reasonable 
to consider ambiguity and indeterminacy as properties of text as well as its reception. If whatever 
constitutes such experience is codified in the text, if only partially, the new methods are far from 
being able to come to terms with the textual complexity of the phenomenon. 
 
This critical, perhaps overly critical, look into cognitive literary studies is not only relevant to poetics 
but also to Pynchon studies. Applications of cognitive science to literary study overlap with new 
digital and empirical approaches to processing texts, and indirectly contribute to the analyses made 
with the new methods. As ever, Pynchon Studies have been quick to embrace innovation in the new 
millennium. Christos Tsatsoulis studies the possibilities of algorithm-based data mining in describing 
the chapter structure of V., and Simon Rowberry uses the web-based Pynchon Wikis as a possible 
corpus to look into alongside with academic readings. The articles presenting these studies and their 
methods and results can be found in Orbit, the successor to Pynchon Notes and the main sounding 
board for new ideas in Pynchon studies (see Tsatsoulis 2013; Rowberry 2012). On the other hand, 
there are projects like Martin Paul Eve’s wordcloud “Visualizing Gravity’s Rainbow” (2015), which 
contains the text of the novel arranged according to word occurrence and proximity to other words. 
Most importantly, from the point of view of the field of study, it is freely available for the community 
47 
 
to use and evaluate both as a source of interpretable data and as a method of producing it.26 
 
These trends merit a mention before moving on to the final chapter of the introduction, in which a 
method for studying and describing secondary literature is laid out. The tasks of interpretation, 
annotation, and contextualization are taken on socially, communally, and institutionally. To some 
degree, in the academic context this has always been so. However, this is likely be a growing trend 
in the advent of the innovative methods in digital humanities and new empirical studies of reading. 
However, it seems that many things central to our notions of Pynchon and the Pynchonian still depend 
on individual human readers for their realization: the experience of reading Pynchon, the creative 
leap of seeing in a passage the key to understanding an extremely complex text, and the marvelous 
feeling of déjà vu or déjà lu when one first dips into the classics of Pynchon Studies. This work 
proceeds from the idea that there is still a great deal to be said about this human industry. 
 
 
 
1.4. Studying Pynchon Studies, Reading Readings: A Few Methodological 
Remarks 
 
Dialogue about ways of reading can be as gratifying as soliloquizing about others’ ways of reading is 
awkward. Garrett Stewart encapsulates one facet of the problem by reminding us that “an ethos of 
embodied reading is singular, intimate.” Yet at the same time this singularity is held in common to all 
readings: “it is the precondition for community as well as for representation, for social space all told.” 
(Stewart 2015, 2.) For several reasons, therefore, one cannot expect probing Pynchon Studies for 
demonstrations of shared ways of reading to be unproblematic. The present study sees this 
problematic not as something to be contained and surmounted but as an opportunity to practice a 
certain methodical sensitivity. The introduction concludes in this attempt to further describe the exact 
role of Pynchon studies in this work, while also striving to reflect on its own procedures of reading 
readings. The theoretical context for this self-reflection is poetics, understood as a theory of reading, 
and the methodological limitations of this work are, to a great degree, limitations of poetics. 
 
As discussed above, the urge to understand the conditions and conventions of interpretation and grasp 
                                                          
26 Also, in Pynchon Week 2015 conference Erik Ketzan introduced a corpus-based computational application, which 
recognizes recurring configurations of word patterns, sentence structures, and simple semantic relations such as 
antonymy in Pynchon’s texts. It seems that the results are yet to be published. 
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the underlying protocols can be seen as a sign of “the turn towards the reader” in literary theory, but, 
in equal measures, it is symptomatic of the third phase of scientific poetics (see Seamon 1989, 301). 
According to Seamon, this stage is the one in which the “project” of poetics stalls. It is possible to 
wonder, after de Man, whether theory finally reached the point in which the increasing sophistication 
of theory veered into the impossibility of “doing” it (cf. de Man 1986, 19). 
 
Indeed, any attempt at methodical observation of reading procedures has to be met with certain 
caveats. On one hand, academic readings are complex and sophisticated, and it is easy to see the 
potential problem in seeking basic similarities in studies bringing different, often avowedly 
“incompatible” theories, contexts, and ideas to reading Pynchon. Also, seeing Pynchon Studies as a 
corpus that demonstrates how Pynchon is read requires interpretation in itself. Few studies are 
themselves methodically committed to the task of reflecting on how they proceed in analysis, and a 
great deal will have to be inferred. As the diversity of possible approaches to literary study keeps 
growing, also the possible priorities of studies become more and more plural. As Culler notes, recent 
decades have not favored approaches attempting to reconstruct “the codes that make possible literary 
works and their effects” (Culler 2010, 906). 
 
On the other hand, using Pynchon-scholarship as source material elicits a suspicion that the shared 
ways of reading and explication in evidence can never be shown to be anything but an institutional 
phenomenon. The similar ways of writing and talking about Pynchon could be merely conventional, 
and they might result from exposure to academic training in practices of textual analysis. This would 
inevitably point toward the mechanic springing from the pages of Gravity’s Rainbow, “the 
routinization of charisma.” This possibility, lest we forget, is something Pynchon Studies have 
deemed paranoia-worthy for nearly four decades, ever since Levine and Leverenz’s Mindful 
Pleasures (1976). 
 
There are certain practical steps that one can take regardless. The methodological choice is to 
provisionally bracket off the theories brought to bear on Pynchon. For the purposes of my study it is 
not necessary to categorize Pynchon Studies according to a distinctive qualifier, such as approach or 
theoretical orientation. Such undertaking would be appropriate for a bibliographer or perhaps 
somebody writing a guidebook to Pynchon Studies, but not to somebody who is interested in the 
repeated patterns across the spectrum of approaches. As mentioned above, the initial bafflement arises 
because of certain citations coming up regardless of the theoretical context in which they are used as 
evidence. It should therefore be certainly possible to look at the citations themselves, and try to 
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discern how they are used to support the argument, logic, or position of the study. The simplest 
explanation is often the most plausible. Many citations are chosen because of their referential content. 
Pynchon’s fictional paraphernalia, fixtures, and garb tell us a great deal about the vision mediated by 
the novels. His dogs, landscapes, seascapes and skyscapes, rivers, buildings, faces, cars, ships, and 
machines offer countless possibilities to detect an interest towards certain aspects of the world, but 
also to explore their role in the fabric of the works. Here, however, the focus is more limited, and the 
point of interest is in how citations are used as part of an argument. 
 
I am talking about the step in which the citation is used in demonstration of its relevance to the work, 
its connectivity within it, and its capacity to illuminate and even stand for the whole. Such passages 
are framed functionally, as key passages seen as relevant to the global interpretive framework. On the 
level of analysis, this very often entails appeal to some of the procedures discussed in the following 
chapter. All of these procedures seem to involve 1) showing that certain thematic material suggests a 
model that is seen to reflect metaphorically or even analogically the overall design of the work; and 
2) treating a part of the text as representative of the whole. 
 
As much of my own vocabulary derives from the study of poetics, which remains a theoretical 
background for many theories of reading, it should be said that there are certain ideas stemming from 
this tradition which this study expressly tries to resist. The work at hand will not treat Pynchon studies 
as attempts to bring Pynchon’s writing within a sphere of some metalanguage or another. In its 
illuminating critique of structuralism, Fredric Jameson’s Prison-House of Language (1972) dedicates 
a great deal of space to the problem of metalanguage. Jameson approaches the problem in its classical 
structuralist form via Roland Barthes, who noted that when the analyst speaks in a metalanguage, she 
or he inaugurates an infinite type of knowledge-system: if someone analyzed the writings of this 
analyst for its latent content, it would be necessary to do this in a new metalanguage (Jameson 1972, 
208). The idea of metalanguage potentially obscures the inevitable realization that we still reflect on 
our use of language by the means of language. In fact, the simultaneity of communication and 
metacommunication can be considered a definite feature of discourse (see Gasché 1986, 78). 
 
Jameson’s The Political Unconscious (1981) offers a solution to the language-metalanguage problem, 
and it strikes a familiar chord. The deconstruction of the binary of metalanguage and object-language 
became one of the recurrent procedures of deconstructive criticism (cf. Keskinen 1998, 55). 
Jameson’s solution also dismantles the opposition, but it is also recognizable in the context of poetics. 
While defending his interpretive position (the neo-Marxist) against others – the ethical, the 
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psychoanalytical, the myth-critical, the semiotic, the structural, and the theological – Jameson states 
that we never confront a text immediately but through sedimented layers of previous interpretations 
and categories inherited from critical traditions. These presuppositions, according to Jameson, dictate 
the use of method, which Jameson conceives as “metacommentary.” (Jameson 1981, ix–x; also 1971.) 
The idea of metacommentary differs from that of metalanguage in that it does not entail a hierarchical 
model of subordinate linguistic levels. Jameson writes: “every individual interpretation must include 
an interpretation of its own existence, must show its own credentials and justify itself: every 
commentary must be at the same time a metacommentary as well” (1971, 10). The method of 
metacommentary is reflective but posits that this reflectivity is possible within language, not only by 
means of a metalanguage. In a distinctly Cullerian way Jameson also suggests that in a 
metacommentary the question about interpreting a text properly is accompanied by the question of 
why we should have to do so at all (ibid.).27 
 
According to McHale (1994), Jameson’s approach is sensitive to the space between theory and the 
meaning of the text arrived at via interpretation. This perhaps explains McHale’s suggestion that 
Jameson is very good at doing descriptive poetics. Jameson’s analysis leaves room for “a semi-
autonomous level of forms” and does not “rush to neutralize the mediating forms of literary 
expression.” (63.) McHale’s treatment of Jameson also reflects the change in thinking about the role 
of poetics. The insistence on different levels of observation now comes across as a precaution against 
the phenomenon McHale sees as a symptom of the proliferation of “cultural” theories and approaches, 
in which the mediating level of textual features and the attendant tradition and history is neglected 
and theory is allowed to collapse into interpretation (ibid., 56). If McHale calls forms “semi-
autonomous,” perhaps not the most illuminating expression, it is not to suggest that forms are not 
shaped by ideology or social sphere, but to emphasize that they do not express an ideology or social 
realities without also being part of the history of literary forms or without being shaped by literary 
traditions (see ibid., 63–64). Conspicuously absent, compared to earlier, structuralist conception of 
studying and describing literature as a system, are the assumptions of isomorphic relations and 
discoverable transformational rules between the levels. 
 
This brings us to another idea stemming from the formalist poetics that needs rethinking. According 
                                                          
27 Jameson eventually turns the question on its head and states that what requires explanation is not so much the need to 
interpret novels but the fact that we do not always have that need (1971, 12). This leads Jameson towards the 
political unconscious behind the deceptively transparent realism and those texts of each historical moment that seem 
the least in need of interpretation. 
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to a long line of work on “literariness,” the passages most likely to elicit interpretation offer 
themselves to scrutiny through various mechanisms of linguistic or cognitive deviance.28 Wolfgang 
Iser is quite right to call this idea, first theorized by the Russian Formalists, the “old answer” (1978, 
87–91). The question of textual passages with seemingly heightened “interpretability” might be 
difficult to answer without some notion of deviation (cf. Chambers 1984, 12–13). Iser, however, 
insists that this deviation should not be defined as a difference from ordinary or non-literary language, 
but simply deviation in context, deviation from norms which are determined contextually. It is 
therefore the concept of context that most critically requires rethinking. When Iser discusses context, 
he is concerned with the sum total of not only literary and social systems by which the work is formed 
but also of the context provided by the whole of the work. This together amounts to what Iser names 
the work’s repertoire (1978). 
 
According to Iser, the specifically literary problem of context lies in “the fact that the whole text can 
never be perceived at any one time” (ibid., 108). The text as “an object” can only be imagined by way 
of consecutive phases of reading. The reader’s “wandering viewpoint,” however, is at once both 
caught up in and transcended by what it is to apprehend. Each of the phases of reading concretizes 
aspects of the object that reading tries to constitute, but none can be representative of it. (Ibid., 109.) 
According to Harding (1993), Iser’s notions of context and repertoire should be seen against the 
backdrop of phenomenology, going back as far as Hegel. Drawing on Mukarovsky’s 
background/foreground distinction and figure/ground perception of gestalt psychology, Iser states 
that reading can be understood as a series of consistency-building, gestalt-differentiating operations. 
 
To Iser, however, the process is neither cumulative nor complementary. There are alien elements only 
just excluded from the emerging gestalten, “outlined without being brought to focus.” Iser goes on: 
“From their virtual presence arise the ‘alien associations’ which begin to accumulate and so to 
bombard the formulated gestalten, which in turn become undermined and thus bring about a 
reorientation of our acts of apprehension.” (1978, 126.) Harding shows that Iser maintains that we 
always fall short of the final synthesis, the constitution of the whole or the totality. Instead the 
concretizations produce a series of wholes, “movements.” According to Harding, there is no 
culmination or resolution for the movements: “[T]he pull is not toward an autonomous unconditioned 
external Universal, but through semantic, interactional diversities. While the dialectical interaction is 
actual, it is textual and linguistic, not transcendental or spiritual.” (1993, 46–47.) 
                                                          
28 See chapter 1.3 above. 
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In addition to complexifying the idea of literariness as deviation, the notion of dynamically shifting 
“movements” of reading could be crucial to understanding how novels like Pynchon’s are 
processed.29 The idea closely echoes the Gadamerian conception of the hermeneutic circle of reading. 
Gadamer states in Truth and Method: 
 
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole 
as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is 
reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out this fore-projection, 
which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding 
what is there. (2004, 269; cf, Aczel 2001, 606–607.) 
 
A succinct summary of how context is understood in this line of thinking is offered by Michael 
Wheeler: context is a local manifestation of the background, the whole of which is unrepresentable 
(cf. Iser 1978, 94–95; Harding 1993). This conception of how the gestalt or figure changes, loses its 
form, or is replaced by another during the process of reading seems a viable – if possibly unwieldy – 
option to the simplistic model of deviation. 
 
The final caveat to the method of reading readings is that it should not be accompanied with grand 
claims of novelty. Indeed, what I would rather claim is that reading readings is something few studies 
can do without. In this work, however, the focus on poetics and on the procedures of reading requires 
an unusually concentrated effort at negotiating the degree to which our protocols of reading allow 
methodization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 McHale’s (1979) analysis of the concretization-deconcretization structure of Gravity’s Rainbow presents a version of 
this line of reasoning. 
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2 Approaches to Pynchon Studies as Pattern Recognition 
 
 
 
I have tried to argue that quotations, like statistics, can easily be extracted to 
muster evidence for whatever ‘coherence,’ ‘logic,’ or ‘position’ their 
manipulator wants to find anyway. (McHoul 1987, 31.) 
We can classify new studies of Gravity’s Rainbow by their quotations: do they 
focus on the juicy set pieces – the colonies as the outhouses of European 
souls, the vampirish lament of Technologies for their funding, the stout 
rainbow cock – or do they regale us with felicities we had passed over? 
(Hume 1986, 116.) 
If we construct meaning from comparing pattern recognition, we must rely 
less on a will to truth than on a will to community. (Berressem 2012, 173.) 
 
 
 
 
As the first surge of Pynchon Studies settled, having spanned roughly a decade from 1976 to late 
1980s, the accumulated reservoir or criticism made possible as well as necessary a certain 
introspective stance. Two of the citations above, one from Alec McHoul and another from Kathryn 
Hume, represent the interest stirring in Pynchon Studies towards its own reading practices and 
analytical procedures. Both of the studies cited above reflect on the field of Pynchon Studies as an 
“interpretive community” negotiating the canon of citations and preferred interpretations, as well as 
reflecting on its habitual interpretive moves. The turn toward the reader, breaking into the academic 
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mainstream with the publication of several influential volumes on reader-response (such as Tompkins 
1980; Suleiman and Crosman 1980) as well as Culler’s rethinking of poetics as a theory of reading 
were debated in many of the main publications on the field. That these writings coincide temporally 
with the peak period of reader-response criticism seems by no means incidental, and many studies 
not directly committed to the “turn toward the reader” can be expected to share some interests with 
one of the prevailing research paradigms of the time.30 Yet the debate about citing Pynchon has always 
been very much a debate about Pynchon, and about the question whether his works are in agreement 
with our methods. 
 
In emphasizing the metatheoretical side of these studies I wish to suggest that the questions they raise 
about ways of reading and making interpretive moves are still compelling and, largely, unanswered. 
The third epigraph above, form Hanjo Berressem’s contribution to the Cambridge Companion to 
Thomas Pynchon (a veritable Who’s who of Pynchon Studies as of the early 2000’s), is also very much 
of its time. The term with which it approaches the common procedural ground in Pynchon Studies, 
with its diverse approaches and analytics, is sensibly broad: pattern recognition. 
 
However, neither Berressem nor anybody else is mooting the point about a “canon of citations” in 
Pynchon Studies (cf. McHoul 1987, 31). As suggested in the introduction, that the recognition of this 
canon requires but a tentative dip into Pynchon studies is intriguingly at odds with the widespread 
notion of ambiguity and indeterminacy at the heart of Pynchon’s art. Yet of course the issue is more 
general. Citing the analyzed text to strengthen whatever coherence, logic, or position one wants to 
find is one of the fundamentals of academic writing, and therefore the issue is much larger than 
Pynchon Studies. Anybody who is not a complete stranger to literary studies knows that it is not just 
Pynchon whose studies are continuously illuminated by the same key passages. The field of Pynchon 
Studies, however, has clearly benefited from acknowledging that there are conventional patterns – 
and from making the effort to look past them. As shown in the introduction, several recent works 
intentionally set out to work with overlooked segments of Pynchon’s novels. Arguably, though, 
Pynchon Studies have always tended towards a self-reflexive rhetoric, quite possibly inherited from 
the object of study (see chapter 1.1 above). 
 
                                                          
30McHoul’s and Hume’s comments can be seen as emblematic of a number of logics or positions. McHoul’s position is 
that of a rather extreme grammatological textualist, as best seen in Writing Pynchon (1990, with David Wills). With 
her Pynchon’s Mythography (1987), Hume was among the first to comment on the theoretical lopsidedness of 
Pynchon Studies during the 1980s and to argue that the predominance of postmodernist theory might end up 
impoverishing the stock of knowledge about Pynchon (1987, 186–195). 
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The starting point for my inquiry into the patterns of Pynchon studies is the observation that some 
citations show up with great frequency regardless of the coherence, logic, or position they are meant 
to support. It suggests that there are operations at play perhaps best characterized as pattern 
recognition, to borrow Berressem’s term, that are not a priori subordinate to our consciously and 
methodologically applied logics and our chosen theoretical positions. Becoming a reader of Pynchon 
Studies will quickly lead to a realization that certain passages come up with such frequency that the 
repetition itself begins to seem almost Pynchonian. Again depending on our position it might either 
confirm that some qualities of writing make Pynchon’s prose exceptionally citable, or that literary 
language has means to attract our attention to itself, or that style can produce an effect of heightened 
intensity and reader engagement, or that it is necessary to subject literary criticism to the Derridean 
idea of citationality or iterability. The chapter at hand, however, proceeds along two simple lines on 
a more general level. 
 
First it argues that some aspects of Pynchon’s writing rather than others can be linked to the extreme 
citationality and the copious repetition of patterns in Pynchon Studies, and studying these aspects has 
traditionally been the province of poetics. Secondly, it must be argued that the answers to the first 
question are in some respects generalizable to literary study at large. This idea structures the latter 
parts of this chapter, which consist of three discussions of specific interpretive or analytic procedures. 
The first of these (chapter 2.1) looks into the use of Pynchon’s “ideas” as models and metaphors for 
the ways his novels work. Modelling can be regarded as a basic mental operation behind many 
cognitive skills – some perfectly mundane, some highly imaginative. Pynchon’s ideas discussed here 
seem to resist easy assimilation as models of literary designs or interpretive moves, but can be and 
often are given that role in interpretations. I will argue that conventions of reading literary texts play 
a significant role in the strategy of seeking models and metaphors. The second subchapter (2.2.) takes 
a further step towards reading strategies more specifically connected to aesthetic reception. This 
subchapter studies the tradition of the device known as mise en abyme. This device has been 
extensively discussed in aesthetics and art theory, including literary theory. Here it is treated as a 
specific type of modelling procedure, and this is also the view taken in new cognitively informed 
studies of mise en abyme. The final part of this chapter (2.3.) discusses a specifically literary critical 
procedure of thematization. It is argued here that thematization is at work in many extremely well 
received and persuasive readings, of Pynchon and otherwise. On the whole, this chapter seeks to 
identify certain recurring reading strategies that participate in great many readings of Pynchon’s 
novels. They are also telling of the practices of analysis and of structures of literary criticism itself. 
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With the methodological reservations of the final part of the first chapter in place, my sampling of 
Pynchon studies mostly focuses on the practices and procedures of interpretive and descriptive work. 
Yet it is important to acknowledge that these types of “work” in literary criticism are fundamentally 
a site of creative and idiosyncratic thinking. Some aspects of literary analysis are best understood as 
creative yet purposeful acts of reading than as derivative and metalinguistic (meta)commentaries. 
Although reading may be only possible “after (a) theory,” as Valentine Cunningham puts it, this 
should not suggest to us that either the use of theory is fully programmatic and methodical or else it 
is fully inadvertent (cf. Cunningham 2004). In literary theory, this position might be best represented 
by Iser. According to John Paul Riquelme, Iser’s view on reading does not entail understanding 
something “contained and given in advance by the text.” Instead, it generates “a new perspective and 
mental object.” Rather than taking stock of procedures of reading, Iser’s view of the act of reading 
sees reading as the place of creativity in culture. (Riquelme 2000, 8.) 
 
While Iser’s position is shaped by the tradition of studying the phenomenology of literary works, the 
ideas he puts forth also have bearing on a more general theory of understanding and knowledge. 
Highlighting the role of creativity in methodical thinking, Thomas Kuhn coins the term “re-
orientation.” He holds the view that there is an ongoing exchange between the conscious and 
unconscious, as well as the inadvertent and learned aspects of observation. Kuhn writes: 
 
The complexity of the objects presented by experience permits an infinity of independent observations; so 
that the process of scientific observation presupposes a choice of those aspects of experience which are to 
be deemed relevant. But the judgment of relevancy is made on a largely unconscious basis in which 
commonsense experience and pre-existing scientific theories are intimately intermingled. (Cited in Galison 
2016.) 
 
Kuhn’s idea about the predetermined relevance of certain aspects of experience, which can be either 
unconscious or conscious, is also found in theory of poetics. We can see it at work in Olsen’s account 
of poetics, which posits that interpretation entails a method of “assigning artistic relevance to parts 
of a work identified through this method,” and which sees this cyclical process as inevitable (Olsen 
1976, 349). This view, where expressed by Kuhn, is often found in the form of an argument for 
perception and observation always already being “theory-laden” (see Kaiser 2016, 78). Similar ideas 
of there being, as Fry puts it, “method to our inadvertencies,” are found in theories of reading, 
reception, and interpretation. Such approaches suggest a possibility of a theory of reading that could 
challenge the dichotomies commonly structuring our theorizing. 
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Reading must be allowed to traverse the boundary of conscious and unconscious processing, cultural 
learning and human capability. As Culler has pointed out, it is extremely difficult to draw clearly the 
line between what is done consciously and what is done unconsciously in reading (1975, 137). 
Although it is obvious that much of interpretive reading results from consciously made interpretive 
moves, and while it is clear that many reading processes are guided by conventional procedures 
attributable to cultural knowhow and literary competence, too much in reading is decided on the 
threshold of conscious attention to warrant leaving either aspect of reading out of consideration (cf. 
Rabinowitz 1987, 42–46). Furthermore, understanding the creative idiosyncrasy involved in literary 
readings requires a reflective stance on seemingly commonsensical notions of application or use of 
theory. In contrast with inadvertencies, working with texts often entail a pragmatic and goal-oriented 
employment of theory rather than a mechanical and neutral application. 
 
To briefly show why discussion of readings benefits from giving room to creative idiosyncrasy, let us 
consider Matthew Carbery’s essay “A War on Totality.” Its interpretive conclusions are based on what 
seems to be a unique reading of one of the most often quoted passages in V.: 
 
Under “Florence, April, 1899” is a sentence, young Stencil has memorized it: "There is more 
behind and inside V. than any of us had suspected. Not who, but what: what is she. God grant 
that I may never be called upon to write the answer, either here or in any official report. (V., 
63, emphasis added) 
 
What is particularly distinctive about this reading is that Carbery’s attention is drawn to the fact that 
the text from Sidney Stencil’s journals is not really “a sentence” but three sentences, which allows 
the analysis to focus upon the other principal meaning of the word “sentence.” We may interpret the 
passage sentencing Stencil to his obsessive search. 
 
But this interpretive idiosyncrasy is necessarily offset with certain shared and familiar interpretive 
moves. Carbery’s point is not that the text uses the word “sentence” in its punning and punitive sense. 
Rather, the text creates an unsolvable indeterminacy of meaning: 
 
Ultimately – as is so often the case throughout V. – we cannot decide on the sovereignty of either of the 
meanings of the ‘sentence’ from which the quest begins. We are thus led to an indeterminate position 
between the two which is not, following Barthes’ notion of the text, necessarily a negation of any possible 
meaning. (Carbery 2012, n.p.) 
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Carbery also sets off from the widespread interpretation that in V., Stencil is the reader’s double, or 
that the reader’s position in relation to the novel is analogous to Stencil’s position in relation to V. 
Carbery also cites a classic treatment of this idea, Elizabeth Campbell’s essay “Metaphor and V.: 
Metaphysics in the Mirror” (1988). It seems strikingly obvious that this holistic interpretation is much 
less directly based on anything we could point to as “textual evidence.” It also seems that the 
idiosyncratic reading on the level of detail can easily attach to more familiar larger-scale interpretive 
patterns, which makes the whole reading comprehensible in terms of conventions of the novel and 
novelistic reading. The figure of the reader’s double makes a strong appeal to self-reflexive qualities 
routinely ascribed to literature. We can find the notion of reading or questing characters mirroring the 
reading process recurring in works as dissimilar and temporally far apart as Robert Alter’s classic 
Partial Magic (1975) and Reading Matters: Narrative in the New Media Ecology edited by Joseph 
Tabbi and Michael Wutz (1997). In literature, the convention suggests, reading characters are 
interpretable as the reader’s images, whether sentenced to their fate or not. 
 
Interestingly, the idiosyncratic part of the process seems to be more directly engaged with the textual 
features, and also more imaginative and creative. This type of idiosyncrasy is actually one of the 
things that brought New Criticism under fire in the post-war academia (cf. Culler 1988b, 275). The 
less surprising aspects of the reading, are, inversely, based on textual evidence far more indirectly 
and implicitly, and they also are more clearly entangled with institutional ways of reading. The 
reading strategies discussed in the following parts of this chapter belong to the latter category. 
Although they allow for great interpretive ingenuity these strategies also have been institutionalized 
and theorized, taught and learned, consciously and unconsciously. However, let this interlude stand 
as a reminder that our protocols of reading only allow methodization to a certain degree: like literature 
itself, literary analysis has an element of “singularity” to it (cf. Attridge 2004). While this aspect is 
often backgrounded in literary studies, we had better stay attuned to it. At least if one day, as Geoffrey 
Hartman once demanded, criticism should look beyond its educational and social functions to “take 
back its freelance, creative powers” (Hartman 1977, 410). 
 
The coming scrutiny of Pynchon’s novels and their reading in this thesis should be bookended by an 
emphatic statement about what this study aims not to question, namely the force of any individual 
interpretation. Individual readings can end up stating the obvious and the conventional without this 
meaning that what the interpreter does, when working closely with the text, is obvious at all. Inversely, 
highly original and contemporary theoretical approaches may find their best illumination in the same 
key passages that have been cited for decades in Pynchon Studies. 
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2.1 At the Interface: Models and Metaphors 
 
 
He inverts all values and all proportions, because he is constantly under the 
impression that he is deciphering signs […] [H]e sees nothing but 
resemblances and signs of resemblance everywhere; for him all signs 
resemble one another, and all resemblances have the value of signs. 
(Foucault 1989, 54.) 
I had discovered that scientific language, when taken “literally” (non-
scientifically) becomes metaphoric. (Brooke-Rose 1991, 14.) 
 
 
 
Readers of Pynchon’s novels are familiar with the uncommon extent to which the author’s work 
engages with natural sciences and mathematics. The dialogue with numerous scientific fields is also 
mirrored in Pynchon Studies: the role of scientific concepts, ideas, and theories in the novels has been 
discussed vigorously since the emergence of the field. Among the scarce biographical details, 
Pynchon’s engineering studies at Cornell and subsequent period of employment as a technical writer 
for the aircraft and missile manufacturer Boeing are well known.31 Those areas of scientific inquiry 
                                                          
31 Pynchon worked as a technical writer in either the Minuteman or the Bomarc project – or quite possibly both (cf. 
Comyn 2014; Cowart 1980; Wisnicki 2000). The former project developed an intercontinental ballistic missile 
capable of delivering nuclear charges, while the latter worked on a surface-to-air interceptor missile which was to 
become the weapon of choice of the automatized missile defence of the North American continent. The only known 
piece written by Pynchon in the job is the slightly odd health and safety essay “Togetherness” (1960), which was 
published in the journal Aerospace Safety. However, Wisnicki (2000) suggests that Bomarc Service News may have 
featured up to 30 articles by Pynchon in 1960–1962. 
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which academics are these days more and more obliged to call the STEM fields32 also figure far more 
in writings on Pynchon than generally tends to be the case in literary studies. The influence of science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics on Pynchon’s writing is inescapable, but their function in 
his novels has proven more difficult to pin down. 
 
To presume in turn that at least some scientists have been able to connect with Pynchon’s work is not 
entirely fanciful, either. One of the first and most extensive treatment of the role of science in Pynchon 
was written by Alan J. Friedman, a physicist as well as a literary scholar (1983). The role of sciences 
has occupied scholars to varying degrees through decades, and in recent years the significance of 
various scientific revolutions to Pynchon’s novels has been most extensively discussed in Pynchon 
and Relativity by Simon de Bourcier (2012).33 The notion that Pynchon’s fiction might meaningfully 
address the scientific revolutions of the 20th century – such as the changes in our view of natural laws 
and cosmology brought about by quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity – has also elicited 
actual dialogue between literary scholars and scientists.34 All this has contributed to the view that 
Pynchon might be in possession of the rare ability to reach across the “Snovian disjunction,” to speak 
to scientists as well as to “literary intellectuals.”35 
 
In the context of this work it is obvious, however, that the use of sciences in Pynchon is in many 
respects a subset of what is named above “Pynchon’s theory” and defined as a fluid conception of all 
those fields of knowledge by which Pynchon’s writing seems to be “fundamentally informed” (cf. 
Pöhlmann 2012). In this context, revisiting scientific ideas is worthwhile for one specific reason, and 
it has to do with what these ideas are not. As discussed in chapter 1.1 and below, an important aspect 
of “Pynchon’s theory” has been its capability to show that whatever literary or linguistic theory we 
bring to bear on the novels, Pynchon’s text can be seen to comment on and undercut the explanatory 
power of this theory. As I will show below, the specific interest of analyzing scientific models in 
Pynchon arises from how they resist being incorporated in interpretation purely as models of textual 
production, structure, or reception. 
                                                          
32 Acronym for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. 
33 Moreover, the multifaceted relationship between science and fiction has been discussed by Ryan (2011) and 
Rabinowitz (2011), among others. See also Routledge Companion to Literature and Science (Clarke and Rossini, 
eds. 2011). 
34 Richard Pearce in Novel: A Forum on Fiction (1985) Pearce’s essay was followed by Laurence Rosenheim’s reply 
with Pearce’s rejoinder in Pynchon Notes issue 17 (1985). See also Tabbi 1984. 
35 C. P. Snow’s famous dictum about the split of the academic world into two cultures, of scientists and of literary 
intellectuals, haunts Pynchon’s mid-career. While announcing the nomination of Gravity’s Rainbow for the National 
Book Award in 1974, author Ralph Ellison praises the novel for “bridging the gap between the two cultures.” 
Pynchon himself gives Snow’s 1959 lecture “Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution” a place of privilege in the 
polemic of his essay “Is It OK to be a Luddite?” (1984). 
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Therefore, models of natural sciences and mathematics, transformed though they are into literary 
ideas in Pynchon, present a new kind of challenge. The challenge is specifically posed to the idea of 
“interfacing theory and text;” the kind of integration or synthesis, which is endemic to study of 
poetics.36 In addition to becoming distinctly literary ideas which are quite capable of being turned 
back on the hermeneutic circle of textuality, these ideas also remain open towards other processes of 
understanding (in) the world. Through its strong bonding with other, non-literary discourses, and 
other, non-literary contexts, the scientific theory incorporated in Pynchon’s novels reminds us of the 
larger horizon of models, discourses, and conceptual networks within which the literary is no longer 
the primary concern. For its part, science in Pynchon participates in thematizing the human need for 
explication and interpretation everywhere, not just in reading. However, the capacity to be used in 
explaining textual and literary features remains potent, if latent, in these models. Hence the scientific 
ideas come to have a peculiar kind of functionality in Pynchon. This functionality can be 
demonstrated in a short analysis of a short story. 
 
 
Interpreting Entropy in “Entropy” 
 
Pynchon’s early short story “Entropy” demonstrates the functional mobility of scientific concepts and 
theories in fiction. Dictating his personal history to his assistant, (and in the process becoming the 
first of Pynchon’s many characters to refer to a version of himself in the third person,) the brooding 
Princeton alumnus Callisto puts it thus: “he found in entropy or the measure of disorganization for a 
closed system an adequate metaphor to apply to certain phenomena in his own world […]” (SL, 88 
–89, emphasis added). This seems like a good description of how the concept is used in Pynchon, too. 
It is unlikely that outside science fiction any of Pynchon’s contemporaries go to greater lengths in 
motivating the use of scientific concepts in such a way that retains an explicit connection to scientific 
discourses. However, the surplus of meaning these concepts generate in Pynchon’s fiction is due to 
them seeming such adequate metaphors for certain phenomena. 
 
Discussing the characteristics of the use of entropy therefore requires keeping the interpretive horizon 
open. Callisto’s use of entropy as a metaphor may be the foregrounded, and apparently the more 
literary meaning, but it is equally important that the concept is also thematized in the story in the 
                                                          
36 See chapter 1. 
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sense which is conventionally understood as non-metaphoric. This multivalence is what makes the 
use of entropy particularly telling of the way Pynchon’s novels build their network of ideas, concepts 
and highly interpretable passages. The short story shows how this plurality of potential meanings 
opens up the interpretive horizon. 
 
In one of the two alternating storylines, Callisto tries to harness thermodynamic entropy. He has 
turned his apartment into a hermetically sealed “hothouse,” in which he assumes all temperatures are 
bound to become and remain equal. This should help him revive a dying bird, whom he tries to warm 
with the heat of his own body. Callisto talks us through the basic theory of thermodynamic entropy, 
but also extends the idea of entropy metaphorically in his premonition of the imminent “heat-death” 
of culture (SL, 87–89). The other storyline concerns a party that goes on interminably in the adjacent 
apartment. One of the guests has marital problems which he attributes to “noise” in communication. 
This concept comes from information theory, in which noise is analogous to and sometimes equated 
with “entropy” (Schweighauser 2011, 147). The analogy also inverts some of the relations involved: 
whereas in thermodynamics the states of high entropy are the least complex, in communication theory 
high entropy means high complexity (Bruni, 2011; Hayles 1990, 51; Palmeri 1987, 983; 
Schweighauser 2011, 147). The cultural analogy thrives despite this inconsistency. High 
communicational entropy makes communication impossible just like high thermodynamic entropy 
makes life impossible. Neither sounds like it is good news for humanity. 
 
In the story, the multifaceted figuration created by the different meanings of entropy becomes a rich 
source of interpretations. The party can be taken to represent the idea of cultural heat-death (cf. Plater 
1978, 139); the states of affairs in the two apartments may be seen analogous to two different ways 
of understanding entropy (cf. Tanner 1971, 154–155; Seed 1988, 36–49); the two main characters, 
one in each apartment, can be shown to function as “a shorthand picture of the human alternatives” 
of coping with it (Tanner 1971, 155). With its two storylines, flatly allegorical characters, and 
different concepts of entropy each spun as metaphors to the others, Pynchon’s story itself can be seen 
as a mobile system of differential states (cf. Seed 1988, 52). In its capacity to fuel such interpretations, 
we see the force of entropy as a metaphor in the context of the story. We see how it remains connected 
to the scientific fields in which it is taken to figure non-metaphorically, while also being richly 
suggestive of phenomena of society and of human interaction. While the story may be relatively 
unsophisticated, as its author later writes in an unhappy review of his early works, it shows that the 
emplotment of the idea into fiction unshackles it from the scientifically rigid rules of analogy and 
equivalence and makes it exfoliate into a flexible and expressive metaphor (cf. Pynchon 1985, 13). 
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The implications of the use of entropy extend beyond Pynchon’s story, however. In applying the idea 
of entropy to the social sphere Callisto partakes in a rich tradition of understanding and applying 
(scientific) concepts as analogies. In particular, Callisto’s view on entropy is made in the image of 
Henry Adams, whose humanistic extrapolations of scientific marvels at the turn of the 20th Century 
Pynchon echoes through several of his characters (Seed 1988, 40–41; cf. Cowart 1980, 67). Rather 
than Adams, Pynchon himself might be taking his cue from Norbert Wiener, whose work in the early 
1950’s both entertained and warned against the idea that certain theories are generalizable across the 
spectrum of scientific inquiry (Wiener 1989, 16–17; cf. Pynchon 1985, 13). It can be argued that the 
specific interpretive potential of the ideas Pynchon incorporates in his fictions – and not just the 
scientific ideas – is in part due to these ideas themselves so often being products of discourses whose 
aim in their primary context is to explain and analyze phenomena of our world: “natural” as is the 
case with phenomena sciences take as their objects, or “cultural” as with phenomena linguistics and 
social theory strive to account for. Of course, Pynchon’s entropies and gravities come unhinged from 
these frames often enough to suggest that such pre-given domains of thought are constructs 
themselves. This aligns Pynchon with the many thinkers on various fields who have argued that our 
conceptualizations, even those which natural sciences are based on, are always already analogies or 
metaphors and can always be extended as such (Foucault 1989; Lakoff and Nuñes 2000; Hofstadter 
and Sander 2013). 
 
The idea of entropy has continued to inform Pynchon’s work.37 Indeed, while the word “entropy” 
may be conspicuously absent in V., its modulations color the novel’s take on the sinister novelty of 
the 20th century values, virtues, and master narratives – as if they were affected by an entropic force 
beyond human control. If “the century’s master cabal” is real, as certain characters in their paranoid 
moments suspect, it may be much less the force behind the decadent condition of humanity than it is 
a symptom of this force (V., 226). This functions as a part of the historical setting of the novel, too. 
The historical period which Pynchon places under the eyepiece of fiction in V. is one showing much 
interest in the metaphorical sense of entropy, namely the turn of the 20th Century. “Chaos was the law 
of nature; Order was the dream of man,” Henry Adams had put it, knowing full well that the reading 
public would respond to the idea immediately and intuitively rather than through grasping the new 
                                                          
37 Pynchon’s most explicit and best-know employment and emplotment of entropy is found in The Crying of Lot 49 
(1966). Vanderbeke (2000) discusses the changes in Pynchon’s use of the concept from “Entropy” to Mason & 
Dixon (1997). 
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scientific laws and equations presented as its proof (Adams 1918, 451).38 Alongside Adams one may 
spare a thought for a number of influential modernist poets who prophesied that the world as we know 
it was coming to an end – slouchingly, whimperingly. 
 
 
From Model-Building to Reading Literature 
 
While entropy may be the best-known instance of scientific metaphoricity in Pynchon’s work, it is 
far from the only one. Neither is entropy as such all that relevant to the work at hand. Far more 
pertinent is the somewhat more generalizable process of metaphorization which the use of entropy 
can illustrate. While many Pynchon-scholars have reached a formidable level of expertise in entropy, 
most have focused on the literary functions of the scientific ideas and the ways in which the ideas, 
understood in their literary functionality, can help interpret Pynchon’s work. In a manner that can be 
seen as representative of this branch of criticism, Schaub (1981) detects a more general pattern in 
Pynchon’s work: Pynchon’s “ideas” tend to be as much things in the world as they are its potential 
meanings (103). Cooper (1983) writes in the same vein that science in Pynchon urges a new 
understanding of the cosmos, but also a new aesthetic of fiction – and thus insists that earlier 
comparisons between science in Pynchon and whaling in Moby-Dick does not capture the full scope 
of Pynchon’s ideas (Cooper 1983, 110–111; cf. Cowart 1980). 
 
The notion of scientific concepts and ideas urging a new understanding of the novel and of fiction is 
a way of saying that these ideas join the stock of knowledge by which Pynchon’s work seems 
informed, and arguably, that they should be considered part of “Pynchon’s theory.” If we consider 
the wealth of interpretations toward which the idea of entropy contributes, it is clear that the science 
in literature does not simply function as an expression of a world view or of the natural order of the 
world represented. Rather, the interpretive potential of the idea of entropy shows how ideas begin to 
function as part of the “mute speech” of literature: “a language that speaks less by what it says than 
by what it does not say, by the power that is expressed through it.” (cf. Rancière 2011, 59). 
 
Pynchon Studies have acknowledged the need to address the ways in which Pynchon’s use of these 
conceptual constellations is transformed by the context of literature. According to Cooper (1983), 
                                                          
38 Evoking the law of thermodynamics in the context of the early 20th Century is also a device for discussing the 
contemporary culture of V. – as the idea of entropy was common cultural currency in the late 1950s. As Tony Tanner 
has shown, the cultural notion of entropy was much in vogue in American post-war literature and was widely 
employed by numerous authors “as a word or as a tendency” (Tanner 1971, 141–152). 
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Pynchon does not only analyze social issues and human psychology with the concepts of science, but 
“renders into literature its most challenging epistemological and methodological problems” (110). In 
her discussion of the links between scientific revolutions of the 20th century and Pynchon’s fiction, 
Kathryn Hume makes a similar point: 
 
Pynchon has not created a postnewtonian cosmos, but rather a fictional analogue to that world, one in which 
characters and readers must deal with uncertainties as radical as those of physics. His creation remains an 
analogue, however, not a scientific reality. […] Science is one of Pynchon’s metaphors, not his starting point 
for examining reality (Hume 1987, 190–191.) 
 
While in Pynchon’s oeuvre science also remains science – instead of becoming just an adequate 
metaphor – there is no reason not to have it walk under the same shadow that befalls any 
epistemology, explanation, or model in Pynchon’s universe. As suggested above, the STEM bundle 
of sciences holds a special interest here because it resists immediate interpretation and assimilation 
through metaphorization. Science in Pynchon seems highly conducive of creating a sense of 
signification while still resisting settling on particular meanings. The whole sonorous register of 
potential meaning is available to interpretation, neither the use as an adequate metaphor nor the 
scientific, conventionally non-metaphoric use is ultimately privileged. 
 
In a sense the same applies to all theory Pynchon’s fiction uses. While the scientific theory may have 
its functional peculiarity, as I have suggested, Thomas Moore argues that Pynchon’s sciences and 
humanities are irrevocably intertwined: 
 
While, one must assume, it is just barely possible to tear the scientific/philosophical/cultural-historical 
thematic family out of its connections with others of the novel’s such families […] it seems quite impossible 
to discuss Pynchon’s science in isolation from his philosophy or his history (1987, 149). 
 
Moore’s conceptualization of Pynchon’s ideas as “families” is clear-sighted. The ideas from different 
spheres of knowledge can be connected in fiction through the family resemblances of their functions 
in the text. 
 
Therefore, sciences do hold a prominent place in Pynchon’s work, but beyond their capacity to 
illustrate how Pynchon’s “ideas” work as part of his novels, there is no reason why they should 
necessarily detain any description of Pynchon’s fiction. This is apparent in how far beyond STEM 
we end up reaching even when trying to limit the discussion to the most scientific of Pynchon’s ideas. 
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Indeed, to even scratch the surface of the reservoir of ideas in Pynchon we would have to delve in 
equal measure into psychology, sociology, history, politics, philosophy, and linguistics.39 
 
 
Model and Metaphor in the Context of the Work 
 
Pynchon scholars have been keenly perceptive in discussing the functions of Pynchon’s use of 
scientific ideas and concepts. The question which I have tried to answer here has been posed less 
frequently: why and how such “ideas” are interpreted as functionally polymorphous in literature? 
The evidence in Pynchon studies hints at a two-way drive at work in analysis. Seeing the science 
thematized in literature as an aspect of its poetics means allowing the science to function in all of its 
many roles, “neither literally nor as a metaphor” to borrow the title of one of the finest essays on 
Pynchon and entropy (Palmeri 1987). This way of viewing artistic works can be linked to Rancière’s 
“expressive” regime of poetics, which not only considers the figurative mode of language essential 
to the notion “literariness” but also sees it as primary in the division between figurative and literal: 
 
The figurative mode of language expresses a spontaneous perception of things that does not yet distinguish 
between proper and figurative, concepts and images, things and our feelings. […] Poetry is a language that 
speaks of things “as they are” for someone awakening to language and thought” (2011, 57). 
 
As Inger Dalsgaard (2012) remarks, in asking about the use of science in fiction literary analysis 
rarely aims at a better understanding of science. Rather, the focus tends to be on the literary 
functionality of science and on how its use is motivated from the artistic point of view. In practice, 
analyses often proceed to building analogies between fictional or literary strategies and scientific 
concepts, theories or methods. (157.) Yet as I have argued above, scientific thought is in its peculiar 
way both extremely appealing and strangely resistant to the functionalizing and metaphorizing 
reading strategies. It seems obvious that the gap is more easily straddled when the theory interfaced 
                                                          
39 Pynchon studies has (re)constructed a sub-canon of secondary literature, a kind of Pynchon Sourcebook. Common 
topics and theories include Poisson distribution as a mathematical description of randomness (Schaub 1981, 108–
109); Norbert Wiener’s cultural interpretations of laws of physics such as entropy, relativity etc. (Cooper 1983, 46; 
Schaub 1981, 22); Pavlovian behavioristic theory of conditioned response; Henry Adams; Werner Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle (Cooper 1983, 135); Max Weber’s theory of historical progress as rationalization, 
secularization, and disenchantment (Schaub 1981, 57). These scientific subtexts were widely discussed in the early 
1980s, when the corpus of Pynchon’s novels was limited to the early novels up to Gravity’s Rainbow. Later research 
has found relatively little to add (for a summary see e.g. Hume 1987, 187–195). Beyond this, comprehensive 
enumeration of theories and ideas possibly influencing Pynchon is not the job for an inconspicuous footnote. 
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with text is in some sense a theory of textuality. Scott Drake, for instance, nicely encapsulates the 
idea of reciprocity between textual theory and practice. According to Drake, Pynchon enacts in his 
fiction the very problematic that poststructuralist theory reveals. Further, “Pynchon participates in a 
metafictional or metacritical language where theory and fiction are not mutually exclusive categories” 
(2010, 224). This mobility across the interface, promised by the textuality of either side, is the fulcrum 
of the post-structuralist analyses of Pynchon by Berressem, Duyfhuizen, and McHoul and Wills. 
 
Apart from these very general observations of how literature makes use of, and makes literature of 
concepts, ideas, and theories, there is also something more particular to be said of the practices of 
literary criticism. The next two chapters focus on those practices. The widespread interpretive 
procedure, one to which past studies of Pynchon more than amply testify, is that such ideas, concepts, 
and theories are seen as analogues or metaphors for structures and techniques of writing, aspects of 
the fictional world, or the interpretive dilemmas of reading. Although the conceptual development of 
these analogues or metaphors may be realized in patches and piecemeal in the work, they are usually 
seen to crystallize in textual segments which Pynchon scholars have used as “key passages” capable 
of elucidating entire works. 
 
Hägg (2005) speaks of such passages collectively as “structural metaphors of interpretation.” They 
are representations of reading and interpretation which suggest interpretive strategies to the reader. 
Hägg distinguishes three types of structural metaphoricity: 1) There are characters in Pynchon’s 
novels who read and interpret the world or texts in ways that are comparable to reading Pynchon;40 
2) characters in the fictional world face interpretive problems that seem analogous to the problems of 
interpreting the novels themselves; and, 3) elements of narrative can be interpreted as a metaphor or 
a mise en abyme image of reading and interpretation. (101–102.) The diversity found among these 
types already undermines the possibility of any one metaphor being quite adequate enough – being 
able to support a complete and proper reading or interpretation of the novel. Rather, structural 
metaphors hint at the very plurality of interpretive horizons to which they themselves contribute. 
Indeed, according to Hägg, the multilayered presence of images of interpretation hints at “interpretive 
overdetermination” at every level, and reading becomes a site of “meta- or anti-interpretation” (ibid., 
106). 
                                                          
40 Molly Hite memorably names Pynchon’s questing protagonists “hermeneuticists,” and sees their quests as mirror 
images of those the reader partakes (Hite 1982; 1983, 13–14). Scholars have commented copiously on the 
parallelism between the meaning-seeking actions of Pynchon’s characters and the readerly quest for meaning (e.g. 
Patteson 1974; Kermode 1983, 84). 
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While the distinctions found in Hägg are demonstrably useful in describing passages of Pynchon’s 
novels, they can also be used as an analytic heuristic in distinguishing among interpretive procedures 
encountered in Pynchon studies. Also, the interpretations usually take their cue from clearly 
demarcated textual segments, because the unavoidable solution to demonstrating how (Pynchon’s) 
novels work is found in the citation of key passages. The next two chapters look into some of the 
accompanying moves. More specifically, the following chapters argue that certain concepts studied 
in poetics and literary theory can be used in describing these processes of selection. One of them, 
discussed in the next subchapter, is mise en abyme, or an embedded miniature analogue of the whole. 
However, this discussion goes from the particular to the general, and moves on to discuss the relations 
of parts and wholes, which can be seen as the most general conceptualization of the issue at hand. In 
the final subchapter, the focus is on the conceptual family of theme, especially the analytical 
procedure of thematization. Following from the old division between form and content, theme is at 
times seen as the counterpoint for poetics, even something excluded from poetics. Yet it is often, even 
in various formalisms, treated as part of poetics. My argument in this discussion is that literary 
analyses privilege themes that can be seen to transcend “mere thematicity” and be integrated into the 
artistic design of the work. 
 
This discussion of science in Pynchon hopefully shows why the notion of suggestivity or adequacy 
of models and metaphors is actually of broader relevance to the discussion of Pynchon, his poetics, 
and Pynchon studies. The subtle resemblances and the ability of ideas to stand for each other allow 
for the countless interpretations that inhabit Pynchon studies. This brings us back to the epigraph of 
the chapter at hand. When Michel Foucault wrote the words cited, he was, of course, describing the 
madman Don Quixote. To Foucault Quixote’s appearance to literature marks the change of the 
episteme. It is Quixote who keeps seeing resemblances in a world in which things and words, 
resemblances and signs, no longer hold their old alliances. Judging by the evidence of Pynchon 
studies, however, the ability to see resemblances, and to see meaning in resemblance, is central to the 
experience of reading Pynchon. Indeed, reading Pynchon could be a distinctly quixotic affair: signs 
resemble each other and all resemblances seem sign-like; adequate metaphors abound and the 
abundance of metaphors itself becomes both a motivation and a source of interpretations. Yet all the 
while, Pynchon’s ideas still have the feel of things in the world, of more than just their meanings. 
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2.2 The Interface within: Devices and Reading Strategies of Textual Self-
Modeling 
 
 
 
‘It is a frequent habit,’ says Descartes, in the first lines of his Regulae, ‘when 
we discover several resemblances between two things, to attribute to both 
equally, even on points in which they are in reality different, that which we 
have recognized to be true of only one of them’. (Foucault 1989, 56.) 
 
 
Whereas the previous discussion was concerned with the ideas, concepts and theories which may 
function as models and metaphors for the novels in which they appear or for problems of interpreting 
them, the present chapter moves to a more specific level and draws on a phenomenon well known to 
aesthetics, art theory, and most importantly, literary theory. The chapter at hand focuses on a specific 
reading strategy which is commonly involved in identifying key passages in which models and 
metaphors are discovered. This strategy is well known to literary studies, even though it tends not to 
be conceptualized in terms of reading at all. The type of procedure theorized in this chapter involves 
endowing distinct textual passages with global interpretive significance. This commonly involves 
finding a textual passage presenting a condensed image or idea suggestive of a global theme or 
interpretation. In other words, a key passage with certain thematic or formal properties is seen to work 
as a model or metaphor for how the text works on, works with, or works through the idea encapsulated 
in this passage. Therefore, while the issue is arguably relevant to the more general practices of 
analyzing literary texts, it is also easy to see how the phenomenon at hand is related to attempts to 
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find textual encapsulations of “Pynchon’s theory.” Likewise, it is connected to the discussion of 
models and structural metaphors in the previous chapter. 
 
According to Brian McHale we are used working with such a strategy in reading texts. It beckons to 
us at certain points in classic works of literature, such as: 
 
When Don Quixote, in Part Two of Don Quixote, becomes aware of the existence of Part One; when Hamlet 
stages a play that mirrors his uncle's crime; or when Roderick Usher's friend, in Poe's "The Fall of the House 
of Usher," reads aloud a tale that duplicates Roderick's own situation; or when Edouard, in Gide's Les Faux-
monnayeurs, reflects on his plans for the novel he is writing, also entitled Les Faux-monnayeurs (McHale 
2006, 175). 
 
Since André Gide’s first theoretical observations concerning this device or figure it has gone by the 
name of mise en abyme. The following sections approach academic readings of Pynchon’s novels, 
and Pynchon’s “ideas” in the context of the theory of mise en abyme. By extension, they pose the 
question of what it means to read, interpret, and cite parts of texts as representative of the whole. 
 
My argument here is that while mise en abyme has successfully been defined and studied as a discrete 
artistic device, we are yet to grasp the ramifications of the complementary discussion of those 
functions that the device may share with other textual strategies. Relatedly, it will be argued that 
while mise en abyme can be used as an analytically distinctive concept in analysis of textual features, 
it should also be seen to contribute to the more general discussion of determining significance of parts 
of text in relation to the whole work. It also provides, therefore, one way of approaching the question 
of scholarly pattern recognition and the many differences, resemblances and relations among readings 
of literary works – Pynchon’s or otherwise. Arguably certain passages in Pynchon’s works have held 
sway over interpretations of the novels precisely by giving forth the impression that they might, in 
some capacity, be able to stand for the whole. Although the phenomenon is certainly of broader 
significance to literary analysis, the discussion around the concept mise en abyme is where it has been 
approached with particular analytical tact. 
 
Here, the theoretical conceptions of mise en abyme will be studied in tandem with readings of 
Pynchon’s works. More specifically, I am interested in readings which make the interpretive move in 
which a textual passage is taken to represent in an encapsulated form an aspect of the whole. The 
readings show that interpreting textual passages as putting into miniature some aspects of the work is 
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a widespread critical practice. It is then shown that since its inception as a formal concept mise en 
abyme has also been considered with focus on function, reception, and cognition. This theoretical 
circumference suggests that while it may be useful to retain a narrow definition of mise en abyme for 
analytical purposes, the narrow conception cannot do justice to the more general issue at hand: seeing 
textual parts as representative of the works of which they are part. 
 
What is specifically Pynchonian about these condensed images of global meanings is that in Pynchon 
they seem overabundant and foregrounded, but their effect transcends that of mere self-reflexivity – 
in the postmodernist, metafictional sense. This has to do with the specific quality of Pynchon’s ideas, 
discussed in the previous chapter. As of today, self-reflexivity in the playful, postmodernist sense is 
a well-studied topic in literary studies. Yet important works like Robert Alter’s Partial Magic and 
Paul De Man’s Allegories of Reading have shown that self-reflexivity is a significant yet elusive 
property deeply ingrained in fictional and poetic rhetoric. Far from belonging exclusively, or even 
particularly, to the province of postmodernist metafiction, poetics of self-reflexivity shows that 
literature has, in various ways throughout literary history, been able to model itself and put its own 
models under duress. On the evidence of Pynchon Studies, fascination with textual strategies of self-
reflection has also survived the recent decline of interest in metafiction and postmodernist poetics. 
As my discussion below shows, quite a few of the more recent studies of Pynchon’s novels keep 
giving credence to the miniature analogy or mise en abyme as it appears in Pynchon. 
 
The following sections begin by looking into the theory of mise en abyme and expand towards the 
more encompassing question of what it means to read parts of texts as models of the whole. In 
Pynchon, different kinds of part-to-whole relations are thematized in many passages concerning the 
problem of interpreting information or deciding which pieces of information are significant, but they 
are also foregrounded through repetition and variation of thematic concerns, plot developments, and 
motifs. 
 
 
Mise en Abyme: Practice and Theory 
 
Let us move straight to a practical example from Pynchon studies, one that involves reading a literary 
representation as mise en abyme. An illustrative practical example, and one accompanied with a 
telling analysis, can be found in Berressem’s Pynchon’s Poetics (1993). Before being introduced to 
the main protagonist Tyrone Slothrop in Gravity’s Rainbow, we are confronted with the “godawful 
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mess” that is his desk: “Things have fallen roughly into layers, over a base of bureaucratic smegma 
that sifts steadily to the bottom […]” (GR, 21). Berressem emphasizes how both the text and the desk 
it brings into being are saturated with “discarded objects and discourses” (Berressem 1993, 7). 
Berressem’s initial reaction is to the overwhelming torrent of signifiers, “a polymorphously perverse 
delight in signification”, but he then turns back to delve into the level of the signified, and discovers 
“the lovingly detailed refuse of writing itself” (Berressem 1993, 6–8). Indeed, the description of the 
desk lingers at “red and brown curls of rubber eraser, pencil shavings,” “very fine debris picked and 
flung from typewriter ribbons,” and “tattered sheets of carbon paper” (GR, 21). The profusion of 
writing on the page of the book contrasts with the traces of writing left lying on a desk in the fictional 
world. 
 
Most importantly for the present chapter, Berressem reads the description of the desk as a virtual 
thematic catalogue of the novel, in addition also seeing it as incorporating important cultural and 
historical allusions as well as the novel’s “main metaphors” (1993, 8). Indeed, the claim is justifiable. 
Just the “lost pieces to different jigsaw puzzles” on the table contain several motifs that 
metonymically point towards some of the novel’s central preoccupations: a dog for unethical science, 
an explosion and a bomber plane for technologies of war, a pin-up girl for erotica. In addition to the 
materials of writing, different semiotic systems are evoked: texts, music, costumes,41 (but 
surprisingly, no film). It is easy to see why Berressem thinks that the table functions as a “shorthand 
for the historical panorama” of the novel (ibid.). 
 
Berressem then contracts this multiplicity into a statement about Gravity’s Rainbow and its main 
themes. 
 
Slothrop’s desk is a replica of the war in general. The introductory tableau thus prefigures not only the shape 
of history but, simultaneously, the shape of the book, highlighting both its indebtedness to the signifier and 
its investment in the signified. (Berressem 1993, 8.) 
 
History has converged on Slothrop’s desk, and it is a mess. As Berressem puts it, the table is as 
impossible to order as the war itself; the war, which the novel circumscribes with just such debris and 
refuse while largely avoiding conventional depictions of acts of warfare. The image of the table has 
                                                          
41 See e.g. Barthes The Fashion System (1990). 
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been a demonstrably powerful tool for thinking about the novel as a whole. However, is it really a 
case of textual mise en abyme, and why should it matter whether it is or not? 
 
Theoretically, mise en abyme has been most extensively studied in the framework of structuralism, 
semiotics and narrative poetics. In this theoretical sphere, two contesting definitions emerge. In one, 
represented here by Brian McHale (2006), the distinction between mise en abyme and other categories 
of analogy is emphasized. McHale summarizes this branch of thinking about mise en abyme in a two-
part definition. Firstly, the part en abyme must have a demonstrably analogous relationship to the 
whole. Secondly, it must belong to an ontologically secondary world, which is contained within the 
diegetic world (McHale 2006, 176–177; see also 1987, 125). 
 
Therefore, Slothrop’s desk can be seen as an emblematic example of Pynchon’s miniature analogies: 
many descriptions and scenes in Pynchon’s novels fulfill the first criterion of being readable as a 
small-scale analogy of some aspect of the whole, but not the second one, as they are not located at a 
secondary level – neither ontological nor diegetic. This does not stop critics from describing such 
passages in terms evoking characteristics of mise en abyme. According to Berressem, the table on the 
whole functions as “a perfectly well-ordered microcosm that provides a precise architectural blueprint 
for the book” (Berressem 1993, 8). While failing to fulfill the strict criteria of mise en abyme, the 
description of the table is seen to perform a similar function in reading. The quibbling sort of criticism 
might deem the analysis terminologically inaccurate, but this seems beside the point as the reading is 
no less persuasive for it. It can be argued that there is something characteristically Pynchonian about 
the deviance of this case. In fact, Pynchon’s novels seem to use the definition-abiding type of mise 
en abyme sparingly (the “pure” mise en abyme, according to McHale42), but nonetheless find countless 
ways to suggest analogous relations between parts and wholes. This argument can be backed up by 
looking further into readings found in Pynchon Studies. 
 
While considerable analytical sharpness can be gained in insisting on a narrow definition, other 
theorists have followed the opposite trajectory. Since the focus of this study is on readings, here the 
most pressing question about mise en abyme has to do with its inclusiveness, its capacity as a logic 
or procedure in interpretation. This, as McHale correctly points out, makes mise en abyme veer 
                                                          
42 Cohn (2012) uses the term pure mise en abyme ever so slightly differently, and with a reference to Gide’s original 
definition. Cohn says: “in a pure mise en abyme, an interminable process is inevitably involved, and it develops, at 
least in theory, in two directions” (108). To Dällenbach and McHale, interminable recursion is a subspecies of the 
phenomenon, not a necessary condition. Cohn notes, however, that pure mise en abyme with its infinite recursion, is 
only ever suggested by a text and not actualized by it (ibid., 109). 
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towards a more general principle of analogy – which I believe is its right place, at least in the context 
of this work (cf. McHale 2006, 176). 
 
Moshe Ron, for instance, distances himself from the narrow conception of mise en abyme. Ron 
suggest the following definition: “any diegetic segment which resembles the work where it occurs” 
(1987, 436, emphasis added). Ron waives the rule of secondariness and emphasizes instead that the 
figure must transpose a salient aspect of the work to the “scale of the characters” (ibid., 420).43 This 
seems like a wise move insofar as it evades some of the questions inherent in the notion of ontological 
secondariness – like why a textual representation of a view seen through a doorframe or a 
windowpane is ontologically different from a representation of a framed picture.44 Or, in this case, 
the question of whether a desk can be represented textually in such a way that makes it seem like a 
secondary world (cf. Ron 1987, 427–428). There seems to be no reason why it could not be so – 
Berressem even calls the description of the desk a tableau, making the issue of framing or isolation a 
matter of perception or reception rather than fictional ontology. 
 
Though perhaps avoidable, this conundrum is highly illuminating as concerns the ambiguous status 
of mise en abyme. It is on one hand treated as a textual representation but on the other hand as an 
effect experienced in reception and as an interpretive procedure. This ambiguity is reflected in 
McHale’s bipartite definition, in which the first rule of analogousness is obviously far more open to 
interpretive idiosyncrasy than the rule of secondariness, to which definite and rather technical 
restrictions can be appended. McHale does just that in restricting the scope of pure mise en abyme 
with the rule of ontological secondariness. Mieke Bal makes another such restriction by requiring 
mise en abyme to be diegetically secondary – “an object of second degree narration” (1978, 119). 45 
Yet ontological secondariness or narration at a further remove can also be seen as “non-essential” 
features (Dällenbach 1989; Ron 1987). Further, even such criteria may be subject to various 
interpretive judgments in reading more often than is habitually acknowledged. As Ron discerns, many 
“objects” traditionally found mise en abyme, such as paintings or musical pieces, are not textual in 
                                                          
43 The expression “scale of the characters” stems from Lucien Dällenbach’s classic work on mise en abyme (1989 [orig. 
French 1977]). 
44 This is a question much probed in 20th Century art. René Magritte’s pair of paintings both known as “The Human 
Condition” and another one called “Euclidean walks” may be the best known illustrations of the problem. 
45 According to Ron, however, Bal is ambiguous about whether interruption in narration or diegetic downshift is 
constitutive of mise en abyme (see Ron 1987, 428). From this point of view McHale’s focus on ontology is helpful, 
if not unproblematic. 
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themselves and therefore are rendered textual or represented textually rather than “embedded” or 
inserted into texts in a way that necessarily constitutes a “diegetic downshift” (Ron 1987, 428).46 
 
With these reservations in place, we may now take a look into some of the more conventional mises 
en abyme in Pynchon. As conspicuous as the relative drought of such cases in Pynchon’s big historical 
novels may be, his shortest novel, The Crying of Lot 49 (1966), contains no less than two strikingly 
classical examples of mise en abyme. One of them is an ekphrasis of a Remedios Varo painting 
Bordando el manto terrestre.47 The other is a play within the novel, which the protagonist Oedipa 
Maas actually expects to be analogous to the structure of the emergent conspiracy she is yet to 
comprehend. The very reason she goes to see the play (as well as hunting down its myriad folios and 
versions) is to get a glimpse to the secret order of things as a whole.48 (Lot 49, 11–12 [the painting]; 
49–58 [the play]). 
 
The embedded painting has been read as putting into miniature certain aspects of the whole of The 
Crying of Lot 49 at least by Tony Tanner (1971), Stefan Mattessich (2001) and Hanjo Berressem 
(1993). Tanner describes the correspondence thus: “The painting […] is of course a lyrical reflection 
of Oedipa’s own embroidery work, those self-spun versions of reality with which she tries to fill the 
void” (Tanner 1971, 175). Tanner therefore points out the analogousness of the reality-fabricating 
activities depicted in the painting and in those of Oedipa’s own mind. Mattessich’s reading, on the 
other hand, sees here “the part-whole relation at the heart of the novel’s signifying system in an 
example of ekphrasis, in Oedipa herself, and in the novel proper” (Mattessich 2001, 45). He finds 
that the painting is analogical to the novel in terms of the means of produce and the product: the fabric 
produced in the tower turns out to encompass the ground on which the tower stands, and the painting 
produced by means of textual ekphrasis can be seen to encopass the whole text of the novel. 
Berressem, on the other hand, finds in the passage a Lacanian mirror scene. The painting is literally 
a reflection, Oedipa’s self-constituting self-image: 
 
                                                          
46 In texts, that is. This is just the kind of medium-specific point of divergence one does well to acknowledge. Yet from 
the point of view of a more general theory of reception, or perception, one must not fail to appreciate the 
intersemiotic and intermedial translatability of the concept. 
47 http://www.iupui.edu/~lmena1/varo/manto.jpg 
48 McHoul and Wills read the play The Courier’s Tragedy as analogous to the whole novel in one particular aspect: the 
thematization of the “hermeneutic bind” between the whole and the system that organizes it into a whole (McHoul 
and Wills 1990, 67–69). The authors also read Derrida’s The Post Card alongside The Crying of Lot 49, and 
purposefully obfuscate the apparent hierarchy between a primary and secondary text (ibid.). 
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She is one of the frail girls, and the tower the ego that imprisons her. [She is] always already part of the 
tapestry she is weaving. […] The tower in which she sits, however, is itself a part of this world, so that she is 
always already woven into the world she is weaving. (1993, 91–93.) 
 
According to Berressem, this encounter happens exactly within the Lacanian parameters. Oedipa gets 
the first glimpse of her own self, which however splits as it is constituted by this reflection. 
Prereflexive ego is an impossibility, but the mirror scene reveals that the ego is always already split 
(cf. ibid., 91). Therefore, when Oedipa sees the fabric being made in the pictured tower which stands 
on the said fabric, she gains a perspective on the condition of the subject: it is at once made and 
unraveled in such encounters. This encounter may prefigure Oedipa’s paranoia and, by extension, 
motivate the epistemological undecidability of the novel. Yet as Berressem points out, many critics 
have interpreted Oedipa’s paranoia as a distorted perception of objective reality, whereas the 
Lacanian interpretation allows one to do away with the very notion of objective reality. The 
recognition of the mirror scene and the subsequent paranoia are a way of coping with the plane of the 
symbolic inscribed on the plane of the real (ibid., 94). Berressem argues that while the Lacanian 
theory mainly concerns the construction of the symbolic space, The Crying of Lot 49 “follows in 
detail what happens when this network begins to disintegrate” (ibid., 95). 
 
Each of these readings, while unconcerned with theorizing or defining mise en abyme as such, is 
however taking the painting as a structural feature performing a doubling function on a holistic aspect 
of the text. All three readings involve procedures which are perhaps not so much interpretive moves 
as something prefiguring them. Firstly, they all rest on the recognition of the painting as a part of the 
text that in itself is foregrounded as an isolable whole, one which itself can conditionally be seen as 
a “world” ontologically distinct from the narrative world of novel. Secondly, this embedded 
representation is seen as a condensation of an aspect that is integral to the whole novel. In each case 
the inset painting is seen to reflect or miniaturize a crucial aspect of the novel itself. 
 
However, another point should be made here. As far as the scholarly craft of interpretation is 
concerned, these three readings differ in no uncertain terms. Inevitably, in each case the very fabric 
of the interpretation is woven with the theory brought to bear on the text. Therefore, we may find 
another commonality between the different readings: they all conceptualize the mise en abyme in such 
a way which makes the analysis of the part representative of or continuous with the analysis of the 
whole. In all cases, that is, the theory brought to bear on the text in reading makes a difference insofar 
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as it has an effect on what kind of an analogue for which aspect of the whole novel the passage may 
become. 
 
Cases like the Remedios Varo ekphrasis, however, represent a minority in Pynchon’s novels. The 
passage with its uses in criticism could be just about the most illustrative and accessible Pynchonian 
example of how a canonical case of mise en abyme works in a Pynchon novel and figures in its 
interpretations. While the interpretive use of Varo’s painting is highly illuminating, the scholars 
discussed above are not theorists of mise en abyme and are in no way committed to any of its 
competing theories. At the very least, however, the readings above show how the literary critical 
practice makes use of a broader category of part-whole analogies. This broader view would include 
the grasping of motifs, characters, descriptions, and plot sequences as standing for an aspect of the 
whole (cf. Dällenbach 1989, 43, 76). This broader notion – whether one wants to still call it mise en 
abyme or not – is of far greater pertinence to reading Pynchon, at least if we are to judge by readings 
of Pynchon available to us. A more comprehensive look into the theory shows that certain issues, 
formerly discussed at the fringes of the theory of mise en abyme, are actually more telling of this 
broader phenomenon than of the narrowly defined device. 
 
 
The Miniature Analogy and the Whole 
 
It is possible to argue for a looser definition of a miniature analogy on the basis of the rule of 
ontological or diegetic secondariness being “non-essential” (see Ron 1987, Dällenbach 1989). On the 
other hand, if one proceeds from existing literary critical readings empirically, it seems evident that 
scholars have not taken heed of any strict definition, whether analyzing Pynchon or otherwise. The 
principle is frequently applied to “impure” instances of embedded analogies. Slothrop’s table 
provides a prime example of this practice. As suggested, the possibly compromised nature of the 
device does not prevent the passage from creating the effects commonly associated with mise en 
abyme. 
 
Since its conception by André Gide in 1893, the theory of mise en abyme has emphasized the 
compromised nature of the literary cases. Writes Gide: 
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Finally, in literature, there is the scene in which a play is acted in Hamlet; this also happens in many other 
plays. In Wilhelm Meister, there are the puppet shows and the festivities in the castle. In The Fall of the House 
of Usher, there is a piece that is read to Roderick etc. None of these examples is absolutely accurate. What 
would be more accurate, […] would be a comparison with the device from heraldry that involves putting a 
second representation of the original shield ‘en abyme’ within it. (Cited in Dällenbach 1989, 7, emphasis 
added.) 
 
Gide’s ideal mise en abyme was best actualized in the heraldic technique of reproducing the entire 
macrodesign en abyme and in miniature. Gide’s mise en abyme, more littérature potentielle than a 
practical method of literary composition, could only ever be realized inaccurately. As Dällenbach 
(1989) demonstrates, Gide’s original concept never aimed at becoming the fine-meshed heuristic 
dragnet it becomes in contemporary criticism (see 20–26). It was an artistic pipe dream, an idealistic 
structure of the mind, which the author struggled to translate into writing. Tellingly, Gide revised his 
own theory later on, replacing the idea of embedded duplicate shields with a different metaphor, 
“mirror in the text.” This is illustrative of both the dialectic of how the device may be thought about 
and thought with, as well as of the wider analytical allure of mise en abyme. Gide was both describing 
an idea he knew existed – in arts and crafts as well as the minds creating and perusing them – and 
trying to produce artistically something that did not yet exist. 
 
It is reasonable to be wary of watering down analytically distinctive tools. Yet the other hand, formal 
definitions of mise en abyme may needlessly complicate the basic hierarchy of interpretive needs. It 
is obviously the case that not everything represented as an ontologically or diegetically subordinate 
embedding in a text is an instance of mise en abyme, yet it is also plain to see that interpreting passages 
as miniature analogies of the whole does not require an ontological or diegetic downshift. In his 
inquiry into the possible cognitive functions of mise en abyme, McHale emphasizes that the decisive 
factor in the identification of the device is its function (2006). Focus on function, slightly downplayed 
in McHale’s earlier work in favor of the ontological distinction,49 emerges clearly in his more recent 
foray into mise en abyme. Interestingly, though, McHale is still adamant about the rule of 
secondariness being useful. In spite of the analytical sharpness gained by the narrow definition, this 
insistence seems unnecessary. 
 
A brief look into the very idea of ontological downshift will show how this may be the case. As 
McHale is right to point out, the pure, formalized mise en abyme does not require interpretation or 
                                                          
49  See McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction (1987). 
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present any cognitive challenge. The purist view of the self-embedding figure would evoke the 
infinite regress seen, for instance, in commercial packaging in which the image of the package 
contains an image of the package and so forth. (McHale 2006, 177.) A linguistic or grammatical 
version of the pure mise en abyme, albeit without explicitly presented infinite regress, is best 
represented by a self-quoting sentence such as Willard Van Orman Quine’s reduction of the 
Epimenides paradox (in which a Cretan states that all Cretans are liars). Quine’s version goes: “‘yields 
falsehood when appended to its own quotation,’ yields falsehood when appended to its own 
quotation.” Douglas Hofstadter and others have taken this sort of syntactic-semantic recursion to 
heights quite giddy enough (see e.g. Hofstadter 1985, 8–9). Yet the logically formalized device is 
ultimately unhelpful in understanding the analogousness of parts and wholes as encountered in 
literary texts. First of all, this is because these purist formalizations are not analogies in the same 
sense as the cases mise en abyme. La vache qui rit –cheeseboxes and self-replicating sentences clearly 
do something slightly different. In reading a passage describing, for example, Slothrop’s table, we 
read a passage of language as an image of a novel or its world. While not entirely different, this mode 
of perception is clearly subtler and more complex. The thing to notice about phenomena such as 
recursion and self-replication is that in their exemplary and straightforward forms they are blatantly 
explicit and unambiguous. In reading literature there must be something else at stake. 
 
Relatedly, one may extend this criticism to the idea of mise en abyme as an object of “second degree 
narration” á la Bal (1978). On one hand, scholars as different as Lisa Zunshine and Douglas 
Hofstadter have pointed out, in their respective contexts, that we can process with perfect nonchalance 
three recursive levels in a radio news report or conversation we overhear (Hofstadter 1979, 128; 
Zunshine 2006, 28–29). Yet on the other hand, three levels are more than enough to suggest infinite 
regress, as we quickly realize in reading a William Burroughs story which portrays a man reading a 
newspaper story about a man reading a newspaper story about a man reading a newspaper story (cited 
in McHale 1987, 114–115). The only difference is the exact replication of the scenario in the latter. 
However, Burroughs brings an unmistakably artistic sensibility to play and adds: “I had the odd 
sensation that I myself would wind up in the story and that someone would read about me reading the 
story […]” (ibid.). He therefore evokes Borges’s famous idea that we worry about Don Quixote 
reading Don Quixote because of what it might imply about ourselves and our world; because we 
suddenly feel the gravity of what one Vladimir Nabokov narrator calls “a black burden, a huge aching 
hump,” the experience that reality is ultimately indistinguishable from dream. (And further: “How 
much more dreadful it would be if the very awareness of your being aware of reality’s dreamlike 
nature were also a dream, a built-in hallucination!” (Nabokov 1972, 93)). 
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While defining and formalizing mise en abyme is possible, artistic use of the device clearly transcends 
restrictions suggested by definitions. In the literary evocations of the embedded reflections of the 
whole, these reflections are typically also given a sort of interpretation – as they are often 
accompanied by a statement, fantasy, warning, or apprehension about how glimpsing such a reflection 
might affect our outlook on life. This is why the difference between the pure mise en abyme and other 
miniature analogies should be looked into at length. If the classical types of mise en abyme are rare 
in Pynchon, we are however likely to come across myriad embeddings (without miniature analogies 
within them) as well as miniature analogies that are not framed as ontologically or diegetically 
subordinate. Hägg (2005) demonstrates the complexity of what he calls “structural metaphors” with 
a number of well-chosen examples from Gravity’s Rainbow (83–101). He justifiably points out that 
the existing typologies of embedded narrative mirror-structures are less than helpful in analyzing 
actual cases (96). Whether this is because the Pynchonian cases themselves are “impure” is an 
interesting question, but slightly beside the point. As Hägg concludes, the analytically cumbersome 
typologies do nothing to take away the interpretive appeal of the idea of mise en abyme (ibid.). 
 
However, this interpretive dimension is what remains somewhat undertheorized. My argument is that 
it can be fruitfully discussed in the context of a more general theory of reading – even in the context 
of reception and phenomenology of reading. A brief detour into the discussion of the functions of 
mise en abyme will provide a background for this claim. 
 
 
 
Mise en vertige: A Functional Approach 
 
McHale compares John Fowles’s novel The French Lieutenant’s Woman with the Harold Pinter-
scripted film adaptation which replaces the novel’s three mutually exclusive endings with two, but 
also nests the one inside the other as a film filmed within the film. That the filmic mise en abyme is 
so successful in translating the effect achieved by the novel with use of alternate endings, each putting 
the others under erasure, prompts McHale to comment on the functions the devices perform: “[the] 
transformation suggests something like a functional equivalence between strategies of self-erasure or 
self-contradiction and strategies involving recursive structures […]” (1987, 112, emphasis added). 
McHale sees this as an indicator of the shared function of the two devices. They both pluralize the 
ontological horizon of the fiction in which they appear. 
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This insight is related to the observation made by Cohn (2012) in her discussion of mise en abyme 
and metalepsis, in which she shows that the idea of the two devices performing similar functions is 
rather well known. The functional aspect is clearly what concerns several theorists who have found 
the “feeling of vertigo” as essential to mise en abyme. Indeed, this vertigo is something we may 
experience in the face of both mise en abyme and metalepsis. (108–110.)50 Arguably, however, the 
capability to induce a feeling of vertigo in the reader is perhaps better characterized as an effect of 
mise en abyme – one that is quite accommodating to the narrow definition emphasizing the 
ontological boundaries mise en abyme transgresses. 
 
In study of mise en abyme there is, however, a branch of theorizing which grants the device far less 
outlandish and more general function. This tradition begins with Gide and continues with Ricardou, 
Dällenbach and Ron. Dällenbach describes it thus: “Very generally, one can therefore conclude that 
every mise en abyme reverses the function of the text that uses it” (1989, 71). One exemplification of 
this function will be discussed towards the end of this chapter. Ron reiterates the view with subtly 
different emphasis when he writes that the device “ironically subverts the representational intent of 
the narrative text, disrupting it where the text aspires to integration, integrating where the text is 
deliberately fragmentary” (1987, 434). As we will see later, mise en abyme can encapsulate an 
interpretation which says that this very procedure is unnecessary, illogical, or impossible. The reverse 
function can therefore certainly be a vehicle for irony, but as we shall see, it may also have the effect 
of destabilizing ontological boundaries. 
 
Even this function is a kind of second-degree development of the most straightforward function of 
mise en abyme, which is to make the point of the message clear by concisely reiterating it. Indeed, as 
McHale concurs, in some periods and genres the main function of the device seems to be elucidating 
the text, making it more comprehensible by doubling it (2006, 178). As Russell shows in his study of 
the role of emblems in the French culture, this function of mise en abyme is paralleled by the long-
standing, if historically variable, cultural function of emblems and devises, which were primarily used 
to facilitate communication among different social strata (Russell 1985, 62–65; cf. McHale 2006, 
                                                          
50 In her Narcissistic Narrative Linda Hutcheon cites John Barth’s notes on Lost in the Funhouse, according to which 
the method of linking the stories making up Barth’s book is that of turning as many aspects of the storytelling as 
possible, such as the structure, the narrative viewpoint, the means of presentation, or the process of composition, 
enunciating, reading, or listening “into dramatically relevant emblems of the theme.” In another variation of the 
functional approach, Hutcheon convincingly argues for functional connections between Barth’s use of mise en 
abyme and certain features of parody, as well as what she calls a “more extended allegory.” (See Hutcheon 1980, 
56.) 
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175). Gide’s discussion of the history of the device makes this link explicit (see Dällenbach 1989, 7–
10, passim). The post-Gidean mise en abyme, on the other hand, has quintessentially featured in 
discussions of genres and periods marked by their deviation from the dominant “realist” modes of 
their time: romance, noveau roman, and postmodernism, among others (see Ron 1987, 434–436; 
McHale 2006, 178). It is therefore the subversive role of mise en abyme that has received most 
attention in literary studies. 
 
The post-Gidean is also the main context informing Dällenbach’s (1989) book-length treatment of 
mise en abyme. Dällenbach acknowledges, however, that functionally there is still a full spectrum of 
uses for mise en abyme from “virtually mimetic reproduction” to completely “free transposition.” 
Therefore, the most usual function of mise en abyme may be to complicate the logic of the narrative, 
yet it still alternatively performs as a kind of “miniature model” which seems to double and elaborate 
the central point of the narrative. According to Dällenbach, when mise en abyme concentrate on the 
latter type of doubling it tends to restrict the play of signification. Accurate duplications place a limit 
to the interpretive potential in the text, and instead elucidate the point and central theme. (1989, 56–
57.) Pynchon’s use of the device makes use of both these roles. 
 
Dällenbach’s book interestingly combines a rather technical and formal approach with a more reader-
oriented and functional appraisal of mise en abyme.51 Dällenbach writes that although mise en abyme 
is determined through function rather than form, there are different operations which the device can 
participate in, and which are distinctive enough to be adequately formalizable. Particularly important 
to determining these operations is the tripartite distinction between mise en abyme of the utterance, 
the enunciation and the whole code (1989, 55). Within these categories we see the reach of the 
functional approach beyond the narrow and formal definition. 
 
The first category, mise en abyme of the utterance, is where the consolidating, message-enhancing 
function is most commonly performed. According to Dällenbach, mise en abyme of the utterance can 
be divided into two groups: “the particularizing (miniature models), which concentrate and limit the 
meaning of the fiction; and the generalizing (transpositions), which give the context a semantic 
expansion beyond that which the context alone could provide” (ibid., 59). 
 
                                                          
51 This is apparent in how Dällenbach hesitates to connect his study with narratology and argues that mise en abyme 
differs from the “elementary structures of poetics” (1989, 54, note 38). 
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On Dällenbach’s second level, mise en abyme of enunciation, the idea of duplication becomes more 
metaphorical. A text can certainly dramatize and thematize its own telling, as Dällenbach shows 
(ibid., 76–81). It is likewise plausible to claim that when this happens in narratives, it is also probable 
that they make a theme of reflecting on their own production, or at least this becomes a recurring 
feature (ibid., 77). Therefore, mise en abyme of the enunciation is often a thematization or 
representation of the situation, agent or context of enunciation (ibid., 75). In cases which Dällenbach 
labels as mises en abyme of the enunciation, such thematizations or representations are interpreted as 
a self-reflexive rhetorical move. Many thematizations or representations that fall within the range of 
this type have become conventional. Since the days of Don Quixote, if not before, representations of 
invention, creation, and craftspersonship have come with the potential analogy to writing, and the 
products with an analogy to the written work (ibid., 77–78; Alter 1975, 8–16).52 
 
The third level, the level of code is not based on duplication at all, but is, rather, a realm of metaphors 
and model such as those discussed above.53 The conceptual categories of invention, creation, and 
craft are typical here, equally successful in modelling structural principles as they are as figures of 
the enunciation. That is, on this level, instead of being metaphors of the act of production they double 
as images of the structural principles of the product. According to Dällenbach, the favored metaphor 
is that of fabric, in which case the analogy implies that both text and textiles are “interwoven” and 
have a “texture.” There are other thematic fields that seem to provide suitable images for the 
organization of the text. These include the anatomical, the artistic, and the technical. (1989, 96.) As 
perceiving the analogy on this level requires quite a bit of imaginative thinking and competence with 
literary conventions, the mise an abyme of the code cannot be seen as a text-immanent form. Instead, 
the mise en abyme of the code may be seen as a further sign of proximity between the broad 
understanding of mise en abyme and what Hägg calls a structural metaphor, and understood primarily 
as a function and a readerly strategy (Hägg 2005, 96). 
 
Many facets of Dällenbach’s treatment of mise en abyme support the idea that the functional approach 
is more accommodating to the diversity of actual, empirical cases of miniature analogues found in 
literature than the narrowly defined device of mise en abyme. In Dällenbach’s account only a specific 
type of mise en abyme of utterance is accurately describable as a textual copy, reproduction, or a 
                                                          
52 In Don Quixote we have, for instance, the simile of translations being like the backsides of Flemish tapestries: 
“although you see the pictures, they are covered with threads which obscure them so that the smoothness and gloss 
of the fabric are lost.” Of course, Don Quixote itself is presented to the reader as a translation from Arabic (see e.g. 
Brink 1998). 
53 See chapter 2.1; cf. Dällenbach 1989, 94–96 
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miniature of the whole. In most instances mises en abyme at the level of utterance, and in nearly all 
instances at the level of enunciation and code the cases may only be interpreted as mirror images or 
models of an aspect of the work. Therefore, the problematic of mise en abyme inevitably expands to 
the realms of reading, interpreting and understanding. The theory of the device is at many places 
understandable as a theory of how and to what ends parts of the work are foregrounded and become 
understood as models or metaphors for the whole. Further, recent reformulations, such as McHale’s 
(2006), suggest that the theory may also be able to address the cognitive processes through which 
these parts are seen as significant miniatures of larger and more complex textual wholes. Arguably, 
therefore, what the theory of mise en abyme outlines is a specific procedure of seeing or reading a 
part as suggestive of the significance of the whole. While the theory of mise en abyme has developed 
into a highly sophisticated subfield of art theory and literary theory, it may also be seen as one of the 
most specialized and advanced elaborations of distinct reading procedures to be studied in poetics. 
Interestingly, the theory of mise en abyme also mirrors the movement within poetics discussed above. 
Like its discipline on the whole, the study of the literary device has gradually drifted towards being 
understood as a theory of reading or a description of an interpretive procedure. 
 
 
Miniature Analogies in V. 
 
As most of Pynchon’s novels make little use of the canonical types of mise en abyme, the use of the 
device or figure has not been extensively studied as such.54 However, readings evoking the functions 
of mise en abyme are far more common. This can be demonstrated by taking a brief look into 
commentaries of V. which make use of the discovery of miniature analogies, yet do this in such ways 
that are not easily reconciled with the orthodoxies of mise en abyme. A good example may be found 
in Tony Tanner’s (1978) reading of V. which highlights several passages foregrounding the theme of 
detecting plots and patterns. In an episode connected to the main plotlines of the novel only by the 
finest of threads a barmaid named Hanne cannot get rid of a stain on a plate. The stain is hardly visible 
and “roughly triangular.” According to Tanner, the passage contains the problem of the book in 
miniature (34). 
 
                                                          
54 See, however, Hägg’s discussion of metaphors of interpretation, which doubles as a sophisticated account of mise en 
abyme and modelling function of key passages in Gravity’s Rainbow (2005, chapter 4.). 
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Puzzled, she moved her head to look at it from another angle. The stain flickered twice in and 
out of existence. Hanne found that if she focused her eyes a little behind and off the edge of 
the plate the stain would remain fairly constant, though its shape had begun to change outline; 
now crescent, now trapezoid. […] 
Was the stain real? She didn’t like its color. The color of her headache: pallid brown. It is a 
stain, she told herself. That’s all it is. She scrubbed fiercely. […] 
O God, would it never go away? She gave it up at last and stacked the plate with other dishes. 
But now it seemed the stain had fissioned, and transferred like an overlay to each of retinae. 
(V., 90–91.) 
 
Tanner sees the passage as analogous to the whole in two aspects. He writes that Hanne “is 
experiencing as a temporary puzzle” what is “a lifelong dilemma” to one of the novel’s main 
characters and its primary pattern-seeker, Herbert Stencil (Tanner 1978, 34). Yet the problem extends 
to the level of the whole novel and the meaning-determining actions its readers have to undertake: 
“Perhaps the changing shapes we see on the external blankness are the shifting projections of our own 
‘headaches’ or subjective pressures; on the other hand, there might actually be a stain on the plate” 
(ibid.). As Tanner notes, the description of the shape of the stain further encapsulates the problem. 
The geometrical descriptions abounding in the novel are themselves patterning and structuring our 
perception of the fictional world. Do we the readers of the novel V., then, infer that the stain is V-
shaped, or is it just “roughly triangular”? Even the allure of this slightly paranoid overinterpretation 
is itself mirrored in the passage, in which the shape of the stain, once detected, remains imprinted on 
Hanne’s retinae and overlaid on her perception. The V-evoking potential of the scenario is also 
intensified by the fact that the passage on Hanne and the stain is itself part of an embedded 
“Stencilized” narrative showing many of the uncertainties associated with its production.55 
 
It is easy to see how the tenacious stain transposes some aspect of the whole novel on the level of 
characters. The interpretive conundrum encountered by a minor character is presented succinctly in 
a few short paragraphs, but it finds parallels in problems other characters have in interpreting the 
world of novel and events around them. The problematic even exceeds the scope of the fiction as the 
reader is implicated in a similar problem of interpretation. 
 
As a further example of miniature analogies, let us consider the way in which Grant comments on 
another passage in V. In one of the historical chapters of the novel, Herbert Stencil’s father finds 
                                                          
55 See chapters 3 and 4 for more on how the “Stencilized” narratives create a horizon of indeterminacies on several 
levels. 
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himself in a situation (or Situation, as Stencil Sr. calls it) the likes of which refuse “to make sense no 
matter who looked at it, or from what angle.” Based on his experience of international crises Stencil 
Sr. has reached the conclusion that “no Situation had any objective reality: it only existed in the minds 
of those who happened to be in on it at any specific moment.” (V., 189.)  Grant’s comment on this 
passage goes: “Sidney’s thoughts on the subject of ‘Situations’ reflect an ambivalence that resembles 
the reader’s response to Herbert Stencil’s various attempts to make sense of the V-phenomenon” 
(Grant 2001, 99). Like Tanner’s more elaborate analysis of the passage with Hanne and the V-shaped 
stain, this brief comment draws two parallels. One is made on the level of characters: Stencil Sr.’s 
thoughts are reported in an intradiegetic story but seems to mirror the predicament of the master 
plotter Herbert Stencil, whose search engulfs the whole novel. The other parallel is made between the 
problems encountered by fictional characters and the problems of reading and interpreting V. The 
question arising on all levels connected by this parallelism is whether the sense of meaningfulness 
and connectedness one observes individually can serve as a ground for making assumptions about the 
interpersonal reality on a global scale. 
 
Grant’s is another example of analysis that makes use of the modelling function that can be read into 
discrete textual passages. Again, the reading does not explicitly treat the passage as mise en abyme 
but it is read as functionally equivalent to those uses of the device which make the text more 
comprehensible by doubling it (cf. McHale 2006, 178). Readings such as the two discussed above are 
based on two reading procedures: 1) discovering a representation of a character trying to make sense 
of something, and 2) taking the interpretive choice of seeing this representation as performing a 
modelling function. While we may find several passages in Pynchon’s novels that resemble more 
closely the classic cases of mise en abyme, it is more common to come across passages which do not 
fulfil the strict conditions set out for the device, but which can nonetheless be treated as functionally 
equivalent. 
 
The final question to be asked here is whether the procedure of reading involved in such analysis 
could sometimes be more distinctive than the device itself. One further example from V. sheds light 
on this idea. This episode in the novel finds two characters facing a message – or rather, a passage of 
text that requires an interpretation of some kind to be readable as a message at all: 
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One night he [Mondaugen] was awakened by a disheveled Weissmann, who could scarcely 
stand still for excitement. “Look, look,” he cried, waving a sheet of paper under Mondaugen’s 
slowly blinking eyes. Mondaugen read: 
DIGEWOELDTIMSTEALALENSWTASNDEURFUALRLIKST 
(V. 277–278.) 
 
In this case, we clearly have an isolated and distinct textual instance represented within the text. 
Whereas the previous cases were defined by the apparent analogue between the problem encapsulated 
by the passage and the problem of interpreting the novel, here the immediately apparent aspect of the 
“message” is its distinctiveness against the background of the fictional world – its second-degree 
status within the fiction. Yet the seemingly nonsensical string of letters cannot be an analogue for 
anything without first being interpreted as a message and deciphered accordingly. On the character-
level, Lieutenant Weissmann has done just that: 
 
 
“So,” [Mondaugen] yawned. 
“It’s your code. I’ve broken it. See: I remove every third letter and obtain: GODMEANTNUURK. This 
rearranged spells Kurt Mondaugen.” 
“Well, then,” Mondaugen snarled. “And who the hell told you you could read my mail.” 
“The remainder of the message,” Weissmann continued, “now reads: 
DIEWELTISTALLESWASDERFALLIS.” 
“The world is all that the case is,” Mondaugen said. 
(V., 278.) 
 
 
The message, such as it is, consists of the scrambled name Kurt Mondaugen, and, in addition. the 
opening thesis of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.56 Again, this message resonates in 
smaller scale on the level of the characters involved in the situation, but also on a larger thematic 
level of Stencil’s quest. The metaphor or model for reading which emerges from this scene is of a 
different functional type than the ones discussed above. Instead of doubling and strengthening a 
meaning, a theme or an interpretation, this embedded message subverts the whole and undermines 
the conditions of interpretation. As discussed above, this is one of the common functions of mise en 
                                                          
56 See Eve 2014 for the latest and most thorough discussion of the relationship between Tractatus and V. 
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abyme (see Ron 1987, 434). Weissmann discovers the message about the world being all that the case 
is only after extensive interpretive tinkering. Receiving this message in this manner is, as Tanner puts 
it, “like discovering that the secret is that there is no secret” (1978, 34). David Seed’s turn of phrase 
casts this as a “bizarre synchronicity,” which mockingly reflects both the characters who obsess over 
plots and the readerly desire to form connections (1988, 96). The message, once correctly interpreted, 
seems to say that interpretation is unnecessary, arbitrary, or simply impossible. If there is a model for 
the novel here, it is the model of self-deconstruction. Finally, however, it is the reader who has to take 
the decision about the sincerity or irony, or the possibilities of making sense of signs, the world, or 
V. 
 
Further, although the passages discussed above may be treated separately, it is above all important 
that in a sense they all participate in drawing the same analogy piecemeal throughout the novel. In 
the course of the novel a similar relationship is continually found between the character-level attempts 
to read or make sense of the fictional reality and the trials of reading the novel. This analogy also 
figures in the background of the more global structural dilemma presented by the novel. This aspect 
of V., which informs my analyses in chapters 3. and 4. involves delving into the interactions between 
the parts and the whole of the novel. It so happens that the passages foregrounding problems of 
reading and interpreting, the ones mirroring the reader’s problems, are often mediated through the 
narratives involving Herbert Stencil and the accompanying narrative quirks. 
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2.3. Metasolutions 
 
 
 
Surrounded by the desert, man builds a pyramid. That would be another way 
of saying what V. is all about. (Tanner 1978, 34.) 
I have never had the slightest doubt that all literature is about something […]. 
That this has come to seem to some recent critics problematical merely 
means that the only works (“texts” they call them) which they are 
comfortable discussing are those which approach degree zero; that is, 
purport to be about nothing but “aboutness.” (Fiedler 1993, 288.) 
 
 
 
Tony Tanner seems to imply that the literary riddle of V., interwoven of diverse thematic materials 
and intricately structured stories, is best described in the form of another riddle. Why do we have the 
need to feel that we live among geometry? Why would we rather fill the space with imagined lines 
and planes than confront shapeless space? This, Tanner says, is what V. is all about – this is its theme. 
Tanner’s pyramid-builder is, of course, an image of the reader, and the act of putting up a structure in 
a featureless space a metaphor for how we read V. Instead of telling us the solution to the riddle or 
explicating the meaning of the novel Tanner reformulates the riddle in a larger human scale. 
 
I will argue in this chapter that we might say that Tanner’s reading of V. can be characterized as a 
thematizing reading of the novel. A thematizing reading can be treated as an interpretation of the 
theme of the work, and it can therefore be seen as a solution to the riddle posed by any text: what is 
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this text (really) about? Yet Tanner’s solution is especially illuminating because it also exemplifies 
the type of solution which Brian McHale calls metasolution (1992, 113). The solution to the difficulty 
and arbitrariness of determining the theme of the novel, it is implied, is to take this difficulty and 
arbitrariness as the theme. While this is a solution to the riddle of the novel insofar as it is an 
interpretation of its theme, moral, or message, it is at the same time a metasolution insofar as it hints 
at a strategy more generally available for sense-making, meaning-determining, or pattern recognition. 
According to McHale, a metasolution produces insight into what makes a range of possible solutions 
available, and allows us to ponder the stakes involved in preferring any one solution over others. This 
kind of problem-solving contributes to understanding processes of literary reading itself, and McHale 
clearly values texts which require us to practice a type of self-reflexive metareading – such as 
Gravity’s Rainbow. (Ibid., 113–114.) 
 
In contrast to linguistic definitions, the more literary and more reader-oriented sense of thematization 
this chapter wishes to evoke is found in Peter Rabinowitz’s Before Reading (1987, 159–160).57 
Rabinowitz defines thematization as a type of coherence-building strategy in reading. A thematizing 
reading often interprets the presence of unexpected or difficult elements, or absence of expected 
elements, as significant in the sense that they help determine the theme of the text. For instance, the 
reader may use a thematizing strategy when facing a surprise ending. This strategy will thematize the 
unfulfilled expectations of reading by determining that unfulfillment of expectations is the theme of 
the text. Thereafter, the preceding reading is revised so that what “first seems a surprise, turns out to 
be in fact prefigured.” (Rabinowitz 1987, 162.) As we saw above, a similar procedure allows Tanner 
to interpret V. as thematizing the very indeterminacy of theme. Thematization, when approached from 
the direction of reading, is already a metasolution – not merely solving one dilemma, but also 
suggestive of a distinctive procedure of interpretation that may be seen in operation in a variety of 
readings. 
 
This view of thematization proceeds, not necessarily from what there is explicitly evident in the text, 
but from the need for a holistic, even if provisional, interpretive framework in which to place the 
various parts of the text. As argued in previous chapters, the circular hermeneutic of interpreting parts 
and wholes provides a way of discussing great many aspects of the endeavor of poetics. This is the 
                                                          
57 The earlier discussion by Gérald Prince clearly informs Rabinowitz’s notion of thematization. Although it is only the 
latter who sees thematization as a procedure of reading, Prince lays the groundwork for this idea by insisting that 
theme does not arise solely from the text itself but depends on interpretive choices and inclinations of the reader (see 
Prince 1985, 432–433). 
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appropriate context for the thematizing strategy, too. Therefore, as far as reading is concerned, 
thematization must not be conflated with focusing on the thematic level of the text. In fact, 
thematizing reading is often a kind of formalist reading in that it ostensibly “lays bare” the devices 
and conventions involved and makes form significant (cf. Shklovsky 1965a; 1965b).58 
 
Though thematization may be linked to a number of general frames of reading, arguably it is 
quintessentially a scholarly reading procedure. Many have argued that there are certain privileged 
themes that more readily than others allow or invite this kind of reading. Such themes are also 
historically variable, and should be seen context of the critical schools under which they acquire their 
privileged status. According to Culler, any critical practice has a preference for concepts which “can 
be and are treated as themes” (1982, 212). More particularly, in the context of deconstruction, Culler 
argues that in practice deconstruction is often a method of interpretation seeking to identify particular 
themes (Culler 1981, 18). Thematizing strategies of deconstructive criticism are distinctive, on one 
hand, for their criticism of thematics as such, and on the other, interest in themes which “define a 
figural or textual logic that produces them” (Culler 1982, 212; also Rimmon-Kenan 1995, 17). 
 
Deconstruction may serve as an exemplary case, but the logic can be discovered elsewhere. This is 
why the second epigraph to this chapter, cited from Leslie Fiedler, while perhaps primarily addressed 
to the postmodern critic, has relevance to any discussion of the role of themes in literary study. 
However, the readerly maneuvers required to move to the level of metasolutions may be closely 
related to the ones practiced and scrutinized in the postmodernist critical climate. Likewise, 
deconstructive criticism may be overtly preoccupied with making texts talk about and against their 
own logic, structure, or rhetoric. However, this also provides perspective into other theoretical and 
historical contexts in which certain works have been seen to thematize certain theoretical issues so 
pivotally that they appear to articulate literary conventions or textual logics with an unprecedented 
force. We can therefore contextualize Fiedler’s comment, which primarily implicates postmodernist 
theoretical hyperboles about “literature of exhaustion” and “allegories of reading.” As Rancière, 
among others, points out, the turns of literary history periodically prefer the Flaubertian “book about 
                                                          
58 As thematization offers one answer to the question of how we make texts signify, it can also be seen as a subset 
among the processes which are at work in what Culler calls naturalization (see Culler 1975, 161). It may also be 
linked to the interests of natural and unnatural narratology, insofar as they are also concerned with readerly frames 
through which surprising and unconventional elements are made cognizable (Fludernik 1996; Alber et al. 2010). 
More particularly, it can be argued that what is at stake in both thematization and naturalizing strategies, and 
possibly even “unnaturalizing” strategies (see Nielsen 2013; Mäkelä 2013), is our capability to see texts in relation 
to base-level conventions of reading literary texts, such as significance and coherence (see Rabinowitz 1987; Culler 
1975, 161). 
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nothing” to books about “a people and an age in the world” (see Rancière 2011, 114–115). Fiedler, 
then, suggests that in the postmodernist era this momentarily manifests in a surge of interest in books 
“about nothing but ‘aboutness’” (Fiedler 1993, 288). 
 
In literary criticism, one such moment is reached in the New Critical classic The Well Wrought Urn 
by Cleanth Brooks (1974 [1st pub. 1947]). The titular metaphor of a poem as a “well-wrought urn,” 
found in John Donne’s “The Canonization,” is adopted by Brooks as a model (Brooks 1974, 17). 
Culler argues that the method of interpretation and explication throughout the essays of the book is a 
kind of methodization of reading Donne’s poem. This poem and its reading are granted the privileged 
position with regard to reading poetry in general. (See Culler 1982, 203–204.) When Brooks invokes 
“The Canonization” as a model, this means that the very phrase “well-wrought urn,” which the poem 
uses as a metaphor for its own craft, is taken up as a metaphor through which all poems become kinds 
of urns, indeed, best of them “better wrought” than the rest. Brooks makes a sustained effort at reading 
all the poems he analyses “as one has learned to read Donne and the moderns” (Brooks 1974, 193). 
While the case is unique in its particulars, it has generalizable characteristics. After all, for Brooks it 
is only the “sufficiently extreme instance” provided by Donne’s poem that finally allows him to 
articulate his view of the latent structuring principle behind the greatest poems of the western canon 
– the principle of paradox (1974, 11). 
 
Arguably, a similar explanation can be given for the fact that the clearly extraordinary Tristram 
Shandy is called by Victor Shklovsky the most typical novel in literary history (cf. Shklovsky 1965b). 
In his essay on Sterne, Shklovsky is primarily concerned with “plot” (sjuzhet) as a device that may 
reorganize and defamiliarize the story (fabula), the seemingly natural sequence of “events ordered 
according to their temporal succession (as they would have occurred in reality)” (Steiner 1984, 51). 
As Lemon and Reis state in their classic introduction to Russian formalism, this ultimately implies 
that Tristram Shandy is the most plotted and the least “storied” of novels – it foregrounds the workings 
of the sjuzhet to such a degree that it never allows the fabula to become more than an unrealized 
potentiality (1965). Despite this unusual disequilibrium – or because of it – Shklovsky can polemicize 
that his essay is not so much an analysis of Sterne’s novel as it is a demonstration of general rules of 
plot. If for Brooks Donne’s poem provided a model for reading poetry, Tristram Shandy teaches 
Shklovsky to read all plotted prose narratives. Works like “The Canonization” and Tristram Shandy 
are at once both singular and representative of a whole class of works. However, only some exemplary 
works in a class “lay bare” their devices at all, and only some of these prove “sufficiently extreme” 
to thematize a textual logic or a set of conventions in such a way that makes them crucial to certain 
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discoveries in poetics. 
 
It could be shown that similar thinking is also what enables Genette to regard Proust’s fathomless À 
la recherche du temps perdu as the prose narrative best suited to revealing the devices and structures 
at work in all narrative discourse while simultaneously forcing him to gravitate towards its “most 
deviant aspects” (Genette 1980, 265–266). Also, this is the logic underlying Todorov’s discussion of 
the detective novel, a genre which better than any other demonstrates the doubleness of all narrative 
– the split into story about what happened (fabula, story) and a story about how the reader (or the 
narrator) has come to know about it (sjuzhet, plot). This is, again, despite the fact that in the detective 
story both are used in a particular, genre-specific way that departs from the norm implied by the 
illuminatingly deviant case (cf. Todorov 1977, 45–46). All of the aforementioned instances prove 
extreme enough to be read as thematizations of a logic or a set of conventions that thereby gains a 
seminal, even constitutive role as concerns the distinctiveness of a genre or a literary mode of writing. 
This particularly strong variety of thematizing reading is marked by its search for what will be called 
below emblematic deviance. 
 
The first and second section below contextualize the idea of thematization within the tension-laden 
juxtaposition of thematics and poetics. As suggested above, the reading strategy we can identify as 
thematization has relatively little to do with particular themes – although it is, of course, always seen 
in relation to particulars – but it can be productively understood in the context of theory of thematics. 
As will be shown in the first section below, thematics has a somewhat uncertain relationship to other 
areas of literary study, like poetics and hermeneutics. Its focus and scope has frequently been 
theorized in contrast to these fields of study. To find an alternative route to the study of thematics, the 
second section approaches thematics via discussions of “aboutness” in philosophy of language. 
Ultimately, the main concern here is the process in which themes become something more than the 
sum of their manifestations in the text, and in which they come to articulate, “at another level, a 
general textual structure” (Culler 1982, 212). 
 
While thematization, seen as a strategy of reading, may best characterize certain critical schools, it 
nonetheless seems to identify a prominent reading strategy met in readings across the spectrum of 
approaches to literary analysis. The third section below shifts focus from theory to practice. In 
Pynchon studies, thematizing reading strategy often concretizes in how certain themes, like entropy, 
or competing scientific epistemologies, are made into principles structuring the novels in a way that 
transcends the thematic level. Tellingly, these are also the themes which have most often been 
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discussed as “Pynchon’s theory” (see 1.1 above). It is also these themes that were derided as the 
“Grand Unified Themes” of Pynchon studies by McHoul and Wills (1990, 3). It can now be observed 
that the critical activity of identifying Pynchon’s theory or the overarching themes of his oeuvre is 
often characterized by employment of a thematizing reading strategy. 
 
More particularly, the third subchapter offers an illustration of how thematizing readings work by 
looking into one reading seeking to identify Pynchon’s theory as it is expressed in V. This reading is 
connected to a prominent thread in Pynchon studies, one characterized by the employment of a 
common interpretive move. This strategy typically involves bestowing thematic significance on the 
complexity and indeterminacy of the works, and arguing for the intertwining of this difficult form 
and the topics and issues dealt with in the novels.59 Such themes have most visibly contributed 
towards “Pynchon’s poetics,” in the Bakhtinian sense. They are most frequently seen to represent the 
author’s artistic view of the world and its expression in the artistic medium (see Bakhtin 1984, 11). 
This section shows how in such readings the search for Pynchon’s poetics or theory overlaps with 
thematic interpretation. 
 
The final section below shows how some well-known and particularly enduring treatments of 
Pynchon’s work have sought to specify its position in literary history with appeals to its emblematic 
deviance within the dominant poetics of its context. The best known of such readings is Brian 
McHale’s analysis of Gravity’s Rainbow (1979; revised in McHale 1992), which not only made 
Pynchon’s novel the paradigm case of literary postmodernism but also saw Pynchon’s trajectory 
through his first three novels as emblematic of the shift from modernism to postmodernism. My 
argument, which is partly backed up by McHale’s recent reassessment of his earlier views (2013), is 
that to McHale Gravity’s Rainbow is not so much defining a postmodernist poetics as it is treated as 
a “sufficiently extreme,” emblematically deviant exposition of modernist poetics. Rather than de-
conditioning us out of reading through modernist conventions, the novel (in McHale’s analysis) goes 
to unprecedented lengths to lay bare the conventions most crucially involved in the canonization of 
the high modernist poetics. Whereas Donne or Sterne taught – so to speak – earlier critics how to read 
poetry or plotted narratives, McHale’s reading of Gravity’s Rainbow is more metahermeneutic (see 
chapter 1.2. above). It shows us what kind of readers literary modernism has made of us, and sees 
that this realization must arrive at the cusp of this readerly repertoire becoming outdated and 
automatized. 
                                                          
59 For summary discussions of how Pynchon’s difficulty is turned into a theme in criticism, see, for example, Boccia 
(1989, 67 n. 5); Eddins (1990, 2). 
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Poetics and Thematics – Beyond Oppositionality 
 
Thematic aspects of literature are still regularly seen in contrast to poetics, and the distinction retains 
some of its evaluative overtones. Even in the current environment, with the desire for literary theory 
past its peak, it seems that we are not above the odd condescending nod towards merely thematic 
criticism (Sollors 2002, 232). The 20th Century schools advocating a systematic approach to poetics 
held the view that thematic criticism failed to address the literariness of literature, and therefore ran 
the risk of failing to be properly literary criticism (ibid., 217–219). This dichotomizing view has been 
found outdated in recent decades, but more recent theory of thematic has been beset with difficulties 
arising from the theoretical baggage carried over from the earlier era (cf. Bremond and Pavel 1995). 
 
According to Werner Sollors, it is especially on the fields of post-colonial studies, cultural studies, 
ideological criticism, and New Historicism that thematic criticism has seen a return – but this has 
happened without overt declarations of interest in thematics as such (Sollors 2002, 219). While few 
would today care to oppose literary study focusing on thematic interests, it is also true that we have 
very little of what might be called theory of thematics (ibid., 220). According to Pettersson, the need 
for such theory is rarely articulated except by scholars who turn to thematics to broaden or challenge 
their previous views – scholars with background in structuralism, narratology, and semiotics 
(Pettersson 2002, 237–238; see also Peer 2002, 253). Against this background it seems indeed 
reasonable to think that the theory of thematics, ardently encouraged by the critics referenced above, 
is still conceived as a study of themes in a systematizing framework – in other words, conceived as 
the poetics of thematics.60 
 
Despite the familiarly “poetic” leanings of thematics, it is clear that the new fields on which thematic 
study of literature have come to the fore have had a revitalizing effect on many areas of study – 
including Pynchon studies. The new foci of interest have taken Pynchon studies beyond the “Grand 
Unified Themes.” Samuel Thomas notes in his Pynchon and the Political (2007) that Pynchon’s 
novels are full of “innovative and unsettling discussions of freedom, war, labor, poverty, community, 
democracy, and totalitarianism,” but points out that these have often been passed over in favor of 
“constrictive scientific metaphors and theoretical play” (11). This is a valid point, and “scientific 
                                                          
60 This view of thematics finds a precedent in the writings of the Russian Formalists who conceived of thematics as a 
classificatory and transformational study of motifs (cf. Tomashevsky 1965). 
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metaphors and theoretical play” unmistakably a reference to the previously dominant themes of 
Pynchon studies. The reorientation towards the political and the social among Pynchon’s “ideas” is 
also seen in recent works by Luc Herman and Steven Weisenburger (2013) and Joanna Freer (2014), 
among others. 
 
These recent works also seem to confirm that critical interest in themes is not necessarily 
accompanied by interest in either theory of thematics or the methodological challenges of studying 
thematics. Herman and Weisenburger (2013) name domination and freedom among the “major 
concerns” of Gravity’s Rainbow, conspicuously omitting the word “thematic” in the midst (3). Freer 
(2014), on the other hand, sidesteps the issue by directly expressing her focus on Pynchon’s 
engagement with the context of the 1960’s American counterculture. Instead of coming across as 
thematic treatment of counterculture, passages evoking this context are now seen as “commentaries” 
and “responses” to it (7–9). The avoidance of a certain terminology is in all likelihood a conscious 
choice stemming from acknowledgement of the former strictures of thematics. The revitalizing effect 
of new “thematic” studies is in part due to the disengagement with the earlier tradition of discussing 
thematics in relation to poetics and hermeneutics (cf. Pettersson 2002, 240). 
 
This background to study of “thematics” shows where the emphasis has traditionally fallen – on 
discovering the global interpretive frame within which as many elements as possible can be integrated 
in interpretation. The vocabulary is New Critical – the goals of analysis, equally so: according to 
Cleanth Brooks one of the tasks of analysis is to explicate “the kind of whole which the literary work 
forms or fails to form, and the relation of the various parts to each other in building up this whole” 
(Brooks 1951, 72). However, scholars such as Claude Bremond and Thomas Pavel argue that the 
theory of thematics has moved forward (1995). It is now acknowledged, for instance, that the reader 
(or a reading) is perfectly entitled to avoid focusing on themes “offered” by the text. Bremond and 
Pavel write: “the reader’s interest is not permanently tethered to the general aboutness of a work, but 
treats itself to escapades, making for secondary aspects and marginal details” (185). 
 
If one examines the themes which Pynchon scholars have considered crucial to Pynchon’s poetics or 
Pynchon’s theory, it is evident that there are disagreements about the “general aboutness” of the 
novels. This is, in fact, one facet of Pynchon’s reputed difficulty. If one is surrounded by the desert, 
a lone pyramid will certainly provide for orientation and structure; but perhaps it is not the desert one 
finds oneself surrounded by – for arguably Pynchon’s novels could evoke a far less arid and 
homogenous landscape. Indeed, it is not uncommon that scholars reject the themes seemingly offered 
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by the novels because there is so much more to capture one’s attention. It is possible to argue that the 
strongest thematic readings of V. are made with an appeal to a thematizing strategy, which allows 
more peripheral and implicit themes to be considered both as pivotal to the whole novel but also as 
exceeding their “mere” thematicity. Making a persuasive thematic reading, therefore, might have 
relatively little to do with volume or prominence of textual evidence for a theme, and might rather be 
predominantly a question of scholarly performance. This observation is reasonable both in the light 
of the empirical evidence from Pynchon studies and in relation to theories of thematics. 
 
 
Aboutness, Thematics, and Interpretation 
 
Study of thematics frequently finds itself slipping back the old pattern defined by adjacency to other 
fields of interest, such as poetics and interpretation. Yet thematics might embody more strongly than 
other theoretical endeavors the drive towards the de-dichotomization of conventional binaries 
involved. Today it is not in thematics where one finds the association between thematics, meaning, 
and referential content bandied about as a given commonplace. While such categorization is not 
entirely without intuitive appeal or heuristic usefulness, I wish to argue that there is little to justify it 
either in theory of thematics or poetics.61 
 
To grasp the difference between theme, on one hand, and referential content, on the other, we only 
need to recall Barthes’ distinction between things and concepts. “The best way for a language to be 
indirect,” Barthes writes, “is to refer as constantly as possible to objects and not to their concepts: for 
the object’s meaning always vacillates” (Barthes 1972, 232). Concepts, in contrast, are precisely the 
opposite – they order, organize and label the flickering of sensory flow (see e.g. Noë 2004, 182). By 
all accounts it is evident that thematics is defined by conceptuality rather than referentiality (see 
Bremond 1993; Peer 2002). According to Rimmon-Kenan (1995), theme is usually found on two 
different levels at once. On one hand, theme is the highest-order judgment about the “aboutness” of 
                                                          
61 Perhaps contrary to common misconceptions, these binaries have been frequently debunked throughout the history of 
20th century poetics, as well. In his critique of structuralism, Derrida argues that structuralism took as its object the 
totality of form and meaning, and furthermore in a specific sense: meaning rethought as form, and structure as the 
formal unity of form and meaning (1978, 4). Nancy Armstrong’s Foucauldian analysis of theme and form concludes 
in a discovery that “form” is what we call the dominant theme of the time, and themes are imbued with potential to 
become “form” in another context (Armstrong 1993, 45). Richard Walsh, on the other hand, points out that the idea 
of the inseparability of form and content is widely accepted, but that the dichotomy is conceptually prescriptive 
regardless. The continuing use of the notion of “content” reinforces the idea of form as a “container.” This 
conceptual pairing makes the equation of content with the “aboutness” of the text all too simple. (1995, 17.) 
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the work.62 On the other hand, Rimmon-Kenan suggest, theme can be seen as a thematic “integration” 
(or interpretation) of structural features. It is a formulation of a meaning that is homologous (or, if we 
prefer the bracketed option in the previous sentence, analogous) to the structure described. (14–16.) 
Neither of these is the level on which content is usually talked about, and both are linked to 
interpretive activity of the reader. Therefore, theory of thematics would allow us to consider theme 
as an interpretation concerning the underlying aboutness of the text without proposing that it be 
explicitly discussed by the text. (Rimmon-Kenan 1995, 13 Prince 1992, 5; cf. Mäkelä 2011, 39–40). 
 
While this way of approaching the distinctive quality of literary themes is theoretically promising, it 
is not quite as evident that it actually represents the manner in which Pynchon’s themes are discovered 
in existing readings. As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, Pynchon’s text, and the search for 
Pynchon’s theory it propels, is marked by a certain excess of textual cues. Thematic issues of potential 
significance are suggestively abundant, as are textual passages which may serve as evidence for a 
reading focusing on these issues. Therefore, the theoretical neatness achieved by fending off themes 
that are explicitly evoked in the text, is countered by the thingy surplus one finds in Pynchon’s novels. 
The general difficulty of deciding what novelistic discourse is about – given the assumption that it 
does not directly say what it means63 – is accompanied in Pynchon by the fact of saying a lot of things 
about a lot of things. Furthermore, Pynchon’s textual world is ambiguous as concerns the meaning of 
its things: merely referred to at one moment, they are only a hair’s breadth from emerging as 
conceptual at the next (cf. Barthes 1972, 232). This could certainly be another way to understand the 
seeming capability of Pynchon’s novels to anticipate theoretical approaches (see chapter 1.1.). 
Therefore, the distinction suggested by Rimmon-Kenan is easier to observe in theory than by looking 
into Pynchon’s thematic readings where the line between the explicit aboutness of the text and its 
interpretive high-order labeling is porous. 
 
Some help may be found in philosophy of language, where discussions of “aboutness” also take place 
on general level, without explicit links to any specific thematics. Prince (1992) demonstrates that 
even though we can make the generalization that literature is always “about” its theme, the inverse is 
not quite true: only some of the theories of “aboutness” are relevant to literary themes (4). Offering a 
view from the philosophical side of the field, Peter Lamarque argues that aboutness in literature and 
literary study constitutes a useful special case to consider in philosophy of language: 
                                                          
62 See also Peer (2002): theme is the highest-level category of meaning construction – it is the “aboutness” of the text. 
(254). 
63 Cf. Rancière 2011; Rancière’s idea of the mute speech of “expressive poetics” is discussed above in chapter 1.2. 
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[W]e can learn a lesson from literary criticism. What is it to say that a novel is about love or death or pride or 
prejudice? Clearly it is to say something about the novel’s thematic content but more particularly it 
encapsulates an interpretation of the novel. To say that Animal Farm is about totalitarianism is not to say 
that the term “totalitarianism” or any synonymous or cognate term occurs in the novel but rather that 
totalitarianism is a concept which helps us to make sense of the novel; no doubt there are other ways of 
making sense of it as well. By bringing to mind totalitarianism in reading the novel and using that concept to 
unite and explain elements in the novel we come to understand the satirical or allegorical content. (Lamarque 
2014, 263.) 
 
As Lamarque, too, suggests, a statement saying what a novel is about is an encapsulated 
interpretation. While this statement about the work can still be linked to the aboutness of its language, 
this is not a defining feature in the aboutness of the work. Prince makes the same point: theme does 
not consist of textual units, and it is different from them in kind; instead, it is illustrated, represented, 
or exemplified by any number of textual units (1992, 5–6; see also Rimmon-Kenan 1995, 13). 
Following Lamarque’s reasoning, we can further argue that the point of interest is the link between 
questions of “aboutness” and conditions of understanding or interpretation (2014, 263). Indeed, it is 
intuitively clear to anyone with a background in literary studies that what we call themes are often 
implicit and something the reader is expected to arrive at in interpreting the text. 
 
There are interesting overlaps in theories of themes, aboutness and interpretation. Culler points out 
that even formalist criticism can only suspend its judgment of the work as a means to an end. 
According to Culler, criticism “inevitably makes that move and tells us what the work is an example 
of, what experience it produces or what truths it embodies.” Making a statement about the force of 
the work is not beyond formalism, or its alternative, it is “a telos for formalist discourse.” (Culler 
1979, 76.) One hears in Culler an echo of the famous essay by Geoffrey Hartman, in which formalism 
is defined as a method. According to Hartman, this definition neither posits that form is separable 
from content, nor does it claim that the two invariably become one in a successful interpretation. 
Instead, writes Hartman, formalism establishes “a priority which has procedural significance,” and 
engages “mediately and dialectically with the formal properties of the work of art” (Hartman 1966, 
542). Indeed, Hartman’s is a method for “revealing the human content of art by a study of its formal 
properties” (ibid.). 
 
As these excursions into theory of thematics and aboutness shows, attempts to define thematics as a 
field separate from poetics and interpretation have not succeeded. Far more interesting are the 
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connections between these areas that come to focus within the theoretical circumference of thematics, 
aboutness, and poetics. Thematics cannot be fixed either to explicit or implicit dimensions of 
aboutness. Rather, it must be seen as a bind tying together the implicit issues expressed through the 
mute speech of literature and concrete linguistic aboutness, while maintaining that both implicitly 
evoked themes and textual aboutness depend on interpretation.64 Thematization can be considered a 
methodization of this bind – a honed scholarly procedure and a metasolution to the banal yet 
embarrassingly difficult task of saying what this or that text is (really) about. 
 
 
Thematization –  V. and the Art of Overcooking 
 
Pynchon’s V. provides an excellent example of this challenge. Many scholars have found V. a complex 
novel that gets simpler with each rereading (e.g. Sklar 1978, 90). Since at the very elementary, 
material level it is evident that the text does not become more or less anything while sitting in the 
bookshelf, waiting to be reread, this change must be understood in a specific way. Alan Wilde 
underscores that this alleviation of initial difficulties happens for a specific reason: 
[N]ot because the book yields up all of its secrets to the determined exegete – it does not – but because 
these secrets (or, better, irresolutions) dwindle before the onslaught of Pynchon’s unremitting concern with 
the devolution of the human. (Wilde 1987, 78.) 
 
Few readers would disagree about the prominence of the theme of “devolution of the human” in V.  
Ideas of dehumanization, decline and decadence have embellished countless interpretations since the 
earliest writings on V. (e.g. Tanner 1971, 156–157). Even those academic readers who, unlike Wilde, 
do not considered the treatment of this theme “ham-fisted” and “tendentious,” often agree on the wild 
overabundance of this thematic. The main disagreement seems, in fact, to be on whether this thematic 
excess signals a distinctive literary quality or lack thereof. 
 
As suggested above, individual readings of Pynchon studies have often rejected the themes most 
ostensibly offered in the text. Thematic interpretations of V. are replete with responses to a wide 
variety of textual passages, and some that have caught on in Pynchon-scholarship as condensed 
emblems of the attitude, philosophy, or theory characterizing the novel seem to offer a counterpoint 
                                                          
64 In a famous essay questioning Wolfgang Iser’s theory of textual givens and gaps, Stanley Fish shows that the 
categories of explicit and implicit are anything but clear-cut or “natural,” and are themselves constituted by a series 
of interpretive choices (Fish 1981, 7–8; see also Björninen 2017). 
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to the thematic concern with of decadence and dehumanization.65 The alliterative endeavors of 
“keeping cool but caring” or “approaching and avoiding” have become recurring points of departure 
in scholarly readings of V. These mottoes have been seen to suggest that Pynchon is actually guiding 
his readers towards moderation and middle grounds. 
 
Wilde’s reading is based on an approach that he finds persistent in Pynchon-scholarship: 
Prompted by [Pynchon’s] repeated variations on the theme of the mysterious “domain between zero and 
one,” most of Pynchon’s critics have understandably directed their energies toward the discovery of 
whatever values escape the “intolerable double vision” that Pynchon shares with at least the more sensitive 
of his characters. (Wilde 1987, 75.) 
 
The phrase “domain between zero and one” connects Wilde’s reading to a line of interpretations of 
Pynchon, primarily Gravity’s Rainbow, the novel from which the phrase is lifted. Furthermore, it links 
Wilde’s discussion to a specific scholarly tradition, which sees Gravity’s Rainbow as Pynchon’s 
masterpiece, and portrays V. as a subordinate apprentice work anticipating the masterpiece. The 
intervening novel, Crying of Lot 49, is seen as something of a curiosity, but at the same time it is the 
first of Pynchon’s works to successfully realize the idea of the middle ground between zero and one. 
Today this view of the artistic development in the procession of Pynchon’s early works is not as 
dominant as it once was, but it remains widely recognized. Wilde names Joseph S. Slade as the notable 
precursor to the between zero and one school of Pynchon-criticism. According to Slade, the foremost 
guideline found in Pynchon’s novels is that “individuals should not exclude middles, should try 
instead to occupy the domain of Oedipa Maas [in Lot 49] and Roger Mexico [in GR], the realm 
between one and zero” (Slade 1974, 246). 
 
Wilde’s argument builds on the contrasting ways in which the idea of between is on one hand 
conveyed thematically and on the other realized in the structures of the work. He accepts that the line 
“keep cool, but care”, spoken in V. by the jazz musician McClintic Sphere might be presenting itself 
as “the novel’s official answer to the paralyzing binaryism […]” (Wilde 1987, 79). In criticism this 
idea is widespread: another study calls this line the “creed” that Pynchon teaches his readers (Lhamon 
1990). 
 
From these preliminaries, Wilde’s analysis goes deeper. It is crucial to the possible success of the 
                                                          
65 It bears repeating that although such passages fulfil none of traditional formal requirements for being labeled as mise 
en abyme, the theory of this figure or device is highly illuminating as concerns the interpretive functions of these 
mottoes or catchphrases (see chapter 2.2.). 
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novel whether this motto is something the novel on the whole is able to live by: “its validity depends 
on how effectively it stands up […] to V. [the character] and the entropic vision she incarnates,” for 
“it is V. who defines for us not only the motive force of [the novel’s] plot but also its ethos” (Wilde 
1987, 79). Wilde thinks it questionable whether the possibility of being both cool and caring is borne 
out by the way the text balances its other dichotomies. According to Wilde, the ultimate problem 
facing the critic is as follows: 
 
[W]here, in the thematic or the formal structure of the novel, is there room for such counsel of moderation 
and bon sens as Pynchon provides in his suppositious resolution of “the cool/crazy flipflop”? The answer 
clearly is nowhere, and its implications have great importance for the novel as a whole. “To have humanism,” 
Fausto Maijstral says in his “Confessions,” “we must first be convinced of our humanity.” Is Pynchon? (Wilde 
1987, 80, emphases original.) 
 
Wilde’s reading is highly illuminating as concerns thematizing readings in general. Analysis of V. 
along the lines chosen by Wilde allows for two interpretations for the methodical overcooking of the 
novel’s ingredients. In one, the novel is guilty of complicating its simple agenda, which is, apparently, 
to embody in its holistic artistic design the theme of the dehumanizing, entropic drives afoot in the 
post-war America. In the other, the novel does not practice what it preaches: its own rhetoric calling 
for the middle grounds goes unheeded by the novel which ultimately produces only a vision of 
debilitating nihilism. In either case, we can see a thematizing reading strategy at work. Both verdicts 
of the novel entail a discovery of an issue dealt with thematically, but also realized in the design of 
the work. 
 
In S/Z, Barthes suggests that re-reading is never possible without a consciously revised method. 
Failure to reread would mean reading the same thing over and over again – or, as Barthes says, reading 
the “same story everywhere” (1975b, 12–13, 16.) The methodically revised reading is, to paraphrase 
Culler, the only way not to read the only way we already know how (1992, 122). This stance poses a 
question to Wilde’s conviction that complex works might become less so on each rereading. A 
counterargument can be made that perhaps it is the reenactment of an interpretive pattern or process 
that makes a complex text become simpler with every rereading. In Culler’s terms this would amount 
to telling the same “story of reading” over and over, and only ever playing the role of one kind of 
reader (see Culler 1982, 67). This is also what Wilde must mean: the existing interpretation of the 
text may be strengthened in repeated reading. This is not, it might be added, because the text rewards 
the reader with an insight of which elements are worthy of interpretation, but because the familiar 
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story of reading dampens the unremitting onslaught of divergent and centrifugal textual forces the 
novel struggles to control (cf. Barthes 1975b).66 
 
If the term “close reading”, as it has been said, suggests an intimacy with the text,67 many readings 
built on previous readings perhaps suggest a former intimacy, a cooled-off interest in the 
idiosyncrasies of works – those that make the work complex in the first place. It seems, almost by 
necessity, that the analysis of much-discussed works should move on to focus on other things besides 
the elements needed for an “maximally adequate” description of the work.68 This is why readings 
focusing on less conspicuous themes and context – such as those one finds in the aforementioned 
Thomas (2007), Herman and Weisenburger (2013), and Freer (2014) – have been met with such 
enthusiasm in Pynchon studies. 
 
 
Emblematic Deviance – Anatomy of a Paradigm-Building Reading 
 
McHale’s early essay (1979) on reading Gravity’s Rainbow will be taken here as a representative 
example of a reading that not only uses a thematizing strategy to a great effect but also extends the 
argument to make a broader claim about the significance of the novel. McHale’s reading proved 
extremely influential in the 1980’s discussions of Pynchon’s postmodernism, but it also provides a 
groundwork for McHale’s account of literary postmodernism at large (see De Bourcier 2014). 
 
To illustrate the difference between a thematization and a reading appealing to emblematic deviance, 
we may look at different readings almost reaching similar interpretations of why Pynchon’s novels 
put certain coherence-building conventions under extreme duress. Molly Hite’s (1983) aptly named 
Ideas of Order in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon sets off by considering the role various orders play 
in our understanding of the world. Narrative, of course, can be considered one type of order: 
“narratives are orders, or orderly arrangements of signs,” Hite writes, and continues: 
                                                          
66 McHoul and Wills’s Writing Pynchon (1990) is probably the closest thing Pynchon-scholarship has to offer by way of 
methodical overinterpretation. Interestingly, much like S/Z, McHoul and Wills’s scholarly excursion allows itself to 
become a productive overinterpretation by reflecting on its own method of citation. As far as the rest of Pynchon-
scholarship is concerned, more modest ways of elucidating the target texts reign supreme. 
67 “In its own most deeply felt metaphor, the classic formalist reading is a ‘close’ reading – a desire for textual intimacy 
whose logic implies the end of reading in self-effacement, all the while, against this logic, elaborating itself in 
complex performances more complex, say the detractors of formalism, than the text being read.” (Lentricchia 1990, 
323.) 
68 Cf. Beirwisch 1970, cited in chapter 1.2. 
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[T]heoretically they can be orders of various kinds, embodying various assumptions about the nature and 
functions of form, structure, system, connection, relation, accretion, accumulation, unity, coherence, 
completion, closure, and plot – to suggest just a few of the relations that the demand for, or discovery of, 
order may imply. (Hite 1983, 3.) 
 
Behind this apparent variety, however, narrative orders tend to be rather restrictive. According to Hite, 
this is because ideas of narrative order are closely tied to dominant social views of reality (ibid.). 
Thus, when Pynchon’s novels challenge conventions of narrative or novelistic orders, this is often 
understood as implying something about the orders we experience and perceive in our lives. Quite 
often, as Hite points out, the relation is ironic: narratives being orderly serves to emphasize that lives 
and the universe are chaotic and inexplicable (ibid., 4). 
 
In addition, however, Pynchon’s novels are about order. Many of Pynchon’s ideas discussed above – 
such as entropy and the different ways of interpreting statistical data – are contiguous with certain 
ideas of order. Hite specifies that being about order is by no means a straightforward thematic label, 
as this broad idea of the aboutness of the novels gives rise to a range of more specific interpretations. 
Pynchon’s novels may be about the presence or absence of order, or about order “as an object of 
desire, dread, fantasy, or hallucination,” or “about what order means, how it is apprehended, and what 
it entails” (ibid.). 
 
Commenting on McHale’s essay, Hite agrees that Gravity’s Rainbow challenges two modernist 
reading assumptions that lead us to expect order behind the “convoluted surface” of modernist fiction. 
First of these is the assumption that a chronological story and coherent reality underlie the surface of 
discourse, while the second one is that through careful deciphering the temporal shifts and multiple 
perspectives employed in the discourse modernist fiction can be naturalized or motivated. However, 
Hite takes a step further and argues that these reading conventions stem from a set of higher-level 
conventions of understanding life and literature. These higher-level conventions “require an 
explicable coherence from the work of art precisely because the work of art must stand in ironic 
contrast to the ‘chaos’ of reality.” (Ibid., 5.) 
 
Hite, therefore, performs in her interpretation what has above been called a thematizing move. The 
“ideas of order” are found both articulated in the texts and implied in the structures of the work. This 
allows one to assign thematic significance to the structural features while also allowing the articulated 
thematics of order to transcend the level of explicit aboutness or “mere” thematicity. Hite then 
105 
 
contextualizes this interpretive reading with a theory of how modernism has taught us to perceive life 
and understand its relation to representations of life in literature. 
 
This set of procedures stands in subtle but significant contrast to McHale’s reading. McHale’s line of 
argument sees the undermining of modernist conventions and reading strategies as an outward sign 
of the epistemological dominant of modernism giving way to the ontological dominant of 
postmodernism. McHale’s reading has become both a canonical reading of Gravity’s Rainbow and 
one of the readings that canonized Gravity’s Rainbow as a paradigm case of American 
postmodernism. However, it has made one further theoretical contribution: McHale’s reading serves 
as a part of his larger theoretical project of defining the shift from literary modernism to 
postmodernism in terms of shifting dominants. McHale’s theory differs from many other theories of 
postmodernism in how it purports to locate the shift “inside literary history, inside the logic of genre” 
(McHale 2013, 358). 
 
McHale proceeds to build his argument in tandem with careful readings of key passages that 
seemingly concern the epistemological perspective on the fictive reality but retrospectively turn out 
to drift towards the ontological questions such as “Which world is this?” (1987, 10). McHale shows 
how the opening sequence of Gravity’s Rainbow invites interpretation as difficult and elliptical 
passage of modernist prose: we are expected to concentrate on the readerly task of processing the 
text, a task greatly accentuated in modernism because of its fondness for achronological and 
perspectivally pluralist narrative strategies (McHale 1992, 61–63). However, the opening, which 
reader can with not inconsiderable pains interpret as a description of an evacuation focalized through 
an unknown evacuee, turns out to be a dream. Similarly, several passages in the novel are retroactively 
revealed as something other than they seem: “dream, psychic flash, omen, cryptography, drug-
epistemology” (GR 689; cited in McHale 1992, 66). 
 
The only point of contention about these examples, replete with dreams, visions and hallucinations, 
is that it seems a stretch to suggest that they undermine questions of epistemology. Rather than 
shifting from the epistemological to the ontological, they emphasize the continuity between the 
epistemological and the ontological – juxtaposing questions of perception and knowing with 
questions of world-building and world-erasure. Of course, McHale is well aware of this. These 
instances of constructing and deconstructing, concretizing and deconcretizing are merely preparing 
the reader for the more radical tricks of the novel. When the novel counters its earlier statements and, 
in effect, narrates events out of existence, the ontological questions about the rules of the world and 
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world-building are unavoidable. 
 
However, it is possible to turn the issue on its head. Has not the novel, by bombarding us with 
retrospectively triggered dreams, psychic flashes, and hallucinatory drug experiences, provided us 
with some of the most powerful and intuitive tools for naturalizing the more estranging and less 
clearly motivated use of modernist narrative devices – the abrupt and inexplicable jolts of perspective 
and voice, and the extreme instability of conventional orders of reality and temporality. What McHale 
conceives of as deconditioning can just as readily be taken as a kind of guidance. That deconditioning 
is just a type of conditioning is, of course, something any reader of Gravity’s Rainbow will have been 
taught. 
 
The point is not to quarrel with McHale’s superb analysis of how Gravity’s Rainbow works and makes 
the reader work. The interesting thing, in the context of this chapter, is how McHale’s reading of the 
logic of Gravity’ Rainbow appeals to an extreme kind of thematization of the shift of the literary 
dominant. Indeed, this is why McHale’s reading aligns with, for instance, Shklovsky’s analysis of 
Tristram Shandy. As suggested above, there are readings that show certain works as emblematically 
deviant with respect to those devices they lay bare. McHale’s reading shows that Pynchon’s novel 
lays bare the machinations by which the reader of modernist fiction can become a reader of 
postmodernist fiction while remaining “inside literary history, inside the logic of genre” (McHale 
2013, 358). Understanding Gravity’s Rainbow – and postmodernism – as McHale wishes to show it 
requires the realization that “we are all, still, modernist readers” (McHale 1992, 81). 
 
As this is where the first part of this study concludes, it should be pointed out that the readings in the 
second part are greatly indebted to McHale’s reading of Gravity’s Rainbow. Much like McHale’s 
analysis, the chapters below tease out conventions and reading procedures at stake in reading. More 
particularly, I will ask questions about the protocols and maneuvers in scholarly explorations into 
what V. is about, what “V.” means – what, indeed, is “V.” or V. The idea that carries the analysis is 
that readings may be read with focus on their choice of reading procedures: on what kinds of passages 
they choose to interpret, on which themes they consider more than just thematic, on what literary 
functions or devices they are seen to thematize. I believe that here lies the possibility of adding to the 
vast reservoir of knowledge about Pynchon’s debut novel. 
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PART II: READINGS 
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3. Hauntings from the Future: Sequence and Repetition in V. 
 
 
Overhead, turning everybody’s face green and 
ugly, shone mercury-vapor lamps, receding in an 
asymmetric V to the east where it’s dark and 
there are no more bars (V., 10). 
 
   VVVVVVVVVVV 
 VVVVVVVVV 
  VVVVVVV 
    VVVVV 
     VVVV 
      VVV 
       VV 
        V     • 
(V., epigraph.) 
 
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that one of the distinctive experiences of reading Pynchon’s 
prose is that it exploits our ability to trace patterns, find analogies, and detect resemblances. The 
theoretical discussions in the previous chapter approached some cognitive, perceptual, and scholarly 
procedures allowing us to share in these recognitions. Instead of the means of recognitions, this 
chapter focuses on some of the patterns detected. The latter part of the thesis turns to questions 
particularly pertinent to V. and its readings, and argues that certain analytical categories most 
systematically studied in narratology or narrative poetics inform many studies of Pynchon’s novels. 
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The starting premise, or caveat, is, however, that the categories discovered in narratological studies 
of novels need not be essential features of literary texts, nor must they be “real” in the philosophical 
realist sense of being there in the text independently of the theory-laden observation of a theoretically 
oriented mind. Yet it can be argued that the central points of interest in narratology are of wider 
significance to literary analysis. Order of events as they take place in contrast to the order in which 
they are told, the narrative voice and its capability to involve other voices, the possibility of a fictional 
character’s consciousness functioning as a filter through which we seem to perceive a pre-existing 
world: the analytical uses of these notions extend far beyond the jurisdiction of the conventionally 
understood narratological inquiry. 
 
The narratology-derived ideas discussed here have to do with, broadly speaking, the temporal 
ordering of narrative discourse (chapter 3) and questions of narrative voice (chapter 4). Although 
these narratological foci could be sharpened upon any number of narrative fictions, it can be stated 
from the outset that they would not be discussed here at length if not for their seeming importance to 
interpreting V. This importance, which is supported by the frequent appeals to questions of temporal 
order and narrative voice in readings of Pynchon studies, obviously stems from the thematic relevance 
of these analytical foci. V. is, arguably, very much about reconstructing past events, tracing narrative 
voices, and figuring out relations between events and their reports. The novel’s thematic 
preoccupation is, furthermore, reflected on the level of reading the novel, an activity which eventually 
bears striking resemblance to what some of the characters do in the novel. 
 
The present chapter focuses on the “V.” of V. itself. The things and meanings “V.” could point 
towards, refer to, or be substituted for, make for a compelling case study. The citations used as 
epigraphs to this chapter demonstrate how right from the beginning the novel proceeds as a profusion 
of clues as to what “V.” could refer to while also implicitly challenging the reader to consider the 
reason for presenting “V.” as such a polymorphous mystery. As will be shown in this chapter, at the 
beginning V. presents the sign with a wide spectrum of different potentialities for signification, but 
the novel amplifies certain frequencies in this spectrum while others fade into the background. 
Ultimately, what is true of many Pynchon’s novels is especially striking with V. Despite the 
complexity and indeterminacy involved, many interpreters of the novel reach somewhat similar 
conclusions about the meaning, moral, or message of the novel, see it as embodying a similar version 
of “Pynchon’s theory,” or locate many of the same themes, often encapsulated by the same key 
passages. 
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In this chapter it is my intention to approach similarities and differences in readings of V. in the 
context provided by two protocols of reading: one of them can be called reading for the whole, the 
other reading sequentially. Both ways are recognized in literary studies, and have their own traditions 
of inquiry. This said, it is clearly the former that has been done more in the academia. It is probably 
the more intuitive of the two to most readers, including professional, academic readers, and also more 
in accordance with culturally conventional views of literature, about how it communicates, and how 
it comes to have meaning. 
 
Melvyn New contrasts reading sequentially and reading for the whole in his classic analysis of V. 
(1979). He elaborates on Northrop Frye’s idea of the modern awareness and its dedication to the 
“maze” of its own making. However, as a counterpoint to this dedication, there remains the drive 
towards the “whole form.” One follows the contours of the maze by submitting to irony, ambiguity, 
discontinuity, and absurdity, yet one also follows the hermeneutic impulse through which the 
fragments are patterned into a whole. (New 1979, 400–401; cf. Frye 1976.) Therefore, reading may 
proceed along two lines. One assumes that this maze is all that there is, and the other assumes that it 
is possible to find meaning beyond the maze. In other words, the first strategy emphasizes that it is 
significant to scrutinize the process of reading from a (quasi)spatio-temporal position within the 
unfolding text (cf. Kafalenos 2006, 127). The second, appealing to what is perhaps the strongest 
convention of reading literary texts, suggests that the disparate parts finally contribute to the 
significance and coherence of the whole text (see Rabinowitz 1987). These two reading protocols 
may be provisionally distinguished, but as will be shown, it is common that they come together in 
interpretations. 
 
These two ways of reading coexist in readings of Pynchon’s novels. The Pynchonian version of the 
readerly balancing act between reading in sequence and interpreting the global meaning of the novel 
is visible throughout the history of Pynchon studies. In the following analysis of V. the two ways of 
reading are put in a dialogue. Arguably, descriptions of this complex novel can be greatly enriched 
by juxtaposing the two, as the contrast can bring to relief some of the conventions involved across 
the spectrum of readings. The processual encounter with the text, which I call the sequential reading, 
is strategically foregrounded in this chapter. In part, this is because sequential reading seems 
undertheorized in theories of reception and interpretation. Yet sequentiality is one of those aspects 
that make writing the medium it is. In other words, sequential reading offers a way of analyzing 
relations between the specific qualities of the medium, the designed patterns of the artefact, and the 
reading mind. 
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In the analysis below the focus is on the proliferation of V’s in the novel, or more particularly, the 
cumulative effect of the V-names, V-words, and V-shaped clues on the significatory potential of the 
sign. In this reading, the sequential processing of the text reveals another facet in the readerly quest 
for V. (the character), “V.” (the meaning of the sign) or V. (the novel). This way of reading also points 
towards some conventions of reading and studying texts which often influence interpretations without 
being made explicit. 
 
Since the sequential reading aims at an understanding of the reading process and conditions of 
signification, it can be characterized as metahermeneutic rather than interpretation-oriented. This 
metahermeneutic inclination largely stems from the theoretical background on which the notion of 
sequential reading is based. The main source lies in the works of the Tel Aviv school of studying 
literary dynamics (see Perry and Sternberg 1986; Segal 2011). The writings of Meir Sternberg, Tamar 
Yacobi, and, in particular, Menakhem Perry, offer perhaps the fullest sustained effort to discuss the 
dynamics of the text during the process of reading. Although the writings of the Tel Aviv school are 
only loosely connected to the other “schools” working on the dynamics of reception, there are certain 
affinities between the Tel Aviv approach and other contemporaneous attempts to account for the 
reading process. In this chapter, it will be shown that some ideas expressed in Perry’s work on 
dynamics of reading can be fruitfully compared to Iser’s theorizing of the reading process and 
interpretation. Although Perry distanced himself and his Tel Aviv peers from Iser’s theory,69 certain 
points of convergence emerge in the context of this work and its view on poetics. 
 
 
 
3.1. The Shape of Things to Come 
 
The following analysis focuses on the simplest of patterns (or so it seems). It aims to show how the 
potential significance of “V.” develops in the sequence of reading. Furthermore, the analysis looks 
into readings of V. for commentaries acknowledging the developing sequence. The changing 
signifying potential of the sign “V.” is a pattern that is traceable during the reading of a text, yet is 
rarely commented on in interpretations, as they more often focus on the meaning or message of the 
whole novel. Interpretations tend to be more concerned with emphasizing some of the global themes 
                                                          
69 See Perry 1979a, 43 n.6. 
112 
 
of the novel, or, as seen in many classic treatments of Pynchon’s novels, proceed towards discovering 
“Pynchon’s theory.” In an approach giving the sequential material of text its due, another dimension 
is added to making sense and finding connections. The following analysis will show how the potential 
significance accumulates and functions as a dynamic sequence in the textual unfolding of the novel. 
Discussing these aspects requires looking into literary theory addressing repetition and the dynamics 
of sequential reading. In this framework, reading is seen as a continuous and dynamic act of 
processing the unfolding text, while repetition functions as a linking device within the text. 
 
The repetitions of either the sign “V.” or its potential referents often connect different temporal levels 
of the story. Most frequently these connections are made between the narrative present (the events 
taking place in the fictional New York in 1956) and one or several of the historical episodes. 
Following the sequence of V’s means considering the potential change of meaning resulting from the 
introduction of one “V.” after another. The temporal “order” of the novel, to use Genette’s term, of 
course points to another kind of sequencing (see Genette 1980). The term denotes the discursive 
rearrangement of the chronological sequence of events that is called fabula by the Russian formalists 
and classical narratologists (see e. g. Chatman 1978). More recent theory of narrative sequence 
highlights the interaction between the temporal sequence of reading and the reconstructed story 
(fabula) expressed through narrative discourse (sjuzhet) (see e. g. Kafalenos 2006; Baroni and Revaz 
2016; Björninen 2016). The analysis here emphasizes the sequence of reading in favor of the temporal 
ordering of events, the Genettian “order.” The latter, however, remains somewhat relevant to the 
sequential reading. Viewing the Genettian order from “within” the sequence, as it were, simply gives 
this order a new kind of dynamics to reckon with.70 
 
When “V.”-motifs and potential referents of the sign link distant temporal moments within the novel, 
another kind of problematic is discovered. In accordance to novelistic conventions, the embedded 
past narratives interrupting the temporal flow of the narrative present should be motivated – it should 
be someone’s past, past as experienced by one or another character. At least it should be past as 
inscribed or recorded somewhere – as this implies by metonymy the possibility of a witness or an 
experience. Yet the quasi-experiential filter through which the events of historical chapters are 
                                                          
70 This is more of a comment on typical applications of Genette’s “order” than Genette’s theory as such. Genette’s own 
discussion contains numerous highly sophisticated considerations of the sequence of reading. These begin with his 
statement that narrative contains no temporality but for the one it borrows metonymically from its own reading 
(Genette 1980, 34). Towards the end of discussion on order, Genette delves into advance notices and anticipatory 
recalls which belie the neat distinction between analepses and prolepses, in part because they may have a different 
function in the order of discourse and in the temporal process of reading (ibid., 82–83). In addition, several well-
known concepts such as paralipsis have a sequential aspect (ibid., 53, 82). 
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mediated in V. severely tests the limits of this convention. In the novel, this “filter” goes by the name 
of Stencilization. Herbert Stencil’s suspect method of recreating past events based on flimsy or 
virtually nonexistent evidence is the fulcrum of novelistic innovation in V. This narrative strategy 
plays a major part in the ambiguities and uncertainties that have detained readers and scholars since 
the publication of the novel. It is also an exemplary case of those “Pynchon’s ideas” which seem to 
encapsulate in miniature certain narrative strategies at large, as well as to reflect and comment on the 
attendant literary conventions. Furthermore, the passages of the novel that discuss Stencilization 
thematize certain problematic aspects of the novel’s singular approach to history and historical 
narration in a subtler and more piecemeal fashion throughout the course of the novel. Stencilization, 
in short, can be seen as yet another key to Pynchon’s theory. 
 
In technical terms, Stencilized narration may be characterized as free indirect discourse grounded in 
the mental projections of Herbert Stencil (Cowart 2011, 44). The Stencilized historical chapters have 
been convincingly analyzed as a novelistic smorgasbord of techniques and styles, many chapters 
borrowing specific parts of the canonically modernist repertoire (see Dugdale 1990, 86; Hite 1983, 
63). This scenario is complicated, however, by Stencil’s habit of referring to himself in the third 
person. McHale has gone as far as to suggest that Stencilization not only uses free indirect discourse, 
but actually personifies, literalizes, or thematizes the technique (McHale 1987, 22). In other words, 
Stencilization has the special effect of destabilizing the conventions which allow us to distinguish 
between “the frame” and “the inset” in speech representation, and which allow us to differentiate the 
position of narration from the deictic position of a character (cf. McHale 2014, par. 4). Similar 
ambiguity faces the categories of focalization labeled “internal” and “external” (see Genette 1980, 
191).71 The thematization of these issues entails that the effects are no longer restricted to the level 
of sentences representing speech, but can be taken as a model, metaphor, or analogy to the level of 
interpreting the global narrative situation of the novel. On the other hand, the narratological 
distinctions become a site of interpretive potentialities. Stencil could be the character-narrator of the 
whole novel, but he might also be a global focalizer of the type that Stanzel says characterizes the 
“reflector mode” of narration (Stanzel 1984). Yet Stencil could merely be a character represented by 
extradiegetic narration. The problem is that each of these solutions to the Stencilization either 
excessively simplifies the issue or simply raises more questions. 
 
                                                          
71 These effect of Stencilization are analyzed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
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The historical chapters filtered through the protean narrative strategy have the effect of disrupting the 
conventional horizons of expectations linking time, experience, and narrative. This is in part due to 
“Stencilization” being less characterized by a unified technique or a set of devices than by its 
capability to address on the level of literary presentation some of the problems we have come to have 
with time, experience, and narrative. On the structural level of the novel, it poses also the tantalizing 
question whether it is possible to overlay a pattern, a “stencil” as it were, of sameness on the historical 
chapters, which are actually told using different techniques and strategies (cf. Hite 1983, 57). The 
“Stencilized” historical chapters cannot consistently be provided with a naturalization or 
narrativization through natural, experiential parameters (see Fludernik 2003). Any reading settling on 
a naturalizing strategy is bound to be extremely “expensive,” its cost measured in excluded 
interpretive possibilities (McHale 1987, 14). There is no clear answer to who is channeling whose 
experience based on which document. To make matters worse, Stencilization actually is not so much 
a narrative “strategy” consistently making use of the same devices functioning similarly as it is a 
figure (of speech) tying together various discordant attempts to access the past. The historical chapters 
do not have a consistent narrative situation, they are variously focalized. Further, apart from 
disallowing psychological naturalization they even resist any interpretation fixing the narrative into 
one source or document. 
 
The problem of Stencilization is interconnected with the accumulating sequence of motifs and words 
suggesting potential meanings of “V.” If the Stencilized narratives have the effect of destabilizing 
conventional expectations of motivation and coherence, the repetition of “V.” on different temporal 
levels intensifies this effect. As will be shown below, the sequential accumulation of V’s further 
complicates choosing any one solution to the riddle of Stencilization. The inverse is also true, as 
Stencilization as a narrative strategy refracts the seeming linearity of the sequence of V’s. It could be 
argued that the introduction of Stencil and his obsession with V. makes the previously free-floating 
signifier into a kind of psychological motif. Because of the obsessive search portrayed in the novel, 
the expectations towards V. shift. It is no longer adequate for “V.” to simply have meaning, its 
appearance should also be motivated in the context of Stencil’s obsession – psychologically, that is. 
This makes the idea that sequentiality could be a matter of simple accumulation or annulment of 
meaning seem naïve – in literary text, in an artful narrative fiction the meaning built in a sequence is 
constantly in interaction with the global interpretation. As looking into readings of V. will 
demonstrate, this is part of how we are used to reading the modern novel. 
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Repetition and Sequence as Signification in V. 
 
Numerous Pynchon-scholars have agreed that repetition of words and motifs functions as an indicator 
of the novel’s theme and design. Repetition may also be seen as a device for creating a certain 
interpretive need. Interpreters of V. have often drawn a parallel between the quest for understanding 
portrayed in the novel and their own process of reading. Both the readerly quest and the search 
represented in the novel apparently aim for the discovery of the meaning of “V.,” a sign tantalizingly 
interpretable both to the reader and many of the characters of the novel. Its interpretive potential 
remains highly mobile throughout the novel, which is to a great part due to the repetition of the sign 
in different contexts. 
 
The reader first encounters the letter in various paratexts of the novel, while the search of the novel’s 
questing protagonist Herbert Stencil leads back to a mention of “V.” in his father’s journals. This 
entry contains the initial V. and a puzzling reference simultaneously evoking a gendered and an 
impersonal entity: “There is more behind and inside V. than any of us had suspected. Not who, but 
what: what is she.” (V., 53.) This is the key passage concerning Stencil’s V.-quest, but its power to 
shape the readerly expectations of what the novel is all about is no less evident. The ambiguous quest 
for the sign “V.” is concretized both in reading the novel and in the acts of interpretation represented 
in it.72 This analogy, however, is not the only one which readers possibly make. According to 
Elizabeth Campbell (1988) V. is “a tissue of analogies, and the reader makes connections by tracing 
the similarities or identities from one episode to another” (65). Therefore, reading and making sense 
of V. is another exercise in pattern recognition. 
 
As the case of V. can very well demonstrate, repetition with potential to create difference of meaning 
is central to “V.” being recognized as a pattern. The questions of identity and difference are crucial 
to the act of recognizing repetition in the first place. In their analysis of V., McHoul and Wills (1990) 
link the question of repetition to other meaning-differentiating processes: “[t]he slightest 
displacement or derivation, even repetition, institutes the structure within which difference has the 
possibility of occurring” (170). Each repetition of the same signifier “V.” comes with the possibility 
of different meaning. This view of repetition draws from the famous treatments of difference in works 
                                                          
72 In Pynchon Studies V. and Pynchon’s other early novels are noted for their thematic reduplications of readerly 
positions and strategies (see e.g. Hite 1983; Schaub 1976, 93; 1981, 17–18, 103; Cooper 1983). A related 
interpretation, particularly of V., is that it suggests an equivalence between the character Herbert Stencil, who looks 
for V., and the (implied) reader. (e.g. Campbell 1988, 61; Cowart 2011, 44; Hite 1983, 47–49; New 1979, 399; 
Schaub 1981, 16). 
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of Deleuze (1994) and Derrida (1982). As Deleuze argues, difference is never thought in itself, 
because it is only seen through representations of “[a] relation between different and different which 
would allow it to be thought” (1994, 262). Rimmon-Kenan reiterates this view in the context of 
narrative: “difference is introduced through the very act of repetition, the accumulation of 
significance it entails, and the change effected by the different context in which it is placed” (1980, 
152–153). In V. the paradoxical status of repetition is emphasized and dramatized, but the theoretical 
point also applies more generally. 
 
In Rimmon-Kenan’s view, we could regard repetition as a kind of approximation of Jakobson’s poetic 
function (Rimmon-Kenan 1980, 152). In the poetic function the principle of selection along the 
paradigmatic axis of selection is superimposed on the syntagmatic axis of combination. 
Consequently, repeated resemblances become the dominant device of the poetic sequence. (Cf. Lodge 
1977, 91.) This leads to another paradoxical aspect of repetition, one also discussed by Rimmon-
Kenan: repetition only serves a poetic function through its differences, while repetition of the same 
is disruptive and erodes meaning (ibid., 153). The problem, as Christine Brooke-Rose sees it, is that 
the same features that are considered the privileged marks of the poetic function can also “when 
hypertrophied and rendered transparent, become the very same features of, let us say, the unpoetic 
function, or the way the poetic function collapses” (quoted in ibid., 153-154, emphasis added). 
However, the repetition of the sign “V.” interestingly dramatizes both functions because each 
repetition is by necessity “letter-perfect” as well as indeterminate in meaning. Therefore, the text 
allows one to treat repetition as a signifying feature, functioning in accordance with the Jakobsonian 
poetic function. Yet it never completely eliminates the possibility that the function of repetition might 
collapse into the meaninglessness of the “unpoetic” function. 
 
Käkelä-Puumala weighs these options against each other, and concurs that there are, indeed, two 
strategies of reading, one seeking to fix a meaning and another fixing on the unavoidable possibility 
of its negation (1999, 35–37). However, a larger sampling of Pynchon studies shows that most 
scholars prefer a positive, affirmative reading of the repetition as something that can produce a 
synthesis of the ideas and motifs associated with “V.” For example, Thomas Schaub identifies 
“abstraction of the literal” as one of Pynchon’s techniques by which he creates meaningfulness among 
his labyrinthine plots (1981, 15). His example is the elaboration of the street motif in V. At the 
beginning of the novel we learn that Benny Profane has grown a “little leery” of the countless “named 
pavements” he has seen during his peregrinations. The streets have in his mind fused into a “single 
abstracted Street which come the full moon he would have nightmares about” (V., 10). According to 
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Schaub this thematization of repetition on the level of characters has the function of suggesting that 
the repeated images in the novel suggest an underlying order. The eventual capitalization of the word 
marks the “typographical transformation of meaningless detail into meaningful symbol.” This is also 
an analogy of what happens with Stencil and his “literal” pursuit of V. the person. By the means of 
repetition, the images and the ideas associated with them “transcend the book’s timebound plots to 
suggest a world of meaning competing with the piecemeal chaos within each episode.” (Schaub 1981, 
15.) Although Schaub’s way of reading does not attempt to solve the meaning of “V.” as such, it is 
illustrative of how repetition tends to be understood as an integrative mechanism rather than as an 
occasion for sabotage of meaningfulness. 
 
The sequential procession of V’s provides an example of the function of repetition in narrative. The 
sign “V.” and the different things it could stand for, together produce a symbol-like sign. In his 
analysis of V., Maarten Van Delden evokes a view of literary modernism, most memorably articulated 
in T. S. Eliot’s essay on Joyce’s Ulysses. According to Eliot, the mythic parallelisms in Ulysses were 
“a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of 
futility and anarchy which is contemporary history” (quoted in Van Delden 1990, 119). A similar 
explanation can be given to how the referential meaning of “V.” or “Street” becomes subordinated to 
a symbolic sign which can be seen as an augury of an underlying order. 
 
The poetic function entails that the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axis are synchronically overlaid, 
with the sequential (metonymic, combinatory) aspects of language becoming overshadowed by the 
principle of integration through the metaphoric, selective principle. Given the metonymic dominant 
of prose, Jakobson argues, the poetic function is most commonly seen in poetry (see Lodge 1977, 
92). However, Joseph Frank’s classic study Spatial Form (1945) proposes a way of understanding 
also modernist prose literature according to a principle not much unlike the poetic function. In the 
prose works Frank studies, the diachronic sequence is a counterweight to the synchronic spatial form 
becoming the new dominant in modernist poetics (225). Discussing V., new criticism, and 
modernism, Van Delden argues that the spatial form, studied by Frank and propagated by the New 
Critics’ readings of high modernist texts, is a reading strategy which V. knows and parodies (1990, 
120–121). One way of showing how V. does not simply conform to the modernist spatial form, is to 
look at its repetitions as complicating the very idea of resolution – be it in terms of thematic 
integration of the whole or providing a satisfactory closure to the sequence. 
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However, as discussed above, neither synchrony nor diachrony is ruled out as a strategy of reading 
V. The possibility of following more than one order is also considered in Frank’s essay. He locates 
the difficulty of The Waste Land and The Cantos in “the internal conflict between the time-logic of 
language and the space-logic implicit in the modern conception of the nature of poetry” (Frank 1945, 
229). He then goes on to show that one has to read modern novels like Ulysses “in exactly the same 
manner as […] modern poetry” (ibid., 234). While Frank focuses mainly on the spatial logic in order 
to dwell on the innovations of modernist texts, later commentators such as Eric S. Rabkin have 
emphasized that reading always introduces a diachrony as counterweight to the modernist tendency 
to spatialize our understanding of texts: “To speak of the ‘spatial form’ of a plot is to speak 
metaphorically. A plot, as actualized, must occur through time in the mind of a reader” (Rabkin 1977, 
253). According to Rabkin, the temporal or diachronic experience – what has been here referred to 
as sequentiality – cannot be ignored. Rather, reading involves both synchrony and diachrony as its 
perceptual modes (253–254; cf. Frank 1977, 235–254). 
 
One way of addressing the repetition of the “V.”-sign and V.-names is to consider the functions of 
repetition in the novel more generally. As the past events, expressed through the “Stencilizations” 
and “impersonations” making up the historical chapters, start echoing motifs introduced in the 
“narrative present,” the boundaries between temporal and narrative levels become increasingly 
complex (cf. Käkelä-Puumala 1994, 43). This is where tracing repetitions in different timeframes and 
the ordering of fabula-events are most clearly shown as disparate activities. 
 
Intriguingly, the discordancy between the spatial form and the experienced unidirectionality of time 
is inventively dramatized in Pynchon’s later novels. It is metaphorized by Charles Mason in Mason 
& Dixon (1997) as a “haunting from the future.” The metaphor is literalized in “the Trespassers” of 
Against the Day (2006), who seem to be both time travelers and ghosts – yet not quite either (cf. 
Dalsgaard 2011, 124). The canniest idea these imaginings convey is that time travel and haunting 
may quite successfully express what the reader’s operations in piecing together the spatial form of 
the text might look like from the point of view within the other sequence, the fabula. As the discussion 
around spatial form shows, however, free textual navigation is an institutionalized strategy available 
for novel at least since the high modernist era. 
 
Repetition, therefore, serves as a kind of caveat to the sequential reading undertaken below. Though 
at first unanchored to any specific meaning, “V.” is gradually endowed with more and more potential 
meanings. This is first done via repetitions of the sign “V.” and via its displacement into V-names 
119 
 
and V-words. In the third chapter V. is personified as something referable as both “it” and “she.” 
Subsequently, the significance of the recognitions of “V.” will be assessed according to whether they 
fit into the category outlined by the passage from Sidney Stencil’s journals. Readings with thematic 
and plot-related interests have been keen to emphasize those potential meanings of “V.” which are 
individuated and gendered – and it is just as well that they did. The novel seems to end with the 
feminine V.-character trumping all other interpretations. The novel later comments on the broad 
horizon of interpretation it first seems to entertain when at one point Stencil comes to a realization 
that “V. might be no more a she than a sailing vessel or a nation” (V., 226). But it is a she, is it not? 
At least the overwhelming majority of scholars seem to have decided that Stencil’s quest approaches 
and avoids nothing less than the repressed presence of the mother. This can literally point to lady V. 
as Herbert Stencil’s biological mother, but also evoke the mythical symbol V. as the metaphorical 
mother of “the century’s child,” Stencil (V., 52). 
 
 
V., Pre-Stencilized 
 
In the passage initiating the thread of feminine V.-motifs, another character asks Stencil: “Is it she 
you are pursuing? Seeking?” He answers (referring to himself, as he does, in the third person): “You’ll 
ask next if he believes her to be his mother. The question is ridiculous.” (54.) However, when the 
novel draws to a close this has stopped being ridiculous and seems, rather, the most plausible 
interpretation: V. may well be a woman, Stencil’s mother, and it could be her Stencil was pursuing 
all along.73 In retrospect, therefore, it is quite reasonable to wonder whether Stencil simply protests 
too much at the beginning of the novel. From the vantage point available to the reader at the beginning 
of the text, however, something makes this reading less than tempting. 
 
As the Gadamerian conception of the hermeneutic circle has it, any interpretation begins with fore-
projections, or expectations, about the meaning of the whole which are replaced by more suitable 
ones during the process of interpretation. The reading process also involves shedding the distracting 
fore-projections that are not suited to the continuing process of interpretation. (Gadamer 1975, 269–
270.)  We can see how the beginning of V. manipulates the emerging interpretive horizon by looking 
at the way the novel builds up towards the introduction of Stencil’s obsession with V. As Käkelä-
Puumala (1999) shows, the early state of affairs concerning all things “V.” is quite complex, and 
                                                          
73 Grant (2001, 28–29) produces a list of scholars who accept or at least entertain this interpretation: Cowart (1980), 
Poirier (1975), Hite (1983), Kharpertian (1990), Slade (1974), Eddins (1990), Richter (1974). 
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fixing down the polymorphous signification of “V.” into a reference to a woman does not mean that 
earlier expectations are completely eradicated. Käkelä-Puumala writes: 
 
All these dimensions seem to fuse in the text, or change rapidly from one to another, so that the attributes 
of a symbol – depth, complexity, several layers of meaning – remain when V appears as a “mere” shape, and 
the neutrality of a geometrical shape survives in cases where V appears as a traditional symbol. […] 
In the course of reading it becomes evident that no classification can exhaust all possible meanings. They 
always remain as an imaginary reserve, as a totality that is too vast to be grasped, but that somehow directs 
all interpretation. (1999, 22–23.) 
 
Neither the accumulation of the (symbolic) meaning nor the persistence of the material V. fully 
cancels out the other. The idea of the plurality of meaning surviving as the text runs its course can 
also be seen in the context of textual hermeneutics. As Harding’s elaboration on the ideas derived 
from Iser and Gadamer shows, the hermeneutic process may not result in a final synthesis because 
instead of a consolidated meaning we have one unable to shed the attending “alien associations” 
(Harding 1993; see chapter 2). 
 
In the course of the novel, therefore, the transformation of the sign “V.” into an initial of a feminine 
name is overcast by the many V-shapes and signs preceding it. The shape [\/] is presented as a 
perspectival effect of vision (V., 10), the capital letter is found in the name of the jazz club “V-Note” 
(51). Also, the world of the novel is repeatedly evoked as a geometrical space of angles, lines, and 
intersecting surfaces. The V-evoking potential is seen in an early descriptive passage in which a room 
is deconstructed into a grid of crossing planes, surfaces and lines: 
 
Directly across the room from Rachel was a mirror, hung high on the wall, and under the mirror 
a shelf which held a turn-of-the-century clock. The double face was suspended by four golden 
buttresses above a maze of works enclosed in clear Swedish lead glass. The pendulum didn’t 
swing back and forth but was in the form of a disc, parallel to the floor and driven by a shaft 
which paralleled the hands at six o’clock. The disc turned a quarter-revolution one way, then 
a quarter-revolution the other, each reversed torsion on the shaft advancing the escapement 
a notch. Mounted on the disc were two imps or demons, wrought in gold, posed in fantastic 
attitudes. (V., 45–46.) 
 
Here the space of the room is first structured as planes set in right angles with respect to each other, 
horizontal: floor, ceiling, shelf, pendulum disc; and vertical: wall, mirror, clock face, hands at six 
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o’clock. The quarter-revolutions of the pendulum disc make another right angle. The scene, thus far 
perfectly perpendicular, is split into a field of virtual V’s by Rachel Owlglass’s line of sight: 
 
Rachel was looking into the mirror at an angle of 45°, and so had a view of the face turned 
toward the room and the face on the other side, reflected in the mirror; here were time and 
reverse-time, co-existing, cancelling one another exactly out. (V., 46.) 
 
As these examples show, the problem of the possible meaning of “V.” has from very early on in the 
novel two facets. One of them is the lack of information – the paucity of indicators as to who V. is, 
what “V.” means, or what the novel V. is about – but the other facet is the always already 
overdetermined field of signification buzzing around the distinctive shape on the printed page or 
evoked in the reading mind (cf. Käkelä-Puumala 1999, 23). 
 
McHoul and Wills (1990) demonstrate this by simply presenting a series of early V-sightings in the 
novel: 
 
an asymmetric V to the east where it’s dark and there are no more bars (2) / Section v of chapter 1 (27) / 
‘…V-Note, McClintic Sphere. Paola Maijstral.’ Nothing but proper nouns (40) / Not who, but what: what is she 
(43) / the sentences on V. suddenly acquired a light of their own (44) / The V.-jigsaw (44) / … (McHoul and 
Wills 1990, 164.) 
 
This citation gives us a passable picture of the chaotic world of V. in its pre-Stencilized state, it is 
possible to look even further back: the title, the epigraph, the layout of the title of Chapter 1. (See fig. 
1.) 
 
 
     Fig. 1 V-shaped peritexts 
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The V.-sign or the V-shape is everywhere to be seen even before the text proper of the novel begins. 
As though as an afterimage, the V-pattern keeps being overlaid on the fictional world as it comes to 
life. 
 
In the sequence of the novel these V’s precede the introduction of Herbert Stencil – the connoisseur 
of all things “V.” and ultimately the seeker of the personified, feminine V. One peculiar feature of 
the sequence in which the possible meanings arise is that none of the early clues point toward the 
option that “V.” should refer to a woman. With the introduction of Stencil and his search for lady V. 
these early occurrences become secondary, unmarked, backgrounded and unmotivated. 
 
As shown above, this dynamic of literary reading has been discussed in hermeneutics by scholars 
elaborating on the idea of the hermeneutic circle. Outside hermeneutics, the twists and turns in the 
process of reading have been most successfully theorized by Menakhem Perry in his remarkable essay 
on literary dynamics (1979a). At the most general level, Perry’s essay is a contribution to theory of 
reading, but with strong focus on medium-specific features of reading texts – the sequential mode of 
processing, in particular. Perry summarizes his view of the reading process and the shortcomings of 
earlier theory: 
 
The nature of a literary work, and even the sum total of its meanings, do not rest entirely on the conclusions 
reached by the reader at the end-point of the text-continuum. They are not a “sifted,” “balanced,” and static 
sum-total constituted once the reading is over, when all the relevant material has been laid out before the 
reader. (1979a, 41.) 
  
Perry argues that studies of the nature of literary text have neglected the study of dynamics and 
process in favor of producing finalized interpretations of object-like works. However, he argues, the 
process and its different stages contribute to our understanding of the work, and should be described 
in theory. According to Perry, there are several overlapping processes, only one of which moves 
towards reconstructing the chronological or natural order that narratologists have called fabula. Perry 
argues that elements of the text may participate in several temporal frames at once: “the ‘natural’ 
sequence of an ‘external’ occurrence; the ‘natural’ sequence of a character’s consciousness; the 
sequence within a block of information transmitted from one character to another, etc.” He remarks 
that when scholars find examples of distorted order of the fabula, these are usually cases where the 
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text does not conform to what Perry calls the natural-chronological sequence (1979a, 40; cf. Ronen 
1990). Acknowledging this bias broadens the scope of dynamics of reading beyond the streamlined 
version of narratological analysis of the Genettian “order.”74 
 
Although contemporary to Culler and Iser, who were discussed in the previous chapters as distantly 
related proponents of theory of reading, Perry belongs to yet another tradition of studying reading 
and interpretation. In the late 1970’s, the Tel Aviv school, which Perry helped establish, specialized 
in “literary dynamics.” Like Iser, Perry assumes that the text depends on its reader for 
“concretization” (Perry 1979a, 35).75 Similarly reminiscent of Iser is Perry’s emphasis on the 
capability of the text to surprise the reader so as to require a reorientation of thinking (ibid. 356–357; 
see also Gadamer 1975 269–270; Harding 1993). Perry writes: “The ordering and distribution of the 
elements in a text may exercise considerable influence on the nature, not only of the reading process, 
but of the resultant whole as well” (1979a, 35). This notion of the reading process offers a way to 
theorize the tension between the tentative meanings attached to “V.” and the strong thematic search 
for lady V. which only sets off in the third chapter of the novel. What is at stake in this tension is 
exactly the shifting horizon of expectations of what the whole, the novel, is like, what it is all about, 
and which reading conventions should be relevant to reading it. Like Culler, on the other hand, Perry 
shows throughout his essay that his theory of reading is a metahermeneutic effort: it is a study of 
readings and of the ways in which interpretations are made (see ibid. 62–64). Furthermore, Perry 
insists that the “reader” of his sequential reading is not any particular reader but a “competent” 
construct (ibid., 43; cf. Culler 1975, 131–135). 
 
Perry’s theoretical model may be used to explain why the thematically strong interpretation of V. as 
a woman does not simply eliminate the signifying potential “V.” has before the quest-plot becomes 
the dominant interpretive frame. Perry remarks on “the peculiar survival” of rejected meaning (41). 
The backgrounded, retrospectively unmotivated interpretive possibilities keep influencing the 
                                                          
74 The complex system of interrelations is quite rarely applied to textual analysis with Genette’s finesse and subtlety. 
 
75 Perry emphasizes that the “concretization” of the text means something different to him and to phenomenologists like 
Ingarden and Iser (Perry 1979a, 43 n. 6). Same can be said about the meaning of textual “gaps” in the writings of the 
Tel Aviv scholars and the phenomenologically oriented scholars. For the phenomenologists, the idea that readers 
concretize texts is interconnected with the idea that textual representations are incomplete, “gappy,” as it were (see 
e. g. Iser 1972, 278–282). For Perry and Sternberg, the gappiness of texts entails temporary or permanent 
withdrawal of relevant information (see Sternberg 1978; Perry and Sternberg 1986, 275–277). The Tel Aviv theory, 
therefore, is somewhat conversant with narratological accounts of the dynamics between fabula and sjuyzet, but has 
little to do with the phenomenological texture of textual representations. This said, the account which Iser gives on 
the sequential processing of literary gestalten is much closer to Perry’s view. Both views emphasize the role of 
retrospective reassessment of the previously read and the provisional and dynamic character of interpretation.  
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projected whole towards which the reading process is oriented. This survival of the indeterminate 
meaning of “V.” is expedited by another factor Perry describes. The initial impression given in 
communication, or “information situated at the beginning of a message,” comes to have special 
significance because of its primacy (Perry 1979a, 53–54).76 It can be argued, then, that the primacy 
of the possible, but retrospectively undermined meanings of “V.” do not only survive but are actually 
difficult to discard as the reading process advances. 
 
Perry specifies what he hopes to achieve by analyzing the dynamic aspect of reading process: 
 
The effects of the entire reading process all contribute to the meaning of the work: its surprises; the changes 
along the way; the process of a gradual, zig-zag-like build-up of meanings, their reinforcement, development, 
revision and replacement; the relations between expectations aroused at one stage of the text and 
discoveries actually made in the subsequent stages; the process of retrospective re-patterning and even the 
peculiar survival of meanings which were first constructed and then rejected (ibid., 41). 
 
Perry describes the reading process as being full of “surprises” and “zig-zag-like” constructions and 
reconstructions of the text and its meanings. This is the strong point of Perry’s approach, and may 
also be considered the reason why it is primarily applicable to reading literary fiction. Obviously, not 
all texts call for such intricate description of their processing. We process many texts in a 
straightforward manner, helped all the way by a highly automatized literary and cultural 
competence.77 
 
However, Pynchon’s way of constructing his novels – or making the reader construct them – responds 
well to Perry’s approach. Brian McHale demonstrates this in his seminal analysis of Gravity’s 
Rainbow, which is very much informed by Perry’s work (McHale 1979).78 It describes the reading 
                                                          
76 This idea has also later been adopted in cognitive narratology. Jahn (1997, 456–457) attributes Perry with first 
identifying the principles of text processing which Jahn calls primacy preference rule and recency preference rule 
and which form a part of Jahn’s cognitivist take on narrative modes. Fludernik (2010), too, considers Perry’s ideas 
as significant precedents to cognitive narratology (926). 
 
77 Perry himself is very clear about his essay describing the dynamics specific to reading literary text (1979a, 56–58). 
Yet the concepts primacy and recency have made a successful transition to cognitive narratology (Jahn 1997, 456–
457). However, this is not the first transdisciplinary migration the concepts make: Perry takes them from 
psychologists who studied first impressions or judgments about descriptions of personality. Perry goes to great 
lengths to describe the specific requirements for these concepts placed by fictional narratives, and dwells on the 
reasons why the concepts cannot be simply transferred from one discipline to the next. (Perry 1979a, 53–58.) 
 
78 The scope of the influence goes deeper than the few references in McHale’s essay reveal: the essays by Perry and 
McHale were published back to back in the first issue of Poetics Today. Both scholars were also part of the editorial 
team (See Poetics Today 1:1–2), and both essays are seminal to the development of the Tel Aviv school of literary 
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process of the novel as a series of concretizations and deconcretizations (91, passim.). According to 
McHale the many qualities of Gravity’s Rainbow, especially vis-á-vis modernist and postmodernist 
poetics, are best seen by focusing on text-processing, pattern-making, and pattern-interpreting 
processes in reading rather than formal organization of the text as such (88). The processes Perry 
describes as “retrospective re-patterning” and the survival of rejected meaning are of special 
importance (Perry 1979a, 41). According to McHale the reader undertakes the pattern-making and 
pattern-interpreting operations which are conventionally meaning-producing in modernist texts, but 
are undercut in Gravity’s Rainbow. Therefore, the reader has to continually recontextualize, revise, 
and remotivate entire scenes, events, and episodes. (McHale 1979, 91.) 
 
In V., this observation applies especially to the V.-sequence. It is certainly possible and plausible to 
reach the conclusion that V. is a woman from Stencil’s father’s past, and to construct a single 
continuous story (see e.g. Cowart 2011, 41–42). Yet this is only constructing the fabula, which 
according to Perry and McHale should not detain analysis exclusively. The V.-sequence understood 
as a process realized through reading paints another picture – and not just one but a whole series.79 
 
 
3.2. The Entire History of V. 
 
As discussed in the chapter above, the difficulties of reading V. can be approached via the 
contradictory ways of reading the novel invites, the disparate orders at work in signification of 
narrative fiction, and the inherent paradox of meaningful repetition. The sequential reading taking 
note of the accumulation of details and possibly self-contradictory repetitions is interfered by the 
reading for the whole, which not only seeks closure and meaning but also prefers it to conform to a 
continuous, coherent, and psychologically motivated fabula. Although it is often stated in Pynchon 
studies that indeterminacy of meaning is the point, and that stable meaning and closure are not 
coherent with the entropic worldview of Pynchon’s theory, it seems that rather than an admission to 
incoherence and meaninglessness this is just an appeal to a specific type of meaning and coherence. 
                                                          
dynamics (see Segal 2011). 
79 It is a testament to the predominance of reading for the whole that Käkelä-Puumala’s careful inventory of the 
different types of meanings attached to “V.” comes across as an unusual approach. While it is often acknowledged 
that identifying “V.” as a reference to a fictional person is not straightforward, few scholars have taken comparable 
pains to demonstrate just how multifarious the signifying potential of the sign is – and how deeply intertextual. (See 
Käkelä-Puumala 1999, 22–35.) 
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Readings that discover in Pynchon an entropic theory of the human condition or a theory of history 
as a cycle of disenchantment and decadence are heavily invested in finding global significance. 
 
As discussed in the first part of this study (chapter 2.3), the reading strategy that allows one to suggest 
a kind of analogy between thematic aboutness and artistic construction can be called thematization. 
Thematization is a strategy by which seemingly incoherent and meaningless details can be made into 
a kind of whole – one that addresses, is about, or grapples with incoherence and meaningless as a 
larger human concern. The thematizing procedure of reading is an admission to an entire tradition of 
reading literary works, a deeply humanistic one which values (and is bound to find) a unity or 
correspondence of meaning and form (see Schwarz 1990, 2–3). 
 
However, I wish to continue to keep the thematizing synthesis at the arm’s length in order to take a 
further look into V. and to the interaction of the sequences discussed above. In the course of the novel, 
the coherent and meaningful fabula seems to gain more and more sway over the haphazardly 
accumulating sequence of V’s, encountered as the text is being read. The sections below delve in to 
the readings of Pynchon studies to show how this schismatic situation is or is not reconciled in 
interpretations of V. 
 
 
Telling the Hunter from the Hunt: Herbert Stencil and “V.” 
 
Whatever one makes of the play of possibility and signification around the acute-angled shape from 
the opening pages onward, the significance of the tentative personification of “V.” in Chapter 3 is 
crucial for the plot development of the novel. This event functions as the initial thrust to the second 
quest of the novel – the one acquiring many generic features of a quest narrative – Herbert Stencil’s 
attempt to track down V. the character, who might be his mother. This quest may be a travesty of the 
traditional quest, but it is one actually taking place in the world of the novel (cf. Tanner 1982, 44; 
Cowart 2011). This quest can also be seen as psychologically motivated: as rooted in the experienced 
desires, hopes and fears of a character in the fictional world. 
 
This of course has some bearing on the readerly quest(ions) about the meaning of the symbol “V.” 
Individuated females subsequently become the marked case among all instances in which something 
like a “V.” is evoked. The privileged category continues to include all females, however: cyborg, rat, 
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or human; country or vessel. The sign “V.” may be attached to beings belonging exclusively to the 
fictional world of the novel, but also women of myth or historical artifacts like Botticcelli’s The Birth 
of Venus. Although the free-floating potential of “V.” is by no means smothered altogether, the range 
of interpretive possibilities is placed under the thematic constraint of Stencil’s quest for V. the 
woman. 
 
The interpretation of V. as a woman is prevalent despite the profusion of conflicting clues. This is, 
however, in accordance with Perry’s theory of how certain kinds of interpretive frames are preferred 
in reading literary texts. According to Perry, precedence is accorded to whichever frame connects 
textual elements most closely, so that frames in which “V.” gets the highest degree of continuity and 
order are preferred to those in which different V’s are merely linked (cf. Perry 1979b, 84). Therefore, 
if one were to locate where the early V formed by lampposts receding into distance becomes 
unmotivated and loses all but a residual stake in the “aboutness” of the novel, it is the occasion of 
Herbert Stencil’s obsession being introduced. Interpreting the meaning of “V.” is from this pivotal 
moment onwards increasingly dominated by the female figures who appear in the embedded 
narratives of the novel.80 
 
It seems that in addition to the abstract symbolic scramble for signs we now have a more typical quest 
narrative to follow. Yet when we look how the text instantiates this dual quest, we also see that it 
hastens to comment on this duality in terms that arouse a new kind of suspicion. The narration shows 
us Stencil himself pondering the dual concept of the quest: 
 
He would dream perhaps once a week that it had all been a dream, and that now he’d 
awakened to discover the pursuit of V. was merely a scholarly quest after all, an adventure of 
the mind, in the tradition of The Golden Bough or The White Goddess. But soon enough he’d 
wake up the second, real time, to make again the tiresome discovery that it hadn’t really ever 
stopped being the same simple-minded literal pursuit; V. ambiguously a beast of venery, 
chased like the hart, hind or hare, chased like an obsolete, or bizarre, or forbidden form of 
sexual delight. And clownish Stencil capering along behind her, bells ajingle, waving a wooden, 
toy oxgoad. (Ibid., 61–62.) 
 
                                                          
80 Molly Hite emphasizes that to attach names and meanings to V-symbol is to “limit the resonance of that symbol to a 
certain frequency.” Part of the mystery and fun of V. is, after all, the seeming inexhaustibility of possible reference. 
(Hite 1983, 27.) 
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The first “awakening” hints at the first quest: the symbolic hunt within a sign-system. References 
here are to the famous (proto-)structuralist81 myth-anthropologists James Frazer and Robert Graves, 
late 19th and mid-20th century, respectively. Their works can certainly be understood, among other 
things, as “adventures of the mind” – testaments to human capacity for pattern-finding and system-
building. As David Cowart writes, Stencil’s quest for V. is itself modelled after “the more serious 
system making which, in any age, models reality” (2011, 44). 
 
The second and, according to the text, the “real” awakening means returning to the pursuit of V. the 
woman. This quest may be called “simple-minded” and “literal” one, but it comes across as anything 
but literal and simple. It is, firstly, expressed in deliberately ambiguous terms. While words like hart, 
hide, hare, and oxgoad can be taken at face value, it is clear that together they point toward the 
mythographic discourse found in just such works as The Golden Bough or The White Goddess, in 
which they figure as symbols patterned across the universal structure of the myth.82 In addition to the 
realm of myth, the diction of this apparently literal and simple quest for V. evokes psychoanalysis 
and the subconscious realm of dreams, symbols and sexual fantasies – and also the psychoanalytical 
quest is anything but literal. “Venery” refers “ambiguously” to both hunting and sexuality, but it is, 
in addition, nothing less than a reference to a particular V. (Venus). 
 
Consequently, a deep ambivalence towards the dichotomization of the two quests is already expressed 
in the text when the first female character who might be V. makes her appearance. One quest is a 
literal pursuit, the other a symbolic search; one seeks to locate something in the fictional world, the 
other enacts a search for rules of interpretation. Yet at the earliest intersection of the quests an 
intertwining of the two is suggested. This position of paranoid ambivalence, which the reader is urged 
to adopt, is that of Stencil. The reader who accepts it will find it very hard indeed to tell the hunter 
from the hunt. 
 
As discussed in the previous subchapter, the repetition of the sign “V.” keeps accumulating hints and 
details that seem to fall outside the possibly reconstructible fabula of the lady V. and her connection 
                                                          
81 Sir James George Frazer’s original tile was The Golden Bough: Study in Comparative Religion. Robert Graves’s 
complete title is The White Goddess: A Historical Grammar to Poetic Myth.   
82 The hunt of the hart has had at least since the Arthurian legends a symbolic significance, with special place reserved 
to the rare white variety. Artemis’s Ceryneian Hind, on the other hand, is famously represented in the story-cycle of 
Heracles’s labors. Hare is a trickster-figure in several folkloristic traditions, whereas a shepherdly goad has been 
pictured in the hands of Egyptian goddess Neith, Ganesha of the Hindus and St. John the Baptist in Catholic 
Christian iconographies. Various gods and goddesses of hunt, knowledge and war, all with a long rod of some 
variety, are not far off – and neither is the contrasting image of the good shepherd, without a goad, with the lost lamb 
on his shoulders, found in various stages of the history of Christian art, as well as in some pre-Christian contexts. 
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to Stencil’s father. The excess and surplus of possible meanings of “V.” is strangely concordant with 
internal inconsistencies in Stencil’s quest-narrative. The inconsistencies of Stencil’s quest include the 
differences between the narrative situations of the Stencilized chapters, the different “disguises” or 
aliases of V. (should we believe V. is one woman), as well as the temporal shifts of the fictional 
chronology. As discussed above, difference itself becomes thinkable only in repetition, or, as Deleuze 
writes, in the “iron collars of representation” – identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance 
(Deleuze 1994, 262). Inversely, discussing effects and functions of repetition inevitably focuses on 
difference. The moment we bring up repetition, we are bound to turn to particular variables (Rimmon-
Kenan 1980, 153). The kind of mobility of meaning which difference and repetition allow guarantees 
that the search for the meaning of “V.” and the literal search for the personified V. may always be 
seen as somehow being two parts of the same signifying structure. They are bound to be interpreted 
together, if not because of their identity, then because they can be grasped together by analogy, 
resemblance, or even opposition. The play of the same and the different in the repeatedly evoked both 
in repetition of “V.” and incredulous communicative situations of Stencilization seem to play into the 
hands of interpretability and possibility of coherence and meaning. 
 
 
“Disguise Is One of Her Attributes” 
 
As the early, non-human and non-feminine clues on “V.” were discussed above,83 we can now in turn 
approach the dual quest by looking into the succession of details that suggest that V. is a person. This 
is the dominant reading of what “V.” means or refers to, but looking into the textual evidence 
presented in its defense reveals more uncertainties. The passage posing the question “not who but 
what: what is she?” is one of the two passages directly cited from the elder Stencil’s near-apocryphal 
journals which many (but not all) of the “Stencilizations” and impersonations of the novel’s historical 
chapters are supposedly based on. As suggested above, the interpretation of V. as a woman allows 
things to hang together in a more orderly constellation, which may account for the precedence of 
readings following this interpretive thread (cf. Perry 1979b, 84). Therefore, the interpretive force of 
the historical chapters does not hinge on there being a consistent relationship between the historical 
document and the events portrayed in the historical sections of the novel. As at least one critic points 
out “veracity” is one V-word notable for its absence in the novel (Gilmore 2012). Actually, what 
becomes the expected norm is not only that there might be discrepancies between the original 
                                                          
83 See chapter 3.1. 
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document and the Stencilized story but that the specific quality of the discrepancy changes from one 
instance of historical narration to the next. It is only through these fragments we come to know V. as 
a person. 
 
For illustration, we may consider Father Fairing’s journal in Chapter 5. The clergyman’s journal 
comes up and is cited in a chapter centering on the narrative present of 1956 New York. This is not, 
therefore, a “Stencilized” or “historical” chapter. Fairing’s journal, however, is cited at length and 
verbatim while Benny Profane, the novel’s antihero with no interest or personal investment in V. or 
“V.” whatsoever, wades through the sewers in which Father Fairing once oversaw his parish of rats. 
A tantalizing turn of event takes place when the text of the chapter, thus far centering on Profane’s 
subterranean quest, is interrupted by several passages straight out of Father Fairing’s journal. The 
journal furthermore turns out to identify a “V.” – a rat named Veronica. Fairing’s actual journal is 
reportedly “still preserved in an inaccessible region of the Vatican library, and in the minds of the 
few old-timers in the New York Sewer Department who got to see it when it was discovered” (V., 
120). While it is not impossible that Profane has interviewed one of the old-timers, the text provides 
no textual support for such an interpretation. 
 
However, it is clearly not the point whether it is possible to explain or naturalize this oddity. In other 
words, it is not the question whether we can provide an experiential, emotional, or psychological 
grounds for the interpolation of Fairing’s text between paragraphs focalized through Profane’s point 
of view. According to Elizabeth Campbell (1988) the function of the interpolated narrative is to make 
the reader question categories like history and fiction, or fact and myth, but also to remind the reader 
that Profane is a fictional creation (60–61). Arguably the effect extends to the level of conventions of 
reading, as the novel seems here and again to foreground and undermine the readerly desire to 
motivate and explain unexpected elements by appeals to character psychology. 
 
For further illustration of how little this type of “veracity” figures in the events around V., we may 
turn to chapter 7 (“She Hangs on the Western Wall”). It is possible to construct a reading in which 
the document which initializes Stencil’s pursuit of V. in chapter 3 is repeated by chapter 7, although 
unrecognizably. This reading is found in Grant’s Companion (2001, 28). Grant is perhaps right to 
wonder about the melodramatic tone of Sidney Stencil’s journals. The elder Stencil writes: “Not who 
but what: what is she? God grant that I may never be called upon to write the answer” (V., 53, 
emphasis added). Grant perceptively points out what is often overlooked in criticism: the entry from 
Stencil Sr.’s journal is dated, “Florence, April 1899,” which coincides with young Evan Godolphin 
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arriving to Florence at the beginning of Chapter 7. Therefore, the primal scene of the search for V. is 
concurrent with events represented later in the novel. Were we to take at face value the claim that the 
historical chapters are, somehow, Stencil’s doing, then the very entry that first mentions V. would be 
a part of the source material behind the narrative of “She Hangs on the Western Wall.” Grant plays 
along with the idea and thinks it strange that the elder Stencil should be so aghast to name Victoria 
Wren, whom he meets in Florence. Why is she evoked in the journal with the cryptic phrase “Not 
who, but what: what is she”? On the other hand, if “V.” in Sidney Stencil’s journal refers to something 
else happening in Florence, it is strange that he wishes never be called upon to disclose any details of 
the “Situation” (a veritable V-pageant in which Victoria Wren is joined by Botticelli’s Venus, the lost 
land of Vheissu, the volcano Vesuvius, and the nation of Venezuela). 
 
Yet the situation in Florence is further complicated after another arresting metaphor comes up in the 
middle of the chapter. Within the Stencilized story the reality of historical “Situations” is called to 
question. None other than Stencil’s father wonders whether any patterns one detects in such events 
are finally just tricks of the mind: 
 
He had decided long ago that no Situation had any objective reality: it only existed in the minds of those who 
happened to be in on it at any specific moment. Since these several minds tended to be form a sum total or 
complex more mongrel than homogenous, The Situation must necessarily appear to a single observer much 
like a diagram in four dimensions to an eye conditioned to seeing its world in only three. (V., 189.) 
 
This passage in chapter 7 can be considered another pivotal metaphor for interpreting V., in part due 
to this thematization of interpretation. Here it is suggested that simultaneous existence of several 
interpretations must be considered even if the resulting whole is incomprehensible to any single 
observer. The events in Florence and the repetition of “V.” in the pageant of its potential referents 
shows how repetition works not only as a device of continuity and coherence but as a way of 
questioning the expectations of continuity and coherence. If the kind of reading which seeks to 
establish V. as a single and continuous person must seek its evidence in the Stencilized chapters, the 
task is very clearly undermined at every turn. 
 
In retrospect, it is possible to interpret that Victoria Wren is the true guise of the character followed 
in Stencilized chapters from Alexandria (1898) to Florence (1899), Paris (1913), and Deutsch-
Südwestafrika (1922). This would make character continuity a linking principle between the 
aforementioned historical narratives, but also the (arguably) non-Stencilized Maltese episodes of the 
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“Epilogue” (1919), and “the confessions” of Fausto Maijstral (1942–1943), in which V. also makes 
an appearance (see e. g. Cowart 2011, 41). But even this continuity may finally come across as 
affirming indeterminacy and uncertainty of who or what V. or “V.” is. This is in part because the 
variables of the Stencilized historical narration are discontinuous with each other. This sentiment is 
echoed by Harold Bloom in his commentary on V.: 
 
While possible to suggest that V. is a maze not without form or meaning, the real maze that V. creates, or 
invokes, or evokes, is the maze of certainty or meaning that readers often attempt to splice into life and 
literature, both. Time and again the narration of the book forces us to encounter the meaninglessness and 
uncertainty of the book, and ultimately it poses a question: what made us even think of “certainty” in the 
first place? (Bloom 2003, 52.) 
 
Bloom realizes that in each of the various turns the novel takes, we can shift our position and look 
for certainty from this new position. Eventually, though, the ideal reader Bloom posits will choose to 
reflect on this twisting and turning and rise above it. From this metahermeneutic vantage another type 
of question poses itself: what does the novel do to make us think it is possible to be certain about “V.” 
or V.? Disguise is one of her attributes, V. tells us (388). Is certainty, then, just one of her disguises? 
 
 
The Final Sequence and Some Consequences 
 
This question can be approached in the light of Chapter 14, “V. in Love.” Here, finally, V. herself 
seems to be identified through the title and the chapter goes on to show that one of the central 
characters, first referred to only as “the woman” indeed is V.: “If we've not already guessed, ‘the 
woman’ is, again, the lady V.” (V., 406). In this chapter, however, V. is not just as presented as a 
particular woman, but also identified as Victoria Wren. Is this then where the mystery of V. is finally 
resolved? 
 
Harold Bloom persuasively argues that this certainty brings us no closer to the “truth” about “V.” 
than anything hinted at during the procession of “V.s” in the novel. He adds that “by now we perhaps 
have more of a quantum sense of V.” and instead of “truth” we are looking for “probabilities” (Bloom 
2003, 51). As Bloom suggests, this hesitance in the face of this explicit identification of the woman 
as V. and Victoria Wren may be caused by the education we have receive. Having read this far in the 
sequence accumulating a V-word upon a V-thing upon a V-shape as well as in the sequence repeatedly 
betraying its promise of a continuous fabula of the mysterious V. it is hard to take the novel for its 
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word. One hears in this idea an echo of McHale’s reading of Gravity’s Rainbow that shows how the 
novel conditions the reader to accept retrospective reversal or erasure of seemingly stable realities in 
the world of fiction. Like McHale’s reading, also Bloom’s view of V.  gives due consideration to the 
effects of the sequential experience of reading the novel. 
 
However, Bloom’s notion of “quantum sense” is surprisingly easy to translate into certain linguistic 
features in Chapter 14. The woman is V. is Victoria Wren, but only, it turns out, in the subjunctive 
mood. Framed by counterfactual sentences, the sense of a definite identity of V. is as indeterminate 
as ever, but the indeterminacy now frames not only the narrative situation but also sentence-level 
predication. The shorn hair of V.’s paramour is “only an obscure bit of private symbolism for the lady 
V.: perhaps, if she in fact were Victoria Wren, having to do with her time in the novitiate” (V., 410, 
emphasis added). The younger Stencil and his inferential processes and uncertain deductions are laid 
bare: “If she were Victoria Wren, even Stencil couldn’t remain all unstirred […] (ibid.)”. The hesitant 
narration continuously foregrounds Stencil’s historiographic methods and the insurmountable 
distance between the events and the telling: “Stencil even departed from his usual ploddings to 
daydream a vision of her now [1956], at the age of seventy-six […]” (411, emphasis added). 
 
Bloom’s evocative idea of a quantum sense, therefore, is highly suggestive of not only V.’s identity 
but the problem-solving involved in reading V. It is, indeed, slightly misleading to say that “by now” 
we have a “quantum sense” of V.’s identity, as this sense is not only a natural growth of processing 
the succession of appearances of V. and the different Stencilizations preceding “V. in Love.” The 
quantum sense is also produced in the narration of “V. in Love.” In addition to allowing us to counter 
its certainties with the training received during reading, the chapter constitutes another kink in the 
sequence of V’s, another repetition with difference, by being strikingly unique among the historical 
episodes. For the first time, Herbert Stencil becomes a sustained reflector-character explicitly 
presented in the historical narration, and for the first time the conventional distance between narration 
and experience is established. The truly striking effect in the latter historical chapters of the novel is 
that while the earlier overdetermination of the meaning of “V.” decreases, and while the text begins 
offering explicit recognitions of V., the previously backgrounded interpretive clues mount a 
resistance against this clarity. 
 
Perhaps the strongest outward sign of this resistance is found in a non-Stencilized chapter 16 
(“Valletta”), in which Stencil has finally traveled to Malta in what amounts to his most dramatic 
attempt to make sense of the circumstances of his father’s disappearance and V. In Malta, Stencil 
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meets with Fausto Maijstral, whose memoirs (or “Confessions,” as they are titled in the novel) are 
among the documents on which the history of V. is based, and among the very few which are available 
to the reader without the filter of Stencilization. In the sixteenth chapter, Stencil recounts to Maijstral 
“the entire history of V.” and realizes that it adds up “only to the recurrence of an initial and a few 
dead objects” (V., 445). This reversal seems in accordance with Stencil’s predicament. The 
uncertainties of Stencilizations and impersonations can indeed be seen as resulting from the willingly 
applied method of “approach and avoid” (V., 55). Now that this method has been substituted for a 
more straightforward one, the mystery might just dissipate into the “scholarly quest,” it may always 
have been (V., 61). Yet this dramatic reversal is too neat to stand. The next clue, perhaps waking 
Stencil up for the real, second time, propels his quest onwards, towards Sweden and a mysterious 
Mme. Viola (V., 451–452). 
 
The series of appearances made by lady V., however, does not conclude here. In the “Epilogue 1919,” 
a strangely fantastic tale detailing the circumstances of the disappearance of Stencil’s father, all the 
loose ends seem to come together. The chapter finally recounts the events taking place on Malta in 
1919. The epilogue has been subject to some commentary, and the available analyses illustrate why 
on one hand the epilogue can be seen as an acceptable closure to the novel, but also why its version 
of the entire history of V. is difficult to digest. These readings show that the reinforcement of the 
interpretation of V. as a woman does not do away with the potential meanings attached to the V-initial 
or V-sign throughout the procession of the novel. The epilogue, seemingly showing how it all came 
to pass, has not been accepted unconditionally by scholars. 
 
However, one reading strategy of the Epilogue is taking the novel for its word. David Cowart (2011), 
among others, shows that it is possible to construct a coherent and plausible timeline of V. the woman. 
To this end it is required that we accept the “Epilogue” at face value.84 According to Cowart, the point 
of view in the “Epilogue” does not appear to be “Stencilized,” and “the author seems to identify V. 
as Stencil’s mother” (2011, 44, emphasis added). Molly Hite makes the same observation, although 
without evoking the author: contrary to the previous historical chapters, there are no framing devices 
around the epilogue, and therefore nothing hints that positing a reflecting character’s (Stencil’s) 
consciousness is called for (1983, 62). Dwight Eddins (1990) goes even further and suggests that the 
                                                          
84 Cowart does this and more, as he also accepts story-level evidence from the early version of Chapter 3 (known as 
“Under the Rose”). The latter contains most of the events of chapter 3 “In which Stencil, the quick-change artist, 
does eight impersonations,” but the framing quasi-presence of Stencil and the fragmentation into eight 
impersonations are found only in the final version of V. 
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designation of the chapter as “Epilogue,” which can be seen as a type of peritext, gives it “autonomy, 
and authority” and suggests that the strangely deus ex machina ending takes the shape of authorial 
closure in the very literal sense (87). Despite considerable differences between the readings above, 
they all suggest that finishing the novel concludes the reader’s search for V. This reading therefore 
allows or invites the reader to escape her role as Stencil’s double – for this is history becoming 
unstencilized and our access to historical events becoming independent of the effects of 
Stencilization. Whether this invitation should be accepted is the final ambiguity of the novel. 
 
The choices made by the scholars cited in the paragraph above suggest various interpretive frames in 
which the Epilogue can be seen as motivated. The one that emerges surprisingly strong is the 
interpretive frame of authorial exposition. This would indeed be the first historical episode using the 
classically authorial narrative strategy of the so-called omniscient, heterodiegetic narrator, with “zero 
focalization” (cf. Genette 1980, 208). While this is something that all of the scholars cited 
acknowledge, yet this does not make the issue of the epilogue any simpler. Cowart, for instance, sees 
that in addition to the “authorial” reading also the “Stencilized” reading of the epilogue is possible. 
More importantly, Cowart suggests that finally the choice is a non-binary one: “Even if one takes the 
epilogue as free indirect discourse grounded, still, in the projections of the younger Stencil, the 
suggestion regarding a baleful maternal parent seems nonetheless valid” (Cowart 2011, 44). 
 
In contrast to those who choose to take the epilogue in good faith, there are scholars who think that 
the epilogue is all charade. Richard Pearce argues that the “Epilogue” is best understood a parody of 
epilogue: “it does not merely provide a shift in orientation, it is absolutely discontinuous with what 
came before” (Pearce 1985, 147). At first glance this reading departs radically from any reading 
choosing to take the Epilogue in as an exposition of formerly omitted story material. The main point 
of contention, as Pearce suggests, is that the very idea that the epilogue might provide closure seems 
incompatible with the indeterminacy carefully upheld throughout the sequence of the historical 
episodes (Pearce 1985, 145–147). The difference, therefore, is not so much based on seeing the textual 
evidence of the epilogue in different ways but, rather, on an interpretation of the ethos or message of 
the whole work. What is at stake is not so much the meaning mediated through details but an attitude 
towards conventions of motivation, coherence, and closure. 
 
It is not difficult to see how this multifaceted web of indeterminacy might contribute to our 
understanding of Pynchon’s works and the ways in which they achieve the effects documented 
extensively in Pynchon scholarship. If the Pynchon of V. is the prophet of entropic forces affecting 
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humanity, then surely the floating “V.” and the indeterminable V’s, and the unfathomably Stencilized 
narrative fragments – no matter how internally contradictory – are part of the vision. Surely it is only 
all of this, and nothing less, that amounts to the full literary realization of “Pynchon’s theory.” It 
would be difficult to rebuke such an interpretation, but it is perhaps possible to point out – as has been 
done throughout this chapter – that behind the interpretive intricacy and textual play there are certain 
traditions of interpretation, protocols of reading. Focusing on these procedures may give a partial 
account of how all the interpretive intricacy and textual complexity may produce interpretations that 
are recognizable across the spectrum of approaches one might take to Pynchon. 
 
This chapter has been an attempt to see V. in the double exposure of two reading strategies. On one 
hand, we have the sequential reading that focuses on the internal dynamics of the reading process and 
strategically seeks to avoid reading with the “anticipation of retrospection” that some scholars have 
taken to be our “chief tool in making sense of narrative” (see Brooks 1992, 23). Yet as we have seen, 
this strategy also has the capacity to tease out the conventions of seeking the retrospectively grasped 
global significance and weighing textual evidence based on its relevance to the holistic interpretive 
frame. This holistic and retroactive strategy works as a counterpoint to the sequential reading, and it 
largely conforms to the classically literary critical protocol of seeking the frame in which the whole 
of the novel becomes as meaningful as possible. 
 
Although strategically foregrounding the sequential reading, the analysis here shows that eventually 
it is as difficult to choose only one of these strategies as it is to find one definitive answer to the 
indeterminacies of the V. This is probably why in many readings V. may be both an augury of 
historical force of decadence and an accidental figure at the fringes of cataclysmic events – just like 
Stencil Jr. may truly be “the century’s child” (V., 52) as well as the son of lady V. whom we may (or 
may not) finally accept is Victoria Wren. The quest which the reader accepts in assuming the readerly 
position offered by Stencil is, after all, a dual quest. It is on one hand a quest for V.’s natural habitat 
in the 20th century – its historical states of siege. On the other hand the quest remains the “literal” 
quest for V. or “V.” in V., a novel, whose reading is driven by a desire for a plot, coherence, and 
closure. 
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4. Prescribing a Common Dream: Problems of Narrative Voice in 
V. and Gravity’s Rainbow 
 
 
 
We shall call voice the product of the reader’s quest for the origin of the text. 
“A voice”: such is the vague, empty answer that we must give to the question 
of “who speaks,” at least until we can describe more or less correctly the 
situation at the other (sending) end of the act of communication. (Coste 
1989, 164.) 
“Stencil called it serendipity, not he. Do you understand? Of course you do. 
But you want hear him say it.” (V., 249.) 
Halos of meanings around words his mouth evidently spoke (GR, 172). 
 
 
This chapter will momentarily divert from analysing V. in order to approach an aspect of its 
interpretations. In the previous chapter I aimed to show how the sequential processing of details is 
taken into account in interpretations. Although earlier Pynchon studies have, to varying degrees, 
analysed the development of motifs, ideas and narrative strategies in the sequence of reading, they 
still mostly focus on the meaning of the emerging whole. The cumulative procession of V-shapes, V-
words and V-women is intertwined with other aspects of the novel: the temporal organization of the 
novel viewed as a holistic strategy and the thematic significance of repetition as such. The holistic 
interpretation of the novel often thematizes these problems of reading as aspects of “Pynchon’s 
theory,” or in more commonsensical terms, the novel’s worldview, message, theme, or moral. 
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Interestingly, sequential reading and reading for the whole come across as two strategies that underlie 
a wide range of readings approaching Pynchon with different aims and through a variety of theoretical 
interests. That is, they shape readings that are not explicitly expressing interest in the problems of 
reading literary texts. Somewhat comparably, in the present chapter I will argue that the problems 
concerning the historical narratives of V. can be – and have been – approached through the notion of 
narrative “voice” and structures of narrative communication. Many conspicuous, much-cited key 
passages thematize narrative or communicative acts in Pynchon’s novels. They foreground issues of 
voice, mediation and communication as significant to interpretation. Again, I will argue that even 
when the theoretical apparatuses brought to bear on the novels in scholarly readings are not primarily 
concerned with narrative structures or communication, communicative and narrative aspects are often 
seen as significant and operate in the background of analysis. 
 
In addition to V., which is focused on during the latter part of this chapter, my analysis will here look 
into Gravity’s Rainbow, which famously lays bare the conventions behind many of the novelistic 
effects of voice and psychological point of view (see McHale 1992; Hägg 2005). In the following 
analyses, I aim to show that the problems of communication and narrative mediation in V. and 
Gravity’s Rainbow are in many ways similar, although the contexts in which these problems are 
thematized are notably different. The themes of communication and mediation in V. are most 
conspicuous in how the embedded historical narratives are framed and presented. In Gravity’s 
Rainbow, however, the problematic of voice, mediation, and communication permeates the narration 
of the novel even more thoroughly. Thematizations of the narrative strangeness abound in the novel, 
but the most interesting ones in this context are those which concern various psychic and 
“supernatural” forms of communication. Rather than simply distinguishing formal properties of 
communication, the approach taken here emphasizes contextual and functional analysis. The 
activities of modelling communication and hearing voices are part of the interpretive process, and 
can be shown to operate in numerous existing readings. 
 
At the outset, however, it is the narratological notions of “voice” that primarily inform this analysis. 
The further theoretical interest lies in the intersection of models of communication thematized in the 
novels and the ways in which they raise questions about textual voice. My argument, as concerns the 
liaison of existing readings of Pynchon’s novels and the metapoetic goals of this work, is that finding 
a place for “voice” is a factor in many readings and interpretations of Pynchon. After decades of 
theorizing in narratology, voice can be understood rather broadly and functionally. Seeking to identify 
the narrative voice can be conceptualized as a strategy central to reading narrative fiction. This entails 
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looking for a source of the text, an intent to communicate, even if this intent or source is not 
necessarily reducible to a textually marked, unified teller persona (see Coste 1992, 164; Aczel 1998; 
Dawson 2013a). 
 
I will focus on analyzing diegetic instances of communication in Pynchon and the ways in which they 
have been approached. Yet it is vital to this discussion that in the narratological context the question 
of voice by default exceeds the scope of the diegetic. Narrative texts create, and sometimes also 
represent, their own narrating instance. That some narratologists have also tended to treat narrative 
text as the product of the represented narration is a source for disagreement and debate. I will argue 
that the paradoxical view of narrative – sometimes called the paradox of enunciation (Coste 1989, 9) 
– being at once the act of production as well as the product of that act, is reflected in thematizations 
of communication within V. and Gravity’s Rainbow. This is arguably most forcefully realized in the 
devices and strategies of Stencilization. 
 
Richard Walsh sees this paradoxical view of narrative as a matter of contrast between, on one hand, 
“conventional understanding of narrative,” which places the narrating instance within the 
communication model, and on the other, “the rhetorical view,” according to which “the 
communicative gesture creates, rather than transmits, the multi-level structure of narrative” (Walsh 
2010, 35). Richard Aczel, also acknowledging these contrasting positions, suggests that we should 
see the whole issue of voice more pluralistically, in the “space between structure and reception.” 
Aczel also believes that the theory of voice should encompass not only “an abstract speaker function 
or subject position” but also discursive features suggestive of subjectivity and voice effects (1998, 
494–495). In both cases, we see a juxtaposition of agency in a communicative schema related to the 
fictional world ontologically and elements of text we may approach in terms of rhetoric, even style. 
These two ways of constructing voice in narrative have affected theory-formation in interesting ways, 
but they can also be seen to operate as procedures of interpretation in individual readings. The latter 
argument will be explored by looking into readings of Pynchon’s Stencilized narratives in V., and to 
scholarly views on a case of otherworldly communication in Gravity’s Rainbow. 
 
Chapter 4.1. below demonstrates how thematized and modelled communication in V. and Gravity’s 
Rainbow throws into relief our tendency to “hear voices” in texts. Previous readings of Pynchon’s 
novels provide evidence for the centrality of the ideas of voice and narrative transmission for a wide 
range of readings. Chapter 4.2. focuses on the chapter “Mondaugen’s story” in V. Arguably the 
emotional and ethical nadir among the novel’s excursions to the crises of the 20th century, this chapter 
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most forcefully foregrounds questions of voice, authority, and motivation of telling. In this 
subchapter, theories of literary communication and voice are discussed in relation to the question of 
narrative ethics. Additionally, readings of “Mondaugen’s story” are seen to negotiate between the 
ambiguity of voice and the ethical imperative emerging out of the represented events themselves. 
 
 
4.1 Voice and World: Communications from the Other Side 
 
This chapter analyses instances of diegetically staged communications in Gravity’s Rainbow and V. 
Second-degree narrative performances and intradiegetic stories figure crucially in literary history 
from One Thousand and One Nights, The Canterbury Tales, and Decameron to Jan Potocki’s The 
Manuscript Found in Saragossa and the modern novel – so crucially, in fact, that the form made up 
of the frame-story and the framed story has become a site for a host of generic conventions. As far as 
my examples from Pynchon are concerned, only the Stencilized stories discussed in the latter parts 
of this chapter are embedded narratives in this sense. These stories draw copiously from the literary 
archive of embedded tales, while bringing to relief the oddity of conceptualizing such tales in terms 
of oral telling. The Stencilized stories use this strategy to thematize those questions of credibility, 
realism, and historical accuracy that stem from the inherent strangeness of literary framing of 
intradiegetic tales. In contrast, the cases from Gravity’s Rainbow exemplify embedded structures of 
spoken or otherwise “voiced” communication in a thematic frame of supernatural or supersensory 
communication. These two classes of diegetic communication, largely discussed in different 
theoretical terms, are shown by my examples from Pynchon to have more in common than literary 
theory and narratology lead us to believe. Drawing from the readings of Pynchon studies, I will argue 
that theoretical ideas of voice and communicative structures are applied to both with analytically 
convincing results. 
Theoretically, however, it is far from obvious that the intradiegetic tale and other diegetically 
represented instances of relaying narratives can be seen as closely related phenomena. This can be 
shown by delving into the narratological theory of “voice.” In what perhaps amounts to the best 
known narratological theory of narrative voice, Gérard Genette groups under the heading of voice 
those categories that describe the “relations between the narrator – plus, should the occasion arise, 
his or their narratee[s] – and the story he tells” (Genette 1980, 215, emphasis added). In the Genettian 
tradition, the question of voice is clearly about the narrator and separate from questions of point of 
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view or focalization through a character – whose idiom might colour the narrative discourse. Voice, 
as a conceptual category pertaining to the narrator is also distinct form other tiers of communication. 
This view is summarized in William Nelles’s formulation: “the historical author writes, […] the 
implied author means, […] the narrator speaks (Nelles 1997, 9, emphasis added; see also Kindt and 
Müller 2006, 156). Most narratologists, to a greater or lesser degree, recognize and respect this 
definition of voice. The scholars taking this stance also proceed from the principle that the actual 
narrating instance is always “voiced” (if not necessary produced) by the narrator (Chatman 1978; 
1990, 85; cf. Rimmon-Kenan 2002, 91.) 
 
Others, like Richard Aczel, point out that in one sense all narrative “agents” in texts, and not just the 
implied author who “means,” are implied (1998, 474–475).85 This approach contrasts with many 
narratological theories, which present the question of the narrator as a deal-breaker in negotiations 
about whether certain texts are narrative or not. Both Genette and Chatman, for example, insist that 
the presence of a narrator, overt or covert, telling or “presenting,” is a prerequisite for narrative 
discourse (see Chatman 1990, 113–116). On the other hand, theorists otherwise far apart, say, Ann 
Banfield and Richard Walsh, both argue that positing a narrator in cases in which the presence of 
such textual agent is not textually implied is unnecessary and theoretically unsound. Yet to advocate 
either view, as Manfred Jahn points out, is not to deny that the narrator will often “speak or write, 
establish communicative contact with the addressees, defend the tellability of the story and comment 
on its lesson, purpose, or meaning” (2001, 670). Theorists from different branches of literary studies 
may acknowledge that a work of fiction “leads the reader to imagine a speaker, a situation, a set of 
ancillary events” (Ohmann 1971, 14). This view reciprocates with Fludernik’s, who remarks that 
although conceptualizing narrative fiction as (verbal) communication is not a necessary theoretical 
choice, this will not stop us from modelling literary communication as an interpretive move in reading 
(2001, 622–623). 
 
Therefore, if the narrative agents can be seen as “implied,” in the similarly literalist vein we can now 
emphasize the “illusionistic” nature of the narratological communication model (cf. ibid). It is a model 
describing the levels of intention and agency that can be considered relevant or necessary to 
understanding any specific case of discourse as communication. In narratology, the focus has been 
                                                          
85 It can be added that at the time Booth’s book came out in 1961 the “implied author” was seen as a new element 
introduced to “interpretation theory.” It was only during the following two decades that the idea of the implied 
author was incorporated into the emerging study of poetics. (Kindt and Müller 2006, 67.) Even as the concept was 
gradually integrated into the vocabulary of narrative poetics, primarily via Chatman and Rabinowitz, the debate 
went on about whether the implied author was primarily an element of text or an effect of reading (ibid., 87–89). 
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on fictional narrative texts and the agencies relevant to their communication. However, it is also 
clearly the case that communicative situations are more generally modellable – and do not have to be 
conceptualized only in terms of sending, receiving and mediating roles.86 
 
In the narratological debate the questions of narrative mediation and communication overlap with 
those of narrative voice. Many have striven to make further analytical distinction, arguably no one 
with greater success than Genette. While undoubtedly successful, Genette’s distinctions are also a 
source of certain problems. For example, Richard Walsh notes, free indirect discourse, which is for 
many theorists a key issue in discussions of voice, is separated from the Genettian “voice” by treating 
it under “mood” (Walsh 2010, 37). This seems at odds with the long-standing perception of the history 
of free indirect discourse as embodying a kind of power struggle between the (omniscient) voice of 
the narrator and the characters’ personal idiom breaking its spell as we approach modernism (cf. 
Dawson 2013b, 168). 
 
In the context of my analysis of Pynchon’s novels and their readings these conceptual disagreements 
and overlaps are of special interest, because the represented narrative acts taking place in the world 
of fiction and the actual narration seem to strategically play off each other – often to the effect of 
destabilizing each other. Arguably, one benefit of conceptualizing “voice” as a space spanning from 
speaker function to voice effects is that this conceptualization allows us to see the analogousness of 
the narrative voice and represented voices within the narrative – yet this analogy does not have to 
suggest an equivalence between the two levels on which voices are “heard” in narratives. Walsh 
(2010) makes a useful simplification about what makes this possible: “Acts of representation […] are 
themselves among the possible objects of narrative representation” (37). 
 
However, Walsh also acknowledges the abyss always latent in the hierarchy of the narratological 
model. According to Walsh, the communication model view implicitly posits that every narrating 
instance is “literal with respect to the events represented – that it is ontologically continuous with the 
world on which it reports.” This gives rise to the prospect of an “endless series of implicit narrators.” 
(Ibid., 39.) This may be a “false” problem, created by a theoretical flaw, yet in a sense the problem 
could be fundamental to fiction.87 Here, one wishes to embrace such aspects of literary art which 
allow us to worry about our own ontological reality because Don Quixote can be the reader of Don 
Quixote, because doing otherwise seems like selling short both Pynchon’s novels and the cognitive 
                                                          
86 This is seen in Didier Coste’s model (1992), and, of course, Jakobson’s (1960). 
87 As suggested by e. g. Genette 2004; Alter 1975. 
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experience of reading fiction (see Borges 1964, 196; for a longer discussion see chapter 2.1 above). 
Therefore, this work is necessarily biased towards the stance of suspended disbelief, vertiginous 
glimpses of infinite regress – call it the Borgesian view. As will be shown below, the category-
crossing thematizations of voice in Pynchon are often crucial to interpretations and readings of how 
the communication of these texts works. Further, as chapter 4.2. shows, they also figure in judgments 
about values and ethics of the novels. 
 
 
Communication Model vs. Death in Gravity’s Rainbow 
 
As Hägg points out, narratological concepts describing literary communication are proven both useful 
and utterly deficient by Gravity’s Rainbow (Hägg 2005, 13). This is, in a way, a productive paradox.  
As Pekka Tammi shows in his article, the seeming confusion of narratives both affirming the 
helpfulness of our concepts while also putting them under duress, is actually a better-than-average 
description of how narrative fiction works (Tammi 2008). In Gravity’s Rainbow, no matter how 
esoteric the communications represented, there is some justification is saying that none of them are 
much stranger than novelistic communication. It is tempting to play along with Nicholas Royle, who 
declares the novelistic, omniscient narrator, “by definition, a clairvoyant.”  The narrator seems to 
possess “the uncanny facility of a medium or fortune-teller who not only predicts or prophesies but 
also somehow enacts the prediction or prophecy.” (Royle 1991, 72.) It is difficult to decide whether 
this is taking your metaphors too literally or just literally enough. It is quite evident, in the light of 
Gravity’s Rainbow, that the most otherworldly communications can quite readily be interpreted as 
thematizations of the strangeness of novelistic structures of communication. 
 
The theme of psychic communication is developed to a dizzying complexity during the first part of 
the novel, which largely orbits a military cabal called “The White Visitation.” The faction specialises 
on various esoteric forms of espionage, psychic warfare, and scientific research. Much of the research 
is somehow connected to the fluctuant main protagonist Tyrone Slothrop. 
 
The proceedings of a séance are first described at length in the early parts of the novel (GR, 34–37). 
In their excellent discussion of the novel’s séances Herman and Weisenburger (2013) are fascinated 
by the descriptions of “the technology and protocols of divination” (159). The details of technologies 
and protocols are, indeed, largely responsible for foregrounding the séances as communication. Yet 
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at a more fundamental level the séance can be seen to thematize aspects of narrative communicative 
situations in a rather elementary manner. This is also how Herman and Weisenburger treat it in their 
discussion. 
 
The novel is quite explicit about the communicative functioning of the séance, and clearly spells out 
the context-specific sender, receiver and mediator roles. In the following excerpt the novel implies a 
model for the communication of the séance: 
 
[T]he slender medium […] sits nearest the sensitive flame with his back to the wall, reddish-
brown curls tightening close as a skullcap, high forehead unwrinkled, dark lips moving now 
effortless, now in pain: 
‘Once transected into the realm of Dominus Blicero, Roland found that all the sings had turned 
against him … Lights he had studied as well as one of you, positions and movement, now 
gathered there at the opposite end, all in dance … irrelevant dance. None of Blicero’s 
traditional progress, no something new … alien … Roland too became conscious of the wind, 
as his mortality had never allowed him. […]’ 
[…] 
The medium, irritable now, has begun to drift back out of his trance. Anybody’s guess what’s 
happening over on the other side. This sitting, like any, needs not only its congenial circle here 
and secular, but also a basic, four-way entente which oughtn’t, any link of it, be broken: Roland 
Feldspath (the spirit), Peter Sachsa (the control), Carrol Eventyr (the medium), Selena (the wife 
and survivor). (GR, 34–37.) 
 
Psychic communication, then, involves four participants: the spirit, the control, the medium, and the 
querent. As Herman and Weisenburger (2013) put it, the séance takes a particular discursive form in 
which “the multiple intermediaries each ‘speak’ at a further remove” (161): 
 
The client seeking access to the spirit of a deceased person engages a medium who, from this side, accesses 
on the other side a capable spirit, the control, who translates and transmits the deceased’s message back up 
the line, through the entranced medium, to the client (ibid.). 
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In part, then, this communication is symmetrical across the boundary of life and death: the control is 
the medium’s mirror image on the other side – a sensitive who can communicate across the boundary, 
but only with another sensitive (GR, 171–172, 181). The two mediating participants engage in a two-
way communication. The other participants are limited to communicating on their side of the affair. 
(See Fig. 2). On this side, therefore, the role of the medium in the “four-way entente” of the séance 
is to speak to the querent what s/he receives from the other side. The medium’s speech is represented 
as quoted monologue, which momentarily places the reader on equal footing with the diegetic 
audience of the medium. To this audience the medium is now literally the one with the voice: the 
medium’s quoted speech has both a speaker function and a voice effect. Also, as far as the other side 
is concerned, the reader is as dependent on the medium’s discourse as the diegetic audience at the 
séance. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The “séance communication model” 
Spirit Querent Control Medium 
This Side            The Other Side 
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The séance momentarily brings together a thematic exploration into a bizarre instance of 
communication with some rather common devices of fiction. As Herman and Weisenburger 
convincingly argue, the whole continuum of communicating agents emerges clearly enough in the 
séance. The hierarchical model of communication helps us envision how fictional minds operate as a 
logical structure of communicative relays. Yet outside the explication of the séance communication 
model, the novel plays by a whole different set of rules. During the séance episode, focalization shifts 
to Jessica Swanlake. Later, in a “mind-to-mind” shift typical to Gravity’s Rainbow the focalization 
passes on to “Pirate” Prentice.88 Yet even these relatively abrupt transpositions from one focalization 
to another are curiously reasonable here. Unlike in many other points in Gravity’s Rainbow, in the 
first séance the multiple focalizations are restricted to the members of the medium’s diegetic 
audience, the dwellers of this side (cf. Herman & Weisenburger 2013, 163). This becomes evident 
when the narrator relates how the presently “irritable” medium begins to drift away from his trance, 
but it is “[a]nybody’s guess what’s happening over on the other side” (GR, 36). 
 
The communicative situation is at once more complicated and less exceptional than it may seem – 
especially when seen in relation to the narratological concept of voice. As Käkelä-Puumala notes, the 
novel’s séance passages unveil only a series of messages and transmissions from one medium to 
another, without any access to the original linguistic event (2007, 77). Yet at the same time, the 
medium’s discourse in the text is not markedly different from any piece of quoted speech reporting 
someone else’s experience. The cited passage gives mixed signals, using the proper name of the spirit 
(“Roland”) as an indirect report of the spirit’s speech would. Yet this reporting could be made on 
either side of the boundary: by the medium or the control. Elsewhere, however, the querent Selena is 
addressed directly in a style and diction evoking direct speech: “Yet… Selena, the wind, the wind’s 
everywhere” and “Selena. Selena. Have you gone, then?” (GR, 35). This apostrophe resembles the 
medium’s fragmentary diction, yet in repeatedly calling by name the surviving partner, suggests a 
sudden intimacy across the levels of communication and states of being. 
 
Arguably the séance communication merely foregrounds the indeterminacy inherent in literary speech 
and consciousness representation. In spite of the unusual communicative context in the world of the 
novel the end product is in formal terms no different from countless passages of novelistic 
consciousness representation combining forms of indirect and free indirect discourse. As of today, a 
                                                          
88 On mind-to-mind shifts of Gravity’s Rainbow, see Hägg 2005, 234–235; Herman and Weisenburger 2013, chapter 10. 
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relatively strong consensus has been established on there being no strictly formal properties to 
distinguish between indirect and free indirect representations of discourse (McHale 2014, paragraphs 
4, 17). Alongside with the difficulty of formally distinguishing between an internally focalized 
narration and narration externally observing a character’s demeanor, 89 the indistinctiveness of voices 
in FID is one of the oldest chestnuts of consciousness representation, and examples from Pynchon 
show why one does not simply crack it open. The peculiarities of literary communication Pynchon 
dramatizes are rather ordinary, even though the dramatis personae are anything but. 
 
The medium, it is later revealed, has no memory of speaking while entranced, “only halos of meanings 
around words his mouth evidently spoke” (GR, 172). This may be what prompts Herman and 
Weisenburger to characterize the séance communication chain as “Peter Sachsa’s enunciation of 
Roland Feldspath’s thoughts, spoken by spirit-captured Eventyr at Snoxall’s,” that is: the control’s 
enunciation of the spirit’s thoughts, spoken by the medium (Herman and Weisenburger 2013, 165). 
However, in rendering the medium’s speech a mere mouthing of words, this interpretation also makes 
the medium almost a pitch-perfect image of the narratological narrator as someone who, indeed, 
speaks, but mindlessly, simply uttering words given to her or him by the implied author (Chatman 
1990, 84), the subject of enunciation (Aczel 1998, 475–476), the writer (see Patron 2011, 318), or 
some such entity from the “other side” of fiction. 
 
Here we see how the rhetoric presentation of the communication model works together with the 
mental model of embedded levels of communication. To reach the interpretation Herman and 
Weisenburger make, one must at once make inferences about further levels of communication within 
the quoted utterance of the medium but also take the novel for its word as concerns the “technology 
and protocols of divination.” The phantasmal thematics of the séance, therefore, color the analysis of 
its communicative structures. While the representations of otherworldly communications certainly 
create a sense of being drawn to an uncanny world of fiction, the séance also thematises the inherent 
strangeness of the technology and protocols of narrative. As Aczel suggests, the term “voice” is telling 
of the sense of embodiment conventionally read into narrative agency. Yet the figure of the medium 
challenges this view by having an embodied voice but being at the same time virtually without 
agency. Represented as the only physically speaking subject in the séance, the medium is also the one 
communicator who is wholly emptied of subjectivity and intention. Yet this is not the only part in the 
communication becoming oddly voided. As Käkelä-Puumala (2006) notes, when the message comes 
                                                          
89 On ambiguity of internal and external focalization see Genette 1980, 191. 
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through a medium, the origin of the message is also effaced: “what is left is the structure of mediation 
that has absorbed its origin as something precedent and absolute, and thus, as the slogan goes, ‘the 
medium is the message’” (77–78). 
 
Indeed, in its apparent complexity, the séance communication model also foregrounds the 
fundamental material flatness of all textual representations. As Mäkelä puts it, it is fundamental to 
literary representation that the different levels on which agency, acts of telling, and experience are 
detected are inferred from the material text that in itself lacks the depth suggested by our common 
understanding of literary communication. The text works as a “syntactic-linear display” evoking the 
communicative models in the reading mind. (Mäkelä 2013, 138.) In the same vein, although taking 
the disembodiment of phantoms as his point of departure, Mikko Keskinen (2011) reminds us that 
the absence of embodied speakers is not just a special “unnatural” challenge arising in reading ghost 
stories but an “unmarked feature of reading literary language also known as narrative fiction” (213). 
This of course begs the question about the circumstances under which we may interpret a textual 
representation as a representation of mental activity of a fictional person (McHale 2014, paragraph 
11). 
 
It is therefore illuminating to scrutinize the séances of Gravity’s Rainbow in order to see how texts 
give rise to a mental model of communication. However, it will be shown below that this model pales 
in comparison to the real riches of communicative quirks of Pynchon’s novel. Ultimately, the 
hierarchical organization of voices and speaking intermediaries of the séance do not provide a model 
or metaphor for literary communication in Gravity’s Rainbow but, rather, a useful counterpoint to its 
truly deviant aspects. 
 
 
Communication-Modelling and Hearing Voices as Aspects of Interpretation 
 
The séances of Gravity’s Rainbow are fascinating for a number of reasons. In the first séance alone, 
the meticulous construction of the divinatory scene and the wandering point of view among the 
attending group of characters offer much to delve into. It is easy to overlook a simple textual fact: the 
levels of communication are not only inferred based on conventions of novelistic communication, 
readerly competence, and textual voices, they are also directly pointed out, and thus created by the 
text. If anything, the séance perhaps makes the logic of ghostly transmissions too concordant with 
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conventional novelistic communication. The novel is, however, quick to place its own logic under 
erasure – much in accordance with the process of concretization and deconcretization in evidence 
throughout the novel (see McHale 1979). It turns out that psychic communication in Gravity’s 
Rainbow is a far more unpredictable business than the initial séance suggests. The “kute 
korrespondences” between the séance communication model and the conventional roles in narrative 
communication turn out to be local and fleeting. In a manner characteristic to Gravity’s Rainbow, the 
novel has set up a network of relations only to disarrange it elsewhere. 
 
This reversal is almost classically ironic: the obviously “supernatural” séance is cannily recuperated 
within a model, while much of what goes on “naturally” in the world of the novel seems far more 
inexplicable and incommensurable with constructs like the séance communication model. Herman 
and Weisenburger acknowledge this reversal, and offer a thematically strong interpretation: in 
Gravity’s Rainbow the séance is, after all, Their tool, an instrument of control. In the hands of the 
White Visitation its communicative potential is subordinated to the needs of psychic warfare. (2013, 
165–166.) 
 
Alternative means of psychic rapport are found even while the séance is still in process. One Jessica 
Swanlake of the White Visitation realizes an onlooker of the séance has probably overheard her 
thoughts: 
Jessica Swanlake, a young rosy girl in the uniform of an ATS private, noticing the prewar 
perfume, looks up, hmm, the frock she imagines is about 15 guineas and who knows how many 
coupons, probably from Harrods and would do more for me, she’s also sure. The lady, suddenly 
looking back over her shoulder, smiles, oh yes? My gosh, did she hear? Around this place 
almost certainly. (GR, 36.) 
 
The passage alternates between what Cohn names psycho-narration and narrated monologue, and is 
in most respects a perfectly conventional novelistic passage describing a character’s perception and 
thoughts (Cohn 1978, 11–14). It ends with Jessica’s “own mental language” apparently intervening 
in the reporting clauses (see ibid., 14). The text seems to shift from narrating Jessica’s thoughts to 
quoting them: “hmm, the frock she imagines […] who knows how many coupons […] would do more 
for me, she’s also sure” (GR, 36.). The italicized section of the text may be taken as a typographical 
marker of Jessica’s “voice,” in the sense of it being indicative of her “idiom” (cf. Walsh 2010, 48). 
The italicized words could also indicate that part of Jessica’s thoughts which the lady hears and 
comments on, the response “oh, yes?” also apparently conveyed without speaking. 
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It turns out that quite a few characters around the White Visitation, not just the medium Carroll 
Eventyr, turn out to have gifts for psychic communication.90 Geoffrey “Pirate” Prentice, a character 
whose “dream” we retrospectively realize opens the novel, is later revealed to be another kind of 
psychic sensitive – a fantasist-surrogate. This means that the beginning of the novel, already twice 
reframed in the process of reading, first as a representation of the “real” and then as a dream, gets 
reframed once over: as a dream, vision or fantasy belonging to another person (one Lord Blatherard 
Osmo, incidentally) which is dreamt or fantasized (hence fantasist) in his stead (hence surrogate) by 
“Pirate” Prentice. As Brian McHale suggests, retrospectively triggered ambiguities, correctives and 
reversals at the beginning of the novel set the template for much of the interpretive work the reader 
has to do while reading on (1979, 91). If Prentice is some kind of a psychic sensitive, the model of 
mind-to-mind transfer is different from the one we may construct in the séance. With Prentice, there 
is no four-way communicative scheme, no participants with clear-cut roles, just an abrupt intrusion 
of a whole another world. 
 
Finally, there is the main character Slothrop, who is not so much your average psychic as he is the 
very fulcrum of communicative multilateralism in the novel. He has his share of visions and then 
some, but he also leaves an intrusive trace to other character’s points of view and discourse. His 
identity as a protagonist is highly discontinuous and he fosters multiple personae. During the first part 
of the novel, as well as the last, Slothrop is mostly peripheral figure, haunting the segments focalized 
through other characters. Towards the end of the novel, Slothrop famously “disintegrates,” which 
may be as much an effect of what the text says about Slothrop as it is a result of how the novel, after 
dutifully following Slothrop’s journey through the Zone, reverts to the more discontinuous structure 
of the first part. 
 
The following passage shows one of the first mind-to-mind transitions somehow involving Slothrop. 
Bracketed numbers indicate possibilities for hearing a different voice: 
 
 
 
                                                          
90 Similar manifestations of hypersensitivity to the spiritual world are, of course, found in all of Pynchon’s novels (see 
Käkelä-Puumala 2006, 138). 
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[1], [Dr. Pointsman speaking:] ‘Often, in our experiments […] the first sight of the test stand, 
of the technician, a stray shadow, the touch of a draft of air, some cue we might never pin 
down would be enough to send him over, send him transmarginal. 
‘So, Slothrop. Conceivably. Out in the city, the ambience alone – suppose we considered the 
war itself as a laboratory? when the V-2 hits, you see, first the blast, then the sound of its 
falling … the normal order of the stimuli reversed that way … so he might turn a particular 
corner, enter a certain street, and for no clear reason feel suddenly …’ 
[2] Silence comes in, sculptured by spoken dreams, by pain-voices of the rocketbombed next 
door, Lord of the Night’s children, voices hung upon the ward’s stagnant medicinal air. Praying 
to their Master: sooner or later an abreaction, each one, all over this frost and harrowed city 
… 
[3]… as once again the floor is a giant lift propelling you with no warning toward your ceiling – 
replaying now as the walls are blown outward, bricks and mortar showering down, your 
sudden paralysis as death comes to wrap and stun [4] I don’t know guv I must’ve blacked out 
when I come to she was gone it was burning all around me head was full of smoke [3]… and 
the sight of your blood spurting from the flaccid stub of artery, the snowy roofslates fallen 
across half your bed, the cinema kiss never completed, you were pinned and stared at a 
crumpled cigarette pack for two hours in pain, you could hear them crying from the rows either 
side but couldn’t move … the sudden light filling up the room, the awful silence, brighter than 
any morning through blankets turned to gauze no shadows at all, only unutterable two-o’clock 
dawn … and … 
[1]… this transmarginal leap, this surrender. Where ideas of the opposite have come together, 
and lost their oppositeness. [5/?](And is it really the rocket explosion that Slothrop’s keying 
on, or is it exactly this depolarizing, this neurotic ‘confusion’ that fills the wards tonight?) [1] 
How many times before it’s washed away, these iterations that pour out, reliving the blast, 
afraid to let go because the letting go is so final [4] how do I know Doctor that I’ll ever come 
back? […] (GR, 57–58, ellipses original unless indicated.) 
 
The excerpt begins with the Pavlovian Dr. Pointsman mulling over his experience of conditioning 
dogs. Pointsman then begins to talk about Slothrop’s “transmarginal” states, comparable to those 
observed in dogs, when the paragraph of quoted speech ends mid-sentence. “Silence comes in”: this 
narratorial-seeming segment [2] literally silences Pointsman’s speech, but text makes us imagine 
other, more ephemeral voices – spoken dreams, pain-voices – within this silence. It is reasonable to 
assume that the following segment [3] then represents a number of sensations experienced by these 
“rocketbombed” now treated “next door” in the abreaction ward of St. Mary’s Hospital. While the 
narrating instance does not change between [2] and [3], a voice-change in another sense may be 
detected, as one of the local idiosyncrasies of Gravity’s Rainbow, you-narration, takes over.91 Its 
                                                          
91 See McHale 1992 (“‘You used to know what these words mean’: misreading Gravity’s Rainbow”) for the classic 
discussion of the second-person narration and you-address of Gravity’s Rainbow. 
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function, as protean as ever, is here to represent the strangely voided experience and voice of the 
survivors (alternatively, victims) of a horrific bombing. On the other hand, the italicized sentences 
[4] most certainly represent another speaking voice – now in the same sense as [1] represents 
Pointsman’s. Presented in a mode sometimes called “free direct” (cf. McHale 2014, paragraph 2) this 
voice clearly has a texture of speech by a disoriented Londoner addressing an interlocutor (“I don’t 
know guv,” “me head was full of smoke”). This is a shift in voice in two senses as it both introduces 
a change in the speaker (function) and produces an effect of a distinct voice. 
 
As the paragraph containing the voices of the rocketbombed begins and ends mid-sentence and with 
an ellipsis, another ellipsis begin the following paragraph. Again, we get mixed signals: the sentence 
fragment picks up where Pointsman’s speech trails off, but this time there are no quotation marks, 
and therefore no formal indication of direct speech. All in all, the segment ending the long excerpt 
cited above seems like a mixture of all the elements distinguished above. It features a narratorial 
voice, which characteristically to the novel, hints at internal focalization. Yet it also involves another 
italicized sentence of “free direct” discourse and another local idiosyncrasy – the odd interpolation 
of interrogative sentences in narration, arguably one of the major linguistic harbingers of the paranoid 
mood of Gravity’s Rainbow. 
 
The shifts that signal changes of voice foreground the many conflicting ways in which voice may be 
conveyed and conceived of in texts. Because of the overarching narrative strategies of the novel it is 
perpetually unclear whether strange features in certain passages should be seen as stylistic 
idiosyncrasies or whether they are suggesting a deep structure of embedded levels of subjectivity. 
However, here it is important to simply acknowledge that in the passage cited above these shifting 
voice effects and cited speakers are textually evident. In contrast to the séance, where the hierarchical 
structure of narrative agents each speaking at a further remove is a willingly constructed readerly 
illusion, the section cited above allows for a more detailed interpretive analysis. 
 
Finally, this dilemma may be telling of how reading process preoccupied with questions of voice is 
complicated beyond the outcome of any voice-attribution exercise. The processes discussed in chapter 
3.1 in terms of primacy and recency are also relevant here. As a careful reading of the excerpt cited 
shows, it is the shifts of voice which make the text difficult, not the narrative situations as such, which 
can usually be explained or interpreted in a number of ways – but always after the fact. As primacy 
and recency are related to the processes which cognitive narratologists have discussed as preferences 
affecting the selection of frames through which we may make sense of texts, the dynamic of reading 
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passages such as the one analyzed here could also be described in these terms (cf. Jahn 1997). 
However, even when described in different terms, the analysis highlights difficulties which can be 
fruitfully understood as indicative of the pre-analytic confusion in which categories like the Genettian 
voice and mood, Walsh’s instance and idiom, Aczel’s speaker function and voice effect – ideas of the 
opposite, indeed – blend into a more holistic but mostly intuitive experience of textual voice. 
Therefore, analysis of voice is never quite separable from the experience of “hearing voices” in silent 
texts. Much of the formal innovation of Gravity’s Rainbow can be seen as a result of this protean 
mixture of speakers and voice effects being developed to extraordinary length.92 
 
Herman and Weisenburger, who have more patience than most scholars for the descriptive analysis 
of narratological kind, importantly point out that while these shifts violate both narrative convention 
and common sense, they know of no one “other than a few Pecksniffian guards in the house of realist 
fiction” who minds the liberties Gravity’s Rainbow takes (2013, 165). As Herman and Weisenburger 
know based on decades spent teaching the novel to students, “the dizzying transitions and jump-cuts 
do require some attentiveness and getting used to but soon seem ‘natural’ and even rather 
exhilarating” (ibid.). While the text can usefully be analyzed with distinctions provided by narrative 
theory, finally the ensemble of voices follows a logic no less complex than the world of the novel 
itself. This is no doubt one reason why undecidability and aversion to categorical thinking are often 
deemed among Pynchon’s central themes, or even as the takeaway moral of “Pynchon’s theory.” It 
is clear, however, that Pynchon studies have been greatly enriched by the careful analyses which 
produce invaluable insight about how these themes, “theories,” and effects are produced and how 
they come to be understood as such. 
 
 
Stencilization and The Other “Other Side” 
 
This discussion will be continued in the light of the chapter “Mondaugen’s story” in V., which 
involves communicative scenarios comparable to the séances of Gravity’s Rainbow. The effect of 
these communications is markedly different, however. In V. there is no smokescreen of 
otherworldliness created by séances and ghosts, yet the proverbial foreigncountriness of the past is 
                                                          
92 McHale’s groundbreaking analyses show this exceedingly well (1979; 1985; both also in McHale 1992; see also 
Hägg 2005, especially chapters 3 and 6; and Herman & Weisenburger 2013, chapter 10). 
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rarely felt with more intensity. Both novels thematize conventions and conditions of novelistic 
communication, but as we will see, the explicit aboutness of the texts will have bearing on which 
aspects of novelistic communication are thematized. The passages of Gravity’s Rainbow discussed 
above are explicitly “about” communication with the “other side,” whereas in V. the problematic 
accessibility of the past through historical narratives and documents is discussed repeatedly. As both 
examples concern a kind of boundary-crossing, be it between the living and the dead or the present 
and the past, the similarities are quite pronounced and suggestive of the question of “voice” more 
generally. 
 
There are many points in which the communicative structure of “Mondaugen’s story” and the séance 
of Gravity’s Rainbow compare fruitfully. In the former, the communicative structure within the text 
is once again introduced in a kind of exposition, but is later complicated by structural and thematic 
features within the chapter. The more encompassing context for these complications is the large-scale 
interpretative dilemma of historical chapters, namely their communication through “Stencilization.” 
Consequently, in “Mondaugen’s Story” there are numerous ambivalences which can be helpfully 
conceptualized in the matrix of “voice,” understood either as a speaker function or as an effect. As 
looking into Pynchon studies will show, these ambivalences are one evident source for differences in 
interpreting the role of the chapter in the novel. 
 
There are also obvious and significant differences between the representation of the séance 
communication in Gravity’s Rainbow and the way the communicative situation of “Mondaugen’s 
story” is presented. Unlike the brief instances of quoted and reported discourse allowing us to glimpse 
the other side in Gravity’s Rainbow, “Mondaugen’s story” is a full-blown embedded narrative, in 
many ways marked as a literary creation in its own right. The model of communication in the séance 
is explicitly presented in Gravity’s Rainbow, and while it may be seen to thematize the 
“unnaturalness” of literary communication, it also produces the effect of indeterminacy of the speaker 
in the séance. In contrast, while “Mondaugen’s story” is framed as speech of an intradiegetic narrator, 
it also cannily draws on literary conventions of represented situations of (character) narration and 
intradiegetic framing.93 This means that while the interpretive frame of speech is available, we are no 
more dependent on it than we would in reading Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness,” which Pynchon’s story 
draws on both thematically and structurally. Different conventions attend to speech representation 
and intradiegetic narratives. This allows Stencilized narratives, which insist on the frame of oral 
                                                          
93 See e.g. Chambers 1984, 3–10; Nelles 1997, 136–157; Phelan 2005, 197–201, 205–215. 
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delivery while freely appealing to conventions of literary fiction, to attract many kinds of interpretive 
attention. The variable focus can be detected in various treatments the story has received in Pynchon 
Studies. 
 
The purpose in the following is to show that as far as communication and voice go, Mondaugen’s 
story is every bit as preposterous as the ghostly mind-to-mind transitions of Gravity’s Rainbow. The 
story is flaunting its own epistemological incongruity, unmistakably marking itself as writing with an 
intricate cock-and-bull story of its own production as speech. The subsequent section, which 
concludes this chapter, uses existing readings in dialogue with theories of voice and communication. 
The prior readings of “Mondaugen’s story” serve to show how different notions of voice are 
significant to analysis and often evoked in support to interpretive claims. 
 
 
Whose story is “Mondaugen’s story”? 
 
Stencilization by default blurs conventional distinctions. “Mondaugen’s story” operates in a curious 
double bind of explicitness – on one hand it is marked by “Stencilization” as certain type of writing 
characteristic to V. and, on the other, the novel explicitly posits a frame of oral telling. This 
coincidence of conflicting codes is Stencil’s stamp of authority, his signature, to use Derrida’s term 
(1988, 19–20). If the notion of “Stencilization” opens a vast horizon of interpretive options, this partly 
results from this aporetic double exposure of the historical chapters as pure invention and pure 
quotation. 
 
Taken this way, the chapter could be understood as a quotation, insofar as it is “mimesis of discourse” 
(Sternberg 1982, 107). It forms what Sternberg terms an inset within the frame, the frame providing 
the context of quotation (108). The expository framing could also be seen as “the narrator’s text” 
framing “the character’s text” (McHale 2014, par. 2). The status of the story as a framed instance of 
speaking is foregrounded occasionally, but as is often the case with long embedded stories, the 
framing act generally stays below the threshold of attention (cf. Walsh 2010, 42–43.) 
 
The frame of the story takes place in the narrative present of the novel in New York of 1956. Stencil 
is pursuing another clue that might reveal another piece of the intertwining histories of his father and 
V., presumed at this point in the novel to be a woman of some importance (possibly an instigator of 
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quite a few international crises as well as Stencil Jr.’s mother). This leads him to Mondaugen, a 
German engineer whose “story” the chapter “Stencilizes.” The link between Mondaugen and Stencil 
is purely serendipitous: during the war Mondaugen worked in Peenemünde facilities developing the 
rockets Vergeltungswaffe Eins and Zwei – “the magic initial!” (V., 228). 94 Yet for once the act of 
telling is staged remarkably unambiguously. “Mondaugen yarned,” and “Stencil listened attentively,” 
the text says (ibid.). This is Mondaugen’s telling of the story, with Stencil as its only hearer. What 
the novel presents in chapter “Mondaugen’s story,” however, is something else. This is also where 
the idea of Stencilization is introduced: 
The tale proper and the questioning after took no more than thirty minutes. Yet the next 
Wednesday afternoon at Eigenvalue’s office, when Stencil retold it, the yarn had undergone 
considerable change: it had become, as Eigenvalue put it, Stencilized. (Ibid.) 
 
Indeed, with “Mondaugen’s story,” the Stencilized version has to be distinguished not only from 
Mondaugen’s “history” (his experience in 1922) but also from the story Mondaugen tells to Stencil 
in the narrative present. Mondaugen speaks exclusively to Stencil, who in turn confides the story to 
Eigenvalue. Only the latter version is represented in the novel. This series of tellings can be 
                                                          
94 Mondaugen reappears as a Nazi scientist in Gravity’s Rainbow, alongside Lieutenant Weissmann and the V-2 rocket 
mentioned in the citation by its full name “Vergeltungswaffe zwei.” The events of “Mondaugen’s story” take place 
in 1922, and as Mondaugen meets Weissmann in Foppl’s castle, the latter is surprised that the Bavarian Mondaugen 
has never heard of Hitler, and suggests that Germany will need men like Mondaugen in the future (V., 242). 
Eigenvalue Mondaugen H. Stencil 
Narrative present     1922 
Fig. 3 Stencil-Mondaugen communication model 
157 
 
schematically understood as another chain of teller-receiver-links represented either in the Stencilized 
story or its framing in the narrative present (see Fig. 3).  
 
Furthermore, within the Stencilized story, characters tell (or otherwise communicate) their stories to 
“Mondaugen,” whom we must now recast a character in the Stencilized version. The ensuing model 
allows comparison to the séance-model devised above. In the light of the theoretical background 
introduced above, the problem of communication and voice can now be reframed. Instead of the 
strange speaking situation in Gravity’s Rainbow, here both the speaker function and voice as effect 
emerge as a problem concerning the status of narration of the chapter titled “Mondaugen’s story.” 
“Who speaks” may be posed as a question of the exact relation between the narrator and the world – 
as in Genette’s narratology. However, as Didier Coste puts it in the citation used in the epigraph of 
this chapter, the question “who speaks” may initially only be answered vaguely: “a voice” speaks. 
Coste continues that this will have to do “until we can describe more or less correctly the situation at 
the other (sending) end of the act of communication” (Coste 1989, 164). The symmetrical neatness 
of the narratological communication model might suggest that this is the case on all levels: 
extradiegetic, (intra)diegetic, metadiegetic, etc.95 Yet “Mondaugen’s story” suggests that in extreme 
cases the opposite might be true. As far as the embedded narrative is concerned, the description of 
the sending end of communication leaves little to be desired. However, gradually the diegetic 
narrating instance becomes so torn with internal contradictions that we are left with little more than 
a possibility of “a voice.” In every sense of the word, “Mondaugen’s story” turns out to be quite 
unspeakable. 
 
 
Hearing Voices with “Mondaugen’s story” 
 
The ambiguities of communication in “Mondaugen’s Story” are reflected in the interpretations of the 
novel, in which the story often has a prominent place. As the story foregrounds problems of its own 
production and reception in the novel, many readings which are otherwise uninterested in 
narratological analysis involve considerations of the communicative structure. 
 
On the first diegetic level, as Shawn Smith suggests, Stencil may be considered a narrator telling the 
story through “Mondaugen’s third-person limited perspective” (2005, 34). This seems to be the most 
                                                          
95 Coste eventually present his own communication model. While informed by the “narratological” model derived from 
Booth (1961) and Chatman (1978), his model is significantly different. (See Coste 1989, 78.) 
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typical reading strategy. Despite the exposition of the story as an oral telling, it is more common to 
approach the Stencilized narrative as one produced by a literary narrator. This observation is 
supported by how readings often evoke the “third-person limited” perspective or, in Genettian terms, 
internal focalization, which is conventionally a novelistic device.96 A more particular detail pointing 
towards literary rather than oral frames of storytelling may be found in the “dual voice” (Pascal 1977) 
effect in the very first sentence of the inset story. This already works to destabilize the frame and 
evoke the question of voice in a distinctly literary context. “Mondaugen’s story” opens with the 
following sentence: 
 
One May morning in 1922 (meaning nearly winter here in the Warmbad district) a young 
engineering student named Kurt Mondaugen, late of the Technical University in Munich, 
arrived at a white outpost near the village Kalkfontein South (V., 229, emphasis added). 
 
The illusion of two discourses blending is immediate, and it is the simple insertion of the intrusive 
deictic expression “here” which produces the effect.97 The deictic “here” seems intrusive and odd as 
long as we consider it in the context of oral telling, as the exposition of telling in the frame narrative 
suggests we should. If, on the other hand, Stencil’s role is likened to that of a literary narrator, the 
expression “here” is likely to be read as Stencil’s representation of Mondaugen’s idiom in free indirect 
discourse. In free indirect discourse, the deictic expression is conventionally seen to establish a 
speaker function in the character’s rather than the narrator’s position (McHale 2014, par. 4). 
Furthermore, the expression “here” does what deictic expressions generally do, as it requires us to 
contextualize the expression in relation to subject, time and place (see Stockwell 2002, 43). As the 
only character involved in the communication who actually was there in the Warmbad district in 
1922, Mondaugen is the only speaker whose experience the expression “here” could designate. The 
deictic language placing Mondaugen within the embedded narrative makes him, as Smith puts it, 
“Stencil’s literary creation” (2005, 34). The peritextual clues (the title), the represented 
communicative chain of tellings, and this voice effect together are more than enough to suggest that 
the story is to be read as if Mondaugen were a character through whom the story is focalized.98 
 
                                                          
96 According to Dorrit Cohn, internal focalization is nothing less than a distinguishing feature of fiction (Cohn 1990, 
786). 
97 Even as the dual voice account of FID has fallen out of favor, the cognitive effect of deictic shift remains much 
studied (Herman 2002; Stockwell 2002, 46–47). 
98 As will be discussed in chapter 4.2., this reading also figures in judgments about whether the story is to be read as 
Mondaugen’s eyewitness account (albeit a fictionalized one) or an incredulous figment of the Stencilizing 
imagination of its narrator. 
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Since signs of this type of focalization are everywhere to be seen, the liberties the narrator of the 
Stencilized chapter takes may be interpreted in a frame that is consistent with the use of internal 
focalization: the frame of literary storytelling unhindered by real-world constraints. In this sense, 
therefore, the answer to the question “who speaks” can always be: “the narrator of the Stencilized 
story.” The novel has already established (in its earlier chapters) that the Stencilized narratives make 
short work of realist conventions of representing past events from an epistemologically restricted and 
consistent viewpoint. They are, in addition, remarkably opaque with regard to the material they claim 
to be based on, be it speech, as in Mondaugen’s case, or writing, as in many other places in the novel. 
The Stencilized stories have also tended to be opaque with respect to their production. Until now: 
“Mondaugen’s story” constitutes another break in the sequence of Stencilized tellings.99 This time 
the text explicitly makes Stencil the narrator of the story speaking to a narratee, Eigenvalue, who, as 
the communicative situation warrants, at one point even interrupts Stencil’s narration to air his 
grievances about the liberties his oral storyteller seems to be taking. 
 
To better understand this effect, we may draw on the concepts of sequential reading. Because of the 
narrative situation in the framing story, the interpretive frame of oral storytelling has a privileged 
position in terms of primacy (Perry 1979a, 53; see also chapter 3.1 above). When the story begins, 
we assume that we are “listening” to Stencil’s narration, because the frame narrative represents 
Stencil beginning his narration. The assumption that this continues to be the case in the chapter titled 
“Mondaugen’s story” is a conventional one, and it is supported by the fact that we are yet to receive 
any indication to the contrary. However, the first sentence proves incongruous with this primary 
frame. The sentence “One May morning in 1922 (meaning nearly winter here in the Warmbad district) 
[…]” poses problems to this assumption (V., 229). According to Jahn (1997), the rule of primacy 
entails a preference to maintain the primary frame if at all possible (457). Yet the recency of the 
conflicting frame prompts us to try to reinterpret previously given interpretation in the light of the 
more recent frame (ibid.). As is befitting for a story self-destructively insisting on being both writing 
and speech, in “Mondaugen’s story” the contradiction with the frame of oral delivery is maintained 
on several levels at once – even on the material level of writing, as the narrative clauses are bracketed 
as if to emphasize the shift from the teller’s deixis to that of the character’s. As Perry puts it in his 
original essay, this contradiction of frames is something literary texts may operationalize: “The 
literary text, then, exploits the ‘powers’ of the primacy effect, but ordinarily it sets up a mechanism 
to oppose them, giving rise, rather[,] to a recency effect” (Perry 1979a, 57). The complicated entry 
                                                          
99 Cf. chapter 3.2 above 
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into “Mondaugen’s story” is fittingly symptomatic of what is to come. The story continues to foster 
ambiguities about its status in relation to the events it narrates, but it also turns out to contain a further 
embedded story no less ambiguous. 
 
The commentary on either of these two levels in Pynchon Studies is where considerations of voice 
and communication seem unavoidable. The first level is that on which the Stencilized “Mondaugen’s 
story” is diegetically told in the novel, by Mondaugen to Eigenvalue. The other level is (meta-
)metadiegetic, represented as a story within “Mondaugen’s story.” Towards the end the narrative 
turns more and more analeptic, in various ways reaching towards the not too distant past of 1904. The 
very beginning of Mondaugen’s story foreshadows this turn, when Mondaugen is sent to seek refuge 
at Foppl’s with warnings: “You weren’t here in 1904. But ask Foppl. He remembers. Tell him the 
days of von Trotha are back again.” (V., 233.) The year and the name von Trotha point to the atrocities 
of the great Herero uprising of 1904–1908. Events of this earlier time are recalled piecemeal in 
curious set pieces which include characters’ recollections of the rule of General Lothar von Trotha, 
and conversations between characters who act as if they were performing on stage. Yet by far the 
strangest analeptical parts are the fragments focalized through a German soldier participating in 
systematical extermination of the Herero in 1904. These could be parts of the delirious “common 
dream” which is somehow “prescribed” to the siege partyfolk by Foppl, who dresses up in his old 
Herero-slaying uniform and becomes the “siege party’s demon” (V., 255). However, there is no clear 
consensus among Pynchon scholars about how to interpret the narrative fragments depicting the 
horrors of the genocide. As the earliest introduction of these fragments coincides with Mondaugen 
falling ill, the analepses are open to interpretation as Mondaugen’s “scurvy-induced dreams,” to use 
Grant’s expression (2001, 131). 
 
This embedded narrative within “Mondaugen’s story,” which is itself an embedded, intradiegetically 
narrated story, has been much commented on in Pynchon studies. In the section below its 
indeterminate narrative aspects are weighed against its inevitable historical and emotional weight. 
The problem of narrating past events ethically can be considered not only a prevalent problematic of 
literature but also of historiography. Therefore, while this problem is probed in readings of Pynchon, 
it also connects to wider philosophical issues of knowledge and representation in the postmodern 
context. Below, the layers of history inhabiting “Mondaugen’s story” are considered in the context 
of narrative ethics. I will also analyze how ethics and considerations of narrative mediation are 
brought together in readings of Pynchon studies. 
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4.2. Nacreous V.: Stencilization and The Ethics of Telling 
 
Constantly engaging with truths stranger than fiction, Pynchon’s historical fiction pushes at the 
boundaries of apocrypha and anecdote. V. is not an exception. Representations of historical events 
often come with a surreal tinge of their own. The events of the historical chapters are often situated 
at the fringes of historical crises in Europe or European-colonized areas, but they typically involve a 
fictional plot of intrigue in an exotic setting. Despite the historical gravity of the events portrayed, the 
characters and events are such that one finds in the spy novel, a genre which these chapters constantly 
evoke. The historical events depicted are often those that have been marginalized by the emerging 
grand narratives of the 20th Century Europe. V. rejects one-track views on history and instead presents 
a series of portents and omens against a background of prevailing gloom, suggesting that the (all but) 
forgotten crises at the turn of the 20th Century contributed towards the critical mass plunging the 
continent into two world wars. This is also the historical context for the events depicted in 
“Mondaugen’s story.” 
 
The argument of this chapter is, in brief, that the available readings of Pynchon show that 
“Mondaugen’s story” can be read as a serious exposition of events of historical gravitas and also as 
an act of self-conscious fiction-making flaunting its own instabilities. We may interpret the narrative 
uncertainties of Stencilization in narratives such as “Mondaugen’s story” as thematizations of the 
postmodern doubt towards history, interpret them as aspects of “Pynchon’s theory,” or direct our 
interest in the aesthetic functioning of this curious literary narration. Yet at the same time we may 
also entertain a conflicting view, and engage with the events portrayed through more directly, 
immersively, and affectively. Historical imagination is not an oxymoron, and, as Luc Herman 
suggests, “Mondaugen’s story” may be the strongest testimony to its force in V. (2012, 25). 
 
Molly Hite is one of the scholars to argue that ultimately the presence of the past in the novel signifies 
more than the obscurity of chronology and the uncertainty of truth about events. According to Hite, 
the duplicity of V. is not that of narrativized history in general, but rather, that of Stencilization. (Hite 
1983, 49.) By offering Stencil as a model “hermeneuticist” to the reader, the novel actually 
emphasizes the dangers of the epistemological assumption that history could be a reliable source of 
knowledge as long as it is first experienced by someone, then recorded in one or another appropriate 
medium, and then mediated via appropriate channels. This is also one of the psychologically realist 
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novelistic conventions which V. seems to throw into relief.100 The chapter at hand analyzes 
“Mondaugen’s story,” taken as a kind of pinnacle – or perhaps better, the nadir – of Stencilization. 
The narrative is framed as an incredulous act of fabulation, and it ultimately focuses beyond the main 
events of the story to produce perhaps the gravest historical statements in the entire novel. As before, 
prior readings are read as examples of how scholars may negotiate between the artificial and the 
ethically imposing aspects of “Mondaugen’s story.” 
 
Ostensibly, this is a story of Kurt Mondaugen’s mission in the former colonial realm of Deutsch-
Südwestafrika. Mondaugen, a radio engineer, is sent to study atmospheric radio disturbances. 
However, his stay is complicated by an incident today referred to as the Bondelswarts uprising (of 
1922), which saw a small native population rebel against an oppressive administrative reform. 
Mondaugen is invited to the safety of a manor belonging to a German named Foppl, a plantation 
owner still using Bondelswarts as slaves. Foppl declares a state of siege, which he uses as an excuse 
for starting an interminable “siege party.” Months later, from the roof of Foppl’s manor, Mondaugen 
watches with the other guests as German troops, aided with a bomber plane, come to wipe out the 
remaining Bondelswarts, ending the rebellion. At this point Mondaugen takes his leave from Foppl’s 
and his narrative comes to an end. However sordid this incident, the gist of Mondaugen’s story is 
enclosed within the walls of Foppl’s manor, in the second-order story gradually relegating the siege 
party’s violent drinking games to background. Perhaps the emotional and ethical low point of the 
novel, the fragmented narrative details the atrocities of the Herero uprising of 1904–1908, focalized 
through a nameless German soldier, the rider of a horse called Firelily. 
 
It turns out, then, that the Bondelswarts incident is a kind of foil for presenting the events of the 
Herero genocide. Furthermore, the Bondelswarts incident is explicitly made into a kind of satellite 
event related or metonymically pointing towards the events of the Herero uprising. This relation, in 
turn, is analogical to how the Herero genocide, beginning with dehumanizing politics, developing 
through the institution of concentration camps, and culminating in an official program aiming at the 
destruction of an entire population is often seen as the template for the mass extermination of the 
European Jews forty years later. The connection between the inhuman politics of Deutsch-
Südwestafrika and Nazi Germany is made clear enough in the story (V. 242, 245). The second world 
war, on the other hand, serves as a curiously unobtrusive context for the narrative present of 1955, 
with America sliding from the Post-War confusion towards the Cold War paranoia. 
                                                          
100 The ways in which the organization of V. challenges these conventions is discussed in chapter 3. 
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The thematic links between the different historical layers of “Mondaugen’s story,” and those of the 
novel on the whole, are conspicuously complex while being made in a manner that is more suggestive 
than explicit. To further complicate the situation, this historical layering is reflected on the level of 
narrative communication. As detailed in the previous chapter, the very act of telling “Mondaugen’s 
story” (the chapter) is represented in the novel, and this telling is at two removes from the events in 
1922 and the eye-witness experience of them (Mondaugen’s). While we are told that Mondaugen’s 
personal eye-witness story of the events is delivered to Stencil, this version, which might more 
properly be called Mondaugen’s, is completely omitted. What we get instead is the stretched-out yarn 
subsequently told by Stencil, one in which the events are merely – and strangely enough – focalized 
through the story’s titular character, Mondaugen. In addition, the story involves a further level of 
embedding, in which a whole another layer of historical narrative is revealed, namely that of the 
Herero genocide seen through the eyes of the German soldier. (See fig. 4.) Whichever approach we 
take to “Mondaugen’s story,” it is difficult to ignore the effects of its narrative strategy. What is this 
50-odd page literary rendering of a short oral narrative? Why is Stencil telling to Eigenvalue (and the 
novel disclosing to us) these events in this manner? What does “Stencilization” of Mondaugen’s 
narrative imply? 
 
The rider of 
”Firelily,” 
possibly Foppl 
Eigenvalue Mondaugen H. Stencil 
Narrative present      1922                     1904 
Fig. 4 Expanded Stencil’s-Mondaugen’s communication model 
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The import of the simple fact that all these events (and no others) are told cannot be underestimated. 
On one hand, as James Phelan suggests, in reading narrative we assess ethically both the events told 
and their manner of telling (Phelan 2005, 23). On the other hand, the Levinasian branch of narrative 
ethics argues that narrative forces us to face both what Levinas names the Said and the Saying. That 
is, on one hand we are dealing with the Said, including both what is told and the manner of its telling. 
Yet on the other hand we appraise the very act of something being told at all – the intersubjective, 
self-exposing, responsible act of Saying. (Cf. Newton 1997, 3–8.) 
 
Judging by the sheer volume of commentaries this section of V. has elicited, “Mondaugen’s story” 
seems central to the impact and ethos of the novel on the whole. Yet, while the very fact of 
representing the events can be seen a crucial ethical gesture, there is much to be said about their 
preposterous manner of telling. As Newton argues, narrative structure and form is often seen as an 
allegory of the relation which the Saying constitutes (Newton 1997, 7). In a sense, then, assessing 
what Phelan calls the ethics of telling, with focus on narrative presentation and rhetoric, may double 
as a questioning of the relation of Saying (cf. Phelan 2005, 22–23). Are the complex games with 
narrative strategies advocating a kind of relativism? Is Eigenvalue’s skepticism as Stencil’s audience 
an attitude the authorial audience is to adopt to the events of the historical parts of the novel? With 
its narrative reliability undermined through the intricate communication flaunting its deficiencies, 
and with its tone finally veering towards a magic realist or fantastical register, how are we to take the 
story seriously? I want to suggest that one way to examine the ethical dimensions of the story is to 
look into the existing readings in Pynchon studies and try to find out how they end up taking a position 
in this matter. 
 
Metanarratives of Stencilization 
 
The interpretive decision to read “Mondaugen’s story” either as a felicitous exposition of events that 
need to be told, or as a dramatization of fiction-making flaunting its instabilities, or both, is not made 
at random. The interpretive moves in choosing among these options involve interpretation of certain 
key passages, many of which are in this case commenting on the narration or narrative production of 
the story. Adopting Ansgar Nünning’s terminology, these passages could be seen as examples of 
metanarration or metanarrative commentary (Nünning 2004). As a prelude to “Mondaugen’s story,” 
the epistemological opacity of the historical chapters is thematized in the exposition of Stencilization, 
and the chapter also performs the most thorough interrogation of the concept. 
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While the passage framing the chapter makes the scope of Stencil’s fictional license explicit enough, 
it does not reveal details of Stencilization beyond it being some kind of manipulation and fabrication. 
Yet there is also an accumulation of information about Stencil’s method that must be considered. The 
framing of an earlier Stencilized narrative (chapter 3) gives us another glimpse of how Stencil 
approaches the documents and materials containing clues about his father and V.: 
 
Around each seed of dossier, therefore, had developed a nacreous mass of inference, poetic 
license, forcible dislocation of personality into a past he didn’t remember and had no right in, 
save the right of imaginative anxiety or historical care, which is recognized by no one. 
[…] 
He’d only the veiled references to Porpentine in the journals. The rest was impersonation and 
dream. (V., 62–63.) 
 
This passage prefaces the novel’s first and arguably the most flamboyant Stencilized showpiece 
which tells a story of a political assassination in Alexandria through seven different focalizing 
characters and one strange and stationary camera-eye-like focalization. The framing passage and the 
name of the chapter101 suggest that Stencil “forcibly dislocates” into eight different viewpoints in a 
past he has “no right in” (see V., 62). In the framing passage cited above, Stencil’s method of 
reconstructing past events is clearly presented as an imaginative feat. 
 
Like the women with the initial V. in their names, and like the historical episodes of uncertain 
significance, explanations of Stencil’s historiographical detective work add up and interfere with each 
other in the sequence of reading the novel. The earlier framing cited above is significant to 
“Mondaugen’s story” not only because of its explication of Stencil’s methods but also because of its 
choice of metaphors. The passage adds an interpretive layer to understanding the devices of 
Stencilization and their role in the later in the novel. 
 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness is often treated as a subtext to “Mondaugen’s story” (see Grant 
2001, 115, 130) This is in part because of the thematic concerns of each story – colonial violence, the 
ease with which we can lose our humanity. In addition, there are similarities in the way the narration 
is structured in each. For instance, McHale characterizes the narration of “Mondaugen’s story” as 
“Conradian unreliable narration at two removes” (McHale 1987, 22; cf. Hite 1983). However, one of 
                                                          
101 “Chapter three, In which Stencil, a quick-change artist does eight impersonations.” (V., 61) 
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the most compelling connections between Conrad’s story and Pynchon’s is the strong poetic image 
functioning as an emblem of the intradiegetic narrative situation. In V., Stencil’s narratives build like 
“a nacreous mass of inference” around “each seed of dossier.”102 This metaphor of Stencilized 
narratives developing like pearls inside a shell of a clam bears more than fleeting resemblance to 
Conrad’s emblematic image, which the extradiegetic frame narrator of Conrad’s novella presents as 
follows: 
 
The yarns of seamen have a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which lies within the shell 
of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not typical (if his propensity to spin yarns be excepted), and 
to him the meaning of an episode was not like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which 
brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze [...] (Conrad 2007, 279–280.) 
 
According to Ian Watt, Conrad establishes here that “the meaning of the story represented by the shell 
of a nut or the haze around the glow is larger than its narrative vehicle, the kernel or the glow [...]” 
(Watt 1979, 169). Yet Conrad’s is also a “mixed” metaphor, in which the dichotomy of inside and 
outside is complexified by the semantics of ethereal and solid, transparent and opaque, and hidden 
and visible. As concerns its function as a metaphor for “Heart of Darkness” itself, the fogginess of 
the metaphor is highly appropriate. Besides the particular similarities between the image created in 
“Heart of Darkness” and V., more general parallel can be drawn: Marlow’s tale of going down the 
river Congo is clearly unlike the “yarns of seamen” with their “direct simplicity,” and the 
Stencilization of “Mondaugen’s story” explicitly undermines any illusion of directness and 
simplicity. 
 
Nünning (2004) labels this type of commentary on narration as “metanarration simulating orality,” 
because the metanarrative aspects of the text stage an oral storytelling situation (33, 38). He also 
recognizes the possibility of metanarrative commentary playing it both ways: it may refer to both oral 
and written communication, “thus oscillating between both naturalization strategies” (ibid. 33–34). 
As discussed above, V. clearly plays it both ways: in “Mondaugen’s story,” the explicit metanarrative 
commentary sustains the oral frame, but it is implicitly undermined by how within this supposedly 
oral story certain (implicitly metanarrative) aspects mark it as writing. Therefore, the evaluations we 
make of “Mondaugen’s story” depend on the interpretation given to the ambiguous narrative 
situation. 
                                                          
102 As Eddins perceptively points out in The Gnostic Pynchon, the metaphor of nacreous construction of history can also 
be taken as yet another allusion to The Education of Henry Adams (Eddins 1990, 86). 
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“Mondaugen’s story” as a Fictional Testimony 
 
While the literary framing devices and the narrative situation of “Mondaugen’s story” are fascinating 
and prominently on display, the story they frame is no less intricately literary. The frame of oral 
telling is not only problematized by the framing devices but also by certain features of the story they 
frame. Furthermore, not all of the generic frames relevant to “Mondaugen’s story” are fictional. 
Strikingly, the only circuitous references V., an American post-war novel, makes to the Holocaust are 
made within “Mondaugen’s story,” and the story circuitously incorporates within itself a fragmentary 
narrative of a systematic ethnic cleansing often considered as the immediate precedent to the mass 
murder of the European Jews. This makes Mondaugen not only the person whose experience the 
chapter represents, or perverts, depending on our stance on Stencilization. Mondaugen is also a 
potential witness of a genocide – although perhaps only in the same capacity as Stencil is a potential 
witness to an assassination. 
 
However, it is precisely the model of Stencilization that allows us to entertain the idea that a character 
in a Stencilized narrative might hallucinate or have a dream “prescribed” to him by another character 
– and yet the events within this narrative level might be no more uncertain and unreal than anything 
else in the Stencilized stories. To borrow an idea from Eric Berlatsky,103 Stencilization stands in stark 
contrast to conventions of historiography, and this is what enables it to avoid the problem of 
narrativized history in which “the real” becomes mere “realism.” It is possible to argue that the novel 
incorporates in Stencilization the possibility of being inexplicable and unverifiable, and yet more 
closely reference the historical past. (Cf. Berlatsky 2011, 139.) In V., “Mondaugen’s story” marks the 
most accentuated case of this potential. 
 
This capacity of Stencilization may be illuminated in the theoretical context of Tamar Yacobi’s 
discussion of differences between real-life testimony and its fictional counterpart (Yacobi 2005). In 
the literal, courtroom sense, testimony implies dialogue, making truth-claims, and scrutinizing their 
reliability for the end of making a judgment of both the testimony and the person giving it (ibid., 210–
211). In fiction, this situation is embedded in a context that complicates making such judgments: 
                                                          
103 Berlatsky introduces this idea in his reading of Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (Berlatsky 2011, chapter 3). 
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[S]ince fiction is a mediated framework of communication, its “reports” are devised by the implied author, 
while the virtuality of its events and representations prevents readers from directly investigating the 
reliability of fictive testimony. Hence, the very notion of (un)reliability transforms in the case of fiction: from 
fidelity to the facts, or the “truth,” toward correspondence to the implied norms of the text. (Ibid., 211.) 
 
The “virtuality” of Mondaugen’s experience of genocide poses problems to regarding the chapter as 
a testimony of historical events. In addition, Mondaugen’s fictive testimony, which consists of virtual 
events and representations, is made doubly virtual by its “Stencilization.” The ambiguity of the stories 
on the two levels has the effect of mutually reinforcing the ambiguity. Grant writes: 
 
The deliberately ambiguous status of the fragments recounting events during the von Trotha campaign [in 
1904] is a complex extension of the effect generated by the chapter’s already questionable provenance. Not 
only is the whole story “Stencilized,” but portions of it are further removed from any controlling principle of 
verisimilitude by the possibility that they may be the product of scurvy-induced dreams. (Grant 2001, 131.) 
 
What Grant refers to as the chapter’s questionable provenance is the ambiguous status of both the 
telling and the events recounted. Not only is the “Stencilized” narrative a site of contradictions in its 
own right, but here Stencil’s telling is also a retelling of Mondaugen’s telling, which is itself, one 
imagines, a recollection of past events. Park (1999) concurs that it seems impossible to distinguish 
“between events and versions, between external reality and internal construction” (844). 
 
It is possible, however, to juxtapose Berlatsky’s view discussed above with Yacobi’s claim that even 
fictional testimony becomes more complex “when witnesses report events that count as 
extraordinary” (2005, 212). Arguably, it seems that in some cases this makes fictional testimonies, or 
at least the capacity of fiction to testify, less complex. As shown above, Berlatsky’s approach, 
deliberately weighing fiction against the conventions of narrativizing history, allows the repertoire of 
the work to determine the standards by which this capacity is assessed. While the uncertainties and 
indeterminacies of the reality represented by Stencilized narratives are inescapable, they do not 
preclude reading these very narratives as serious expositions of historical events. 
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Ethics and Aesthetics of Nacreous Narration 
 
 
Peter Brooks regards Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! as a work in which there is plenty of narrating, 
as well as a discernible story set in the past, revealed in various fragments and digressions. However, 
as long they are not brought together in a plot, narrating and the story remain unmotivated and 
unconnected: 
 
[There is] narrating on one hand, an epic historical story on the other, and no narrative plot or design to join 
them. In this structure of the absent middle, the failed mediation, the problem of the rest of the novel is 
formulated: How can we construct a plot? […] On what authority? The narrative of Absalom, Absalom! Not 
only raises these issues, it actively pursues them. The novel becomes a kind of detective story where the 
object of investigation – the mystery – is the narrative design, or plot, itself. (Brooks 1992, 294.) 
 
According to Brooks, in works constructed in a particular manner, the plot or the narrative design 
becomes the mystery pursued. This can be applied to V. as well. The recurrence of V. and the figure 
of Stencil can be taken as a promise of plot, something that brings together the relentless narration of 
the novel and provides a common ground for the stories that point towards the dark turns of history 
in the 20th century. Brooks defines the plot as “something in the nature of the logic of narrative 
discourse, the organizing dynamic of a specific mode of human understanding” (ibid., 7). The absence 
of the plot, therefore, means the absence of an organizing principle. Missing plots also eradicate the 
motives of telling, and therefore become: “unable to name their sender or receiver, and unable to 
define the subject of their narrative discourse” (ibid. 292). This is an apt description of the problems 
arising in reading V. Looking into “Mondaugen’s story” may allow us to link these problems to 
particular features of narration and help us understand why the lack of motivation, which Brooks 
conceptualizes as plotlessness, is a problem of narrative ethics as well as of narrative comprehension. 
 
Stencil’s retelling of “Mondaugen’s story” transforms a short oral story into a winding tale that 
includes several further embedded stories or sequences. There are four distinct temporal moments 
within the Stencilized story: 1) that of Stencil’s telling, 2) that of Mondaugen’s telling, 3) that of 
Mondaugen’s experience in 1922, and 4) analeptic episodes taking place between 1904 and 1908. As 
already mentioned, Mondaugen’s telling is elliptically brushed over by simply mentioning that 
Stencil’s interview of Mondaugen last less than thirty minutes. The substitution of Mondaugen’s story 
for “Mondaugen’s story” is, of course, the source of the “uncertain provenance” of the analepses and 
embedded representations within the Stencilized story (see e. g. Grant 2001, 131). 
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Also, the style and tone of the story pose problems. Allusive and dense, the story is distinctly literary 
and intertextual, with the usual generic references to the spy novel supplemented with heavy doses 
of the gothic. Apart from “Heart of Darkness,” with which the story shares some of its thematics as 
well as a narrative strategy, Poe’s “The Masque of Red Death” has been read as a specific subtext for 
the chapter (Berressem 1982). 
 
Indeed, Mondaugen’s stay at Foppl’s manor is replete with phantasmagorical elements. Mondaugen 
dreams of once meeting a fellow siege inmate, Vera Meroving, the V. of “Mondaugen’s story,” during 
the Bavarian carneval. He develops a sense of “visual serendipity,” a gift which enables him to 
accidentally spy on all the right scenes and overhear all the right conversations (V., 246). He witnesses 
atrocities of colonial slavery, falls in love with a teenage girl, and meets a mysterious character whom 
he does not know (but Stencil does – it is his version of Mondaugen’s story, after all). The character 
is Hugh Godolphin, the senior partner of a father-and-son team that forms a double and a counterpoint 
to the Stencils, the disappeared father and the questing son. Mondaugen discovers and old alliance 
between Vera and Godolphin as he eavesdrops on conversations between the two. These 
conversations contain references to events of other Stencilized chapters in V. These references are, 
of course, what Stencil seeks. The problem is, as noted by Richard Patteson, among others, that 
“Mondaugen’s story” cannot answer the question whether these clues are part of Mondaugen’s 
version of the story or whether they are products of its Stencilization (see Patteson 1974, 36). 
 
All these elements stand in need of motivation: why are these things told in this manner? 
Stencilization, for all its indefiniteness and inconsistency, holds a promise of integration – by 
Stencil’s willpower, if nothing else. Throughout the novel, even outside the Stencilized chapters, we 
occasionally glimpse references to a largely occult conspiracy plot, which may be coextensive with 
the story of V. itself. This plot is called “the Big One, the century’s master cabal […] the ultimate 
Plot Which Has No Name” (V., 226). As McHoul and Wills (1990) write, Stencil’s dilemma is finding 
out whether V. “simply turns up at every earth-shattering event, or whether she is the actual cause of 
that event; whether she is real woman or simply clockwork” (180). The idea that V. might be the key 
to unlocking the organizing principle addresses the readerly desire to produce significance and 
coherence. V. as the emblem of a hidden order indicates that the uncertainty about the past, 
thematically addressed in the novel as well as thematized though the devices of Stencilization, might 
ultimately be surmountable. If, as Brooks suggests, the missing plot obscures the motives of telling 
and the pragmatics of novelistic communication, then the search for V. is largely equivalent to the 
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search for the missing plot. Each further clue about V. can be read as a renewed promise of an 
organizing principle and of the ultimate possibility of meaning and coherence.104 
 
Choosing the frame in which this aesthetic strategy is interpreted will affect readerly assessments 
about the ethics of the story, or to use the more exact term from Phelan, about its ethics of telling 
(2005, 23; 2007, 11). As we have seen, “Mondaugen’s story” gives contradictory signals about its 
relation to past events and its motives for revealing them. Eventually, the interpretation of the 
narrative strategy and aesthetic choices are often made into a part of the scholarly construction of 
“Pynchon’s theory.” In his much-cited early essay on V., Patteson comments that Pynchon’s use of 
intricate narrative structures “underscores the difficulty of piecing together historical truth and 
separating it from the purely subjective” (Patteson 1974, 32). Indeed, Patteson links the changing 
techniques of Stencilization to a kind of postmodernist and relativist view of reality. Patteson 
shrewdly notes how “Mondaugen’s story” marks the place in the sequence of Stencilized stories 
where the focus in narration moves almost entirely “to an interior world of feelings and impressions.” 
However, this is taken as evidence for the same view on history. According to Patteson, Mondaugen’s 
story proves that historical knowledge, even when gained subjectively (through Mondaugen’s 
experience) is rather like Stencil’s eight impersonations, only speculation, dream, and delirium. (Ibid., 
35.) 
 
This can be seen as a challenge to ethics, and one avenue of interpretation is clearly to conclude that 
Pynchon’s theory – his epistemology, in particular – might be one of sceptical antirealism. In the face 
of such indeterminacy of reality, is it possible to know anything? (Cf. Patteson 1974, 36; Cooper 
1983, 131.) However, this view of history is largely commensurate with more generally understood 
problematics of history in the postmodernist context. As Berlatsky writes, this is one facet of the 
Lyotardian withdrawal of the real: the ethical necessity of historical reference is recognized, yet 
defeated by the realization that history is always open to ideological manipulation (Berlatsky 2011, 
3; cf. Lyotard 1984, 77). Yet Berlatsky argues that this view of history might itself stand in need of 
revision. The postmodernist and poststructuralist antifoundationalism might need some recourse to 
                                                          
104 However, the conflicting reactions to the epilogue of V. can be seen as acts of weighing the revelatory content of the 
epilogue against the significance of the form through which it is revealed. Scholars who are suspicious of the 
epilogue tend to emphasize that the evidence of the epilogue is invalid because the epilogue is apparently not a 
Stencilized narrative. This makes the epilogue discontinuous not with the plot fragments revealed earlier but with 
the psychological motivation of the earlier fragments that is provided by Stencil, his quest, and his methods of 
recovering past events. See chapter 3.2 above. 
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objective historical reference, because if history is not something identifiable and locatable, the 
radical discourses end up undermined “subtly, but significantly.” (Berlatsky 2011, 30.) 
 
Pynchon’s critics have felt this need as well. Even while the import of the postmodernist view is 
recognized, they find ways to suggest that Pynchon’s view of history is actually subtler and still 
somewhat humanistic. In Cooper (1983), for example, the postmodernist view of history is discussed 
at length and in depth. Yet in the final analysis, Cooper presents the view of impossible insight as 
Pynchon’s critique of the world of the characters, which brings out the worst in human nature: “the 
fear of Answers, the failure of courage or will that causes one to ‘approach and avoid’ – to retreat 
from knowing” (ibid., 152). Paul Maltby, tellingly classifying Pynchon as a “dissident 
postmodernist,” also makes Pynchon’s take on indeterminacy of knowing into a humanistic comment 
on the impossibility of intellectual growth “in a culture characterized by a deficit of meaning” (1991, 
136). The divergent forces of relativist epistemology and ethical necessity seem to be in dialogue in 
Pynchon studies. As we will see below, these ideas and the judgments we base on them are connected 
to the narrative strategies used in “Mondaugen’s story.” 
 
 
Mediation Is the Message? A View from Pynchon Studies 
 
Firstly, the ethical impact of “Mondaugen’s story” on readings of V. cannot be measured only by 
seeking recurrences or patterns of ethical responses in readings. As in narrative ethics, we can see an 
indication of the ethical toll exacted by the story in the fact of (the critical act of) Saying itself. The 
volume of writings on “Mondaugen’s story” testifies to the price of reading it. 
However, certain qualitative resemblances and differences can be detected in these writings. These 
differences may be teased out by using the conceptual distinctions discussed above. Phelan (2007) 
includes in the ethics of the telling “the narrator’s relation to the characters, the task of narrating, and 
to the audience; and the implied author’s relation to these things” (11). Ethics of the telling also allow 
for considerations of ethics of storytelling, but the focus is on the text’s implied norms expressed in 
its narrative strategies. One qualitative difference in readings commenting on ethics of Mondaugen’s 
story lies in whether, and how, the intricate communication is seen as a significant factor in making 
ethical assessments. 
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The communicative structures can be seen as (ethically) significant in various ways. As discussed 
above, many have found that the Pynchonian narrative strategies express a profound mistrust of 
historical narratives and impossibility of unmediated access to events. Readings in this vein are often 
supported by evoking the self-sabotaging narrative strategies on show. One such strategy is the 
disruption of the narrative by the diegetic audience – possibly yet another Conradian echo. The 
interruption is made by Eigenvalue, to whom Stencil narrates “Mondaugen’s story,” after a passage 
which presents an unlikely encounter between two characters and involves an exposition of a 
conspiracy in a manner reminiscent of stage dialogue. The scene even includes a kind of musical 
number, a common and profoundly puzzling feature common to all Pynchon’s novels. The intrusion 
afterwards is bracketed as if to strengthen the increasingly implausible idea that rest of the chapter is 
actually Stencil’s oral narration: 
 
(Here Eigenvalue made his single interruption: “They spoke in German? English? Did 
Mondaugen know English then?” Forestalling a nervous outburst by Stencil: “I only think it 
strange that he should remember an unremarkable conversation, let alone in that much detail, 
thirty-four years later. A conversation meaning nothing to him but everything to Stencil.” […]) 
(V., 249.) 
 
Cooley (1993) comments on this incursion by emphasizing how it “foregrounds the problems of 
verisimilitude and narrative authority” (313).105 Eigenvalue’s interruption and Stencil’s anxious 
insistence on the verbatim accuracy of his report are thrown into an especially sharp relief by the 
preceding section of the story which lays bare the intricacy of its layered communicative structure: 
Stencil is telling Eigenvalue that Mondaugen (told him that he) heard a dialogue of two other 
characters – with one of them afterwards delivering a soliloquy and a song. The unfeasibility of the 
text being a verisimilar account of events in Deutsch-Südwestafrika in 1922, told some thirty years 
later in an oral storytelling situation, is further emphasized by how in the story Mondaugen happens 
to eavesdrop on the conversation because of the strange gift of “visual serendipity” he has developed: 
“a sense of timing, a perverse certainty about not whether but when to play the voyeur” (V., 246). 
Similarly, the dream-like sequences recalling the events of the Herero genocide of 1904 are often 
appraised in the light of indeterminacy cast on the events by the layers upon layers of communication. 
Simonetti (2015) writes that this strategy establishes a sustained uncertainty “among reality, memory, 
and dream” (2): 
                                                          
105 Cooley is also one of the critics highlighting the similarities between Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and “Mondaugen’s 
story” (see Cooley 1993, 313). 
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[O]ne struggles to establish whether the events experienced by or told to Mondaugen are reliable historical 
reconstructions, memories of some other character, drug-induced illusions, fictional inventions, reveries 
caused by the disease (at some time Mondaugen gets scurvy), or individual projections (ibid.). 
 
Smith agrees that “the dreaming Mondaugen is a primary source that complicates rather than clarifies 
the ‘truth’ of the past” (2005, 34). This complication is further amplified by the implication that these 
dreams may not be Mondaugen’s own, but part of the “common dream” prescribed by the “party 
demon” Foppl. Grant goes a step further by emphasizing the possible analogy between the 
“Stencilization” of the chapter and the complexity of the set pieces embedded within it. He calls 
internal structure of the chapter a complex extension of the effect of Stencilization (Grant 2001, 211). 
As this chapter has been trying to show, the uncertainty and obscurity of access to the past may be 
seen as significant in other ways. In contrast to the skeptical, often theoretically postmodernist-
leaning reading strategies of understanding “Stencilization,” we may find interpretations in which 
these aspects of V. are given other functions. According to David Cowart (2011), the novel “invites 
its readers to see history and other forms of system-making as necessary fictions, product of the 
collective human need for pattern” (56, emphasis added). In a way, then, the very indeterminacy 
enabling readings focusing on uncertainties of communication may also serve as a catalyst for another 
kind of reading, one emphasizing the possibility for a less debilitating awareness of the operations 
involved in making history speak to us.106 
 
If the tricks V. plays on narrative structures can be seen as significant in various ways, there are also 
various ways in which their importance to interpretation may be played down, and this may be done 
to various ends. Martin Paul Eve (2014) analyses another set piece in “Mondaugen’s story,” one that 
earlier in the course of the present work served as an example of mise en abyme.107 During Foppl’s 
siege party, Mondaugen’s devices for measuring atmospheric disturbances are set up in Foppl’s 
manor. Mondaugen begins to think the disturbances are a coded message, but he cannot break the 
code. This is done at the end of the chapter by another guest at Foppl’s, a lieutenant Weissmann. 
According to Weissmann, the message is a string of letters including an anagram of “Kurt 
                                                          
106 Interpretations in this vein may also be less broadly humanistic, as in Cooper (1983), who parallels the 
epistemological uncertainty of Stencilization with the 20th Century developments in scientific worldview (134–137; 
140–141). 
 
107 See chapter 2.2. 
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Mondaugen” with the remaining letters reading DIEWELTISTALLESWASDERFALLIST.108 This 
is the first proposition of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (published in the year of the 
events depicted, 1922). 
Eve approaches Mondaugen’s story from the inside out, as it were, by taking the opaquest, the most 
“unreliable” part communicated, the Wittgenstein reference acquired by a decoding of random 
atmospheric noises – all nested within the nacre of Stencilization – and treating it on one hand as a 
characterological clue and on the other hand as a thematization of a logic governing the whole novel. 
In the first place, Eve inquires: “from where does the message originate?” However, this is done in 
order to pose a question about Weissmann’s motives, not to question whether the multilayered report 
of Weissmann decoding this message is reliable. Thereafter, for Eve, Pynchon’s use of Wittgenstein 
serves as a framework for reading Tractatus. Eve finds in V. a kind of Pynchonian interpretation of 
the Wittgensteinian proposition that the world is everything that is the case (and nothing besides) (cf. 
Eve 2014, 28–30). Therefore, the question is posed on one hand locally in the world of fiction 
(characterologically), and on the other on the level of authorial philosophy. 
Eve’s reading might initially seem simplistic or even misguided to someone trained in the art of 
narratological depth-perception – an interpretive art, to be sure. However, it is evident that this 
reading reaches another kind of sophistication in weighing complex epistemologies against each other 
– one fictional and provisional, the other logico-philosophical. The choice to take a character’s 
“philosophy” at face value is a kind of strategic choice, not to treat characters as if they were real 
people – Eve explicitly disparages such a view – but to suspend the perspectivizing force inherent in 
the narratological view which assigns to each layer of communication an increasing degree of 
virtuality. 
It seems that reading literary works for their ethics is one of the areas where narratological 
conceptions of voice and communication are at once indispensable and most in need of pragmatic 
reassessment. After a fashion, the postmodernist view of history has done us the favor of 
foregrounding the role of conventions in assessing the veracity and reliability of historical narratives. 
The capability of historical narrative to be meaningful is not reducible to its veracity. 
As demonstrated in the discussion above, Pynchon scholars have in various ways emphasized that 
the ethical stakes of Pynchon’s fictions are not voided even in the face of the irreducibly indeterminate 
provenance of representation. “Mondaugen’s story” even involves a scene that can be read as a 
thematization of the enabling capability of unsolvable ambiguity. As we have seen above, Stencil’s 
                                                          
108 Translations include “The world is everything that is the case” or “The world is all that is the case.” 
176 
 
interlocutor, the intradiegetic narratee Eigenvalue, at one point makes a skeptical comment about the 
reliability of Stencil’s account. He questions how the German Mondaugen was able to understand the 
conversation between the British Hugh Godolphin and Vera Meroving (presumably an alias of 
Victoria Wren). This is the reply: 
 
Stencil, silenced, puffed his pipe and watched the psychodontist, a quirk to one side of his 
mouth revealed now and again, enigmatic, through the white fumes. Finally: “Stencil called it 
serendipity, not he. Do you understand? Of course you do. But you want to hear him say it.” 
(V., 249.) 
 
Stencil seems exasperated by this interruption, but he finally allows that not every word of his 
narrative is Mondaugen’s. “But,” he goes on to insist to Eigenvalue: “you want to hear him say it.” 
This appears to be an appeal to the conventions of storytelling. One is not to question the teller’s 
report lest one break the spell endowing the narrative with its peculiar powers. The readers of the 
Stencilized narrative may sympathize with Eigenvalue’s suspicion rather than Stencil’s defense – it 
is, indeed, an act of will to accept any information imparted by the means of Stencilization as a 
glimpse of the historical “real.” However, as the quirks of Stencilization warrant, the passage is 
ambiguous. Since Stencil refers to himself in the third person, the final sentence can be read either as 
“you want to hear Mondaugen say it” or “you want to hear Stencil say it.” The latter interpretation 
would render the passage an exchange between a fabricator who has been caught in the act and an 
interlocutor who is waiting for a concession. In Pynchon studies the latter interpretation stands 
virtually unrecognized, which perhaps shows whom we want to hear say it. 
 
So, maybe this simply proves that some events require witnessing even if they are buried beneath 
layers upon layers of ostentatious fiction. Berlatsky argues that if we look into the question of history 
and ethics, we should see that ethics can only be derived from past experience. If past cannot be 
accessed, then we are incapable of making future decisions and actions based on experience. (2011, 
36–37.) Judging by the responses in Pynchon studies it seems that in the moment of laying bare the 
duplicity of Stencilization the desire for experiential narrative trumps the desire for verifiable history. 
Later in “Mondaugen’s story,” when the atrocities of the Herero war are recounted, at three removes, 
as if hallucinated or dreamt, Eigenvalue makes no further interruptions. 
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5. Conclusions: Pynchon and Poetics, Patterns of Recognition 
 
 
Reading and writing are complementary acts that remain unfinished until 
completed by their reciprocals. The last thing I do when I write a text is to 
read it, and the act that completes my response to a text I am reading is my 
written response to it. Moreover, my writing is unfinished until it is read by 
others as well, whose responses may become known to me, engendering 
new textualities. (Scholes 1985, 20–21.) 
In the course of this book, I will say very little about its title, Doing What 
Comes Naturally. I intend it to refer to the unreflective actions that follow 
from being embedded in a context of practice. This kind of action – and in my 
argument there is no other – is anything but natural in the sense of 
proceeding independently of historical and social formations; but once those 
formations are in place (and they always are), what you think to do will not 
be calculated in relation to a higher law or an overarching theory but will 
issue from you as naturally as breathing. (Fish 1989, ix.) 
 
 
The citations chosen as epigraphs are, again, emblematizing an aspect of the issue at hand. On one 
hand, Robert Scholes proposes that reading and writing are both hermeneutic at heart, and parts of 
the same circle. In reading a text we are already producing a response to it, and in writing down a 
response we are producing something that has to be read and therefore responded to. In a sense, then, 
our readings become writings as soon as others (or we) read them in order to understand their own 
responses and their own readings (or ours). It is hardly surprising, then that the enterprise of literary 
studies is so often conceptualized in terms of community. Equally unsurprising, and perhaps less 
alarming than the rhetoric might warrant, is the frequency of expressions suggesting power struggle, 
repression and resistance, even war. The communal motion through reading, writing, reading 
readings, and writing about readings which are read as writings, already suggests why literary reading, 
interpretation, criticism, and theory veer towards the metatheoretical and metahermeneutic. Whether 
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through conflict or in negotiation, the possibility of treating the field of study as a site of tensions and 
movements suggests that if there are common goals and purposes, and one of the goals is the 
deepening of our self-consciousness about what we are doing and why we are doing it. 
 
On the other hand, as the passage from Stanley Fish provokes, however commendable the striving to 
understand what one is doing, this could always be beyond our grasp. Getting at the hidden, 
unconscious presuppositions of “theory,” which, Fish maintains, should be seen as a set of practices, 
has been a recurring battle cry accompanying various attempts to remedy theoretical blindness. 
However, Fish maintains, acknowledging that the position of pure theoretical observation is 
impossible and that we are always already interpretively situated is no way to escape the implications 
of this realization (1989, 437). 
 
Therefore, the two epigraphs propose a contrast between two procedures available to critical self-
reflection of one’s scholarly practice. Scholes’s hermeneutic movement between reading and writing 
helps us understand why observations made in reading literature are only with difficulty turned into 
academic literary criticism, but it also suggests why some literary studies can so compel us. We 
recognize that the text we are reading is written by someone who are also reading, and also that if we 
are to use this text critically, we supplement another link in the chain of reading and writing. Fish’s 
view, on the other hand, discourages taking this consideration much further – as there is no way to 
take it far enough. Try as one may, one can never be conscious of this chain in full. A certain blindness 
will always result from being embedded in a context of critical practice, and this, in effect, renders 
our efforts at producing writings on readings a kind of well-meaning folly. 
 
However, it is not suggested here that one necessarily must or, indeed, can choose one or the other of 
these positions. This work, for instance, has been informed by the recognition of the necessity of 
reading readings in order to be able to articulate one’s own. Likewise, the work undertaken here has 
been spurred by the unavoidable inadequacy or incompleteness of one’s readings of both primary and 
secondary sources, of which at least the latter are also readings turned into writings. Furthermore, 
while the attention given to secondary sources in this work may somewhat exceed the average, in a 
sense nothing is done here that is not also done in nearly all literary studies. Reading readings is an 
aspect of scholarly practice – one that may be focused on to a greater or to a lesser degree – but one 
that seems so ingrained to the practice of studying literature that it has remained undertheorized. If 
not part of what comes naturally in criticism, it is at least something that convention suggests one 
should not try to do without. 
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I also believe that the contrast made between the scholarly epigraphs above is suggestive of the 
predominant analytical procedure of the present study. In various stages of this work, a contrast 
between perceivable critical protocols has been taken as a provisional distinction, which has been 
used to analyze, if not to classify, categorize, or otherwise pigeonhole existing studies and their 
readings of Pynchon. These distinctions have been made throughout: in the introduction, a distinction 
was made between readings seeking Pynchon’s theory and reading theory with Pynchon. In the 
second chapter, it was argued that interpretive model or mise en abyme can be seen as a distinct device 
in the text but also as a protean set of conventions enabling an interpretive move of modelling the 
interpretation of the whole in a likeness of a part. Likewise, theme can be regarded as a statement of 
textual aboutness but also as a holistic interpretation of the work. The chapters of the second part 
make these heuristic distinctions even more startegically: chapters 3 and 4 are structured around the 
ideas of reading sequentially and reading for the whole; understanding narrative voice as a speaker 
function and as a voice effect. While each of the terms may describe a possible position on the issue 
at stake, these contrasts are far more usefully understood as heuristic distinctions that are capable of 
illuminating a whole range of intermediate or adjacent positions. In the course of this work, I have 
been trying to show that these heuristic distinctions are analytically useful. Moreover, I would like to 
argue that the usefulness of this maneuver does not stem from the needs of the present work alone. 
 
As has been emphasized from the beginning, this study is an attempt to discuss the various efforts to 
articulate Pynchon’s poetics. In a further move, literary poetics as an area of theoretical inquiry has 
been framed as a theory of reading. This framing has required us to consider Pynchon’s poetics as a 
question of scholarly activity as well as of textual features, themes, and significant contexts of 
Pynchon’s novels. While the Bakhtinian view of poetics as the study of the artistic expression of a 
worldview remains salient in many of these efforts, whether understated or concentrated, to discover 
Pynchon’s theory, the argument that this theory is encoded into the novels and contained in them may 
no longer be viable. We have witnessed a profound change in reception of Pynchon’s novels that 
stood as the paradigm of American postmodernism for more than three decades. As Paolo Simonetti 
writes in a recent essay, the fiftieth anniversary of V. in 2013 presented an occasion for rereading the 
Pynchon’s novelistic debut programmatically, in the institutional context of literary studies.109 
According to Simonetti, reading V. “in the light of the most recent European and American political, 
economic, and historical events,” reveals that V. foreshadows some of the most topical issues and 
                                                          
109 Simonetti and Rossi put together a panel titled “Rereading V. Fifty Years Later” in the 2013 conference organized by 
the Italian Association for American Studies (AISNA). 
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anxieties of the new millennium. (2015, 5–6.) This observation squares with other recent 
reassessments of Pynchon – notably Pöhlmann’s vaguely disquieting “We may have to stop calling 
Thomas Pynchon a postmodern writer” (2010, 9). A far cry from any type of lazy revisionism, these 
statements preface new collections of insightful and careful readings of Pynchon’s novels old and 
new. Approaching these new fortunes through the notion of poetics as a theory of reading may shed 
light on this recent turn in Pynchon studies. 
 
As it is framed here, poetics sits at the interface between phenomenology of reading and the discursive 
practices of doing criticism. While it must be obvious how analyzing discursive practices is relevant 
to understanding theoretical fluctuations on the field of study, it is perhaps not equally clear why a 
phenomenology of reading could illuminate an issue that seems chiefly institutional. The argument 
is, of course, that it is not the one or the other that is relevant, but that the issue is best seen where the 
two spheres of theorizing reading intersect – at the interface, as it were. It may be entirely 
uncontroversial to suggest that some parts of critical activity depend on tacitly applied ideas of what 
is relevant, significant and deserving of attention. Here, however, it is not assumed that the processes 
of reading automatic enough to warrant consideration as “cognitive,” can be decisively set apart from 
processes that are learned, trained, even communally negotiated – as many procedures of institutional 
interpretation are. 
 
It was pointed out in the first chapters of this work that the truly striking feature of Pynchon criticism 
is not its canon of citations, nor is it the fact that these citations are used to bolster this or that 
“coherence, logic, or position” (cf. McHoul and Wills 1990, 108; McHoul 1987, 31). It is the 
frequency with which certain key passages come up regardless of the coherence, logic, or position 
they are meant to strengthen, regardless of the interpretation they are meant to support, and regardless 
of the preselected theoretical context they deem relevant. When exploring this phenomenon, I have 
wished to resist the effective but simplistic cognitive appeal to “deviation” or “foregrounding” of the 
parts of text that invite interpretation. On the other hand, I am unwilling to pay lip service to the 
obvious fact that “textual evidence” can be selected, manipulated, and misrepresented so as to support 
any argument. It is a bad time to be saying that “truth and falsity don’t apply” – and before we chastise 
Pynchon for saying it, let us remember that in V. this statement pertains to “sewer stories” (V., 120). 
 
Poetics, understood as a theory of reading, navigates the space between literary conventions and 
readerly perception. This is the middle ground this work has tried to map. The theoretical excursions 
into interpretive models, miniature analogies, and thematization, have shown that many distinctive 
181 
 
procedures of reading straddle the line: all of them distinctly appeal to literary or artistic conventions 
and tradition, but all of them also involve an aspect that might be called cognitive, even perceptual. 
A number of conventions behind the prominence of certain passages in Pynchon scholarship have 
been explored in this work. However, as suggested in the second chapter, the question of common 
analytical patterns in readings of Pynchon is answerable only insofar as our protocols of reading allow 
a degree of methodization. The answers this study offers are found where procedures of critical 
reading blend with patterns of recognition. 
 
This study, therefore, has aimed to do more than to describe patterns detectable in previous readings 
of Pynchon’s works. The contrasting reading strategies discussed in chapters 3 and 4 also have the 
effect of foregrounding certain conventions of reading literary texts. On basis of these analyses it can 
be argued that the difficulties of reading V. often result from expectations of a psychological 
motivation behind the difficulties or inconsistencies of the novel. It has been shown that sequential 
reading and reading for the whole frequently need each other, and that voice understood as a speaker 
function and as an effect often intertwine. This in itself may be wholly unsurprising. However, it is 
interesting that even the interplay of the different reading strategies can still be seen as a route towards 
fulfilling the expectations of a psychological coherence. Whether constructed dynamically during 
reading or integrated retrospectively to a holistic interpretation, the problems and inconsistencies of 
plotting and narration are often interpreted in the light of Stencil’s compulsive quest and 
epistemological desire. Detection of pattern overlaps with expectations of significance and coherence: 
the global rationale for describing the plot and the narrative strategy coherently and adequately can 
still be to reconcile the difficulties of the literary form with the human concerns the text portrays. 
 
Readings of Pynchon’s novels regularly appeal to these conventions of reading. As has been argued 
throughout the analyses, the issues discussed in the final chapters ore often evoked in interpretations 
that are otherwise uninterested in narratological theories of plot, sequence, communication, or voice. 
The importance of these concepts to reading across the spectrum of theoretical and contextual 
approaches to Pynchon’s novels is undeniable. The inquiry into the ways in which these issues are 
evoked as interpretively significant shows that the theoretical intricacy of poetics and narratology is 
crucial to analyzing how literary analysis works. Yet it is often the subtlety and polyvalence of notions 
such as narrative sequence or narrative voice that allows for interpretive insights in individual 
readings. 
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Earlier in this work it was suggested that an inquiry into protocols and patterns of reading might 
ultimately be assessed in the light of the critical insights this method of metareading can yield. 
Delving into readings of V. not only reveals that the novel has invited readings which largely conform 
to the conventions of what Daniel Schwarz calls “humanistic poetics”110 but also suggests why this 
may be so. Criticism of V., especially during the golden era of Pynchon studies, beginning with the 
publication of Gravity’s Rainbow, has somewhat downplayed what is especially striking about the 
debut novel. When Pynchon’s third novel took the American literary establishment by storm, V. and 
The Crying of Lot 49 were often treated as apprentice work, their literary ambitions regarded as 
embryonic forms of the devices coming to full fruition in Pynchon’s magnum opus. However, V., 
predating Pynchon’s later historical novels by several decades,111 stands out among Pynchon’s early 
works by virtue of its extensive interrogation of historiographical methods, and affordances of fiction 
in accessing the past one “has no right in” (V., 62). By problematizing the relations of narrative, 
memory, experience, and historical truths, it reveals the conventions structuring our understanding of 
quests for truths buried in the past. When V. most ostentatiously undermines the reading strategies 
that can be harnessed to the psychological realism of realist and modernist narrative devices, it is 
most forcefully trying to say something about the necessity of historical imagination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 These conventions are presented as gnomic statements, including: “form discovers the meaning of content”; “Man’s 
behavior is central to most literary texts, and should be the major concern of analysis”; and “the inclusiveness of the 
novel’s vision in terms of depth and range is a measure of the work’s quality” (Schwarz 1990, 2–3). 
111 Mason and Dixon was published in 1997 and Against the Day in 2006. 
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